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ABSTRACTS 
 
 
La legislazione ambientale e la regolamentazione in materia di responsabilità sociale delle 
imprese è sempre più restrittiva tra le nazioni. Le imprese a sostenere i costi degli 
investimenti in ambientalmente e socialmente consapevole della tecnologia o dei costi di 
risanamento dei danni sociali e ambientali. Finanzieri, le banche in particolare, dovrebbero 
tener conto di tali costi nel prezzo e prestiti fornitura. In Europa, gli Stati Uniti, e la regione 
del Pacifico, molte banche sono state volontariamente valutato l'impatto ambientale e 
sociale, ma non è riuscito a trasmettere l'impatto sui prezzi. Così, dal 2005, la 
regolamentazione bancaria in Indonesia prescrive le linee guida per valutare e prezzare il 
rischio ambientale e sociale delle attività di prestito. Tuttavia, il regolamento non disciplina 
i prestiti alle proiettare attenuanti che i gas a effetto serra (GHG) di emissione1. Di 
conseguenza, solo poche banche in fattore di Indonesia l'impatto dei crediti di emissione in 
prezzi e dell'offerta di prestiti2. Prestiti a progetti che generano crediti di emissione espone 
le banche indonesiane di incertezza sul prezzo dei crediti di emissione durante la 
generazione di ulteriori entrate dalla vendita di crediti di emissione. 
 
Questo studio indaga interiorizzazione dei crediti di emissione, il rischio ambientale e di 
rischio sociale nella gestione del rischio di 51 banche indonesiane. In particolare, esamina 
l'interazione tra i prezzi dei prodotti della banca, quali prestiti e 1) di rischio-rendimento sui 
prestiti che generano crediti di emissione, 2) effetto di portafoglio di depositi a scadenza 
indeterminata, 3) prestazioni ambientali e sociali delle imprese prestiti. Il problema di 
ricerca è il seguente: 
Come sono i prezzi dei prodotti della banca associata a rischio 
rendimento sui prestiti CER generatrici, rischio ambientale, e l'impatto 
sociale delle attività di prestito? 
                                                             
1 Le emissioni di GHG sono sei gas la cui abbondanza e la concentrazione cambiano il clima, causando la 
siccità a lungo termine, l'inverno estremo, e così via (IPCC, 2001). 
 
2 Crediti di emissione sono emessi ai progetti che riducono l'emissione di GHG. 1 unità di accreditamento 
dell'emissione è uguale a 1 tCO2-eq di meno che la quantità di GHG emesso “nel commercio come di 
consueto (UNFCCC, 2001).  
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Il credito di emissione considerati in questo studio è Certified Emission Reduction (CER), 
che è l'unico tipo di problema di crediti di emissione per i paesi in via di sviluppo come 
l'Indonesia. Rischio-rendimento sui prestiti che generano CER è indagato nel contesto di 
prezzi del CER. Questo studio prende in prestito dal lavoro precedente nella dinamica dei 
prezzi di prezzo futuro di Euroepean Union Allowance (EUA), crediti di emissione 
rilasciate agli Stati membri dell'UE. Tuttavia, la causalità bidirezionale esiste 
presumibilmente tra ciclo economico e prezzi dei crediti di emissione e di energia. Quindi, 
il dynamics di CER è studiato sotto la struttura di VARMAX. I prezzi di macchia di CER 
sono usati invece di prezzi di futuro di risolvere il problema di prodotto di convenienza. I 
risultati mostrano che le scosse positive sull'economia dell'UE-27, il costo di commutare la 
tecnologia e prezzi di EUA aumenti richiedono su CER. L'estremo tempo caldo e freddo 
anche aumenti richiedono su CER. I risultati sono robusti alle misure di costi di commutare 
tecnologici e al ciclo economico. 
 
L'associazione tra crediti di emissione, del rischio ambientale e impatto sociale delle attività 
di prestito è esaminato utilizzando sulla responsabilità ambientale di Dionne e Spaeter 
(2003) e 'dealership model' of Ho-Saunder (1981). Dionne e Spaeter dimostrato quando 
costo per ripulire i danni ambientali influenza il servizio del debito, banche indirettamente 
pagare responsabilità ambientale dei mutuatari. "Dealership model" è scelto come il 
costrutto teorico poiché potrebbe catturare l'associazione tra la rifornimento di prestito ed i 
prezzi, e la rifornimento di deposito ed il costo. Il modello  è modificato per dimostrare 
l'effetto di portafoglio di deposito e l'impatto ambientale e sociale di credito. Il modello è 
stato testato su dati panel non bilanciati trimestrali di 51 banche da marzo 2005 a dicembre 
2010 I risultati sostengono modificato di “dealership model”. La differenza tra il prezzo ed 
il ritorno di deposito di maturità (deposito di termine)  aumenti il deposito di non-maturità 
(depositi di risparmio e richiesta). La differenza tra il prezzo ed il ritorno di deposito di 
maturità (deposito di termine)  aumenti il deposito di non-maturità ( depositi di risparmio e 
richiesta). La differenza tra il prezzo ed il ritorno di maturità deposito (deposito di termine) 
diminuisce il non-maturità deposito ( depositi di risparmio e richiesta). 
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 Rischio di mercato, rischio di credito, rischio di sociali, rischio di ambientali, il grado di 
avversione di rischio, il profitto aspettato, la volatilità di prezzo di CER, volume di 
transazione, ed il potere di mercato aumenta la differenza tra il prezzo di prestito ed il 
deposito (il margine di intermediazione). Il costo di contanti, il costo di opportunità di 
riserva monetaria, il requisito di riserva di liquidità ed il limite superiore di prezzi di 
deposito diminuisce la differenza di prezzo. È importante notare che la volatilità del prezzo 
dei CER non è statisticamente significativo nello spiegare la variazione dei prezzi di prestito 
a causa del piccolo volume di CER. I risultati sono robusti per l'inclusione di tempo 
variabili, clustering e heteroskedasticity in residui. 
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ABSTRACTS 
 
 
Environmental legislation and regulation on corporate social responsibility has been 
increasingly restrictive across nations. Firms often bear costs of investing in 
environmentally and socially conscious technology or costs of cleaning up social and 
environmental damage. Financiers, banks in particular should take into account such costs 
in pricing and supplying loans. In Europe, the USA, and Pacific region, many banks have 
been voluntarily assessed the environmental and social impact but failed to transmitted the 
impact into prices. Thus, since 2005, banking regulation in Indonesia prescribes guidelines 
to assess and price environmental and social risk of lending activities. However, the 
regulation does not govern lending to project abating greenhouse gases (GHG) emission3. 
Consequently, only a few banks in Indonesia factor the impact of emission credits into loan 
prices and supply4. Lending to projects generating emission credits exposes Indonesian 
banks to uncertainty about price of emission credits while generating additional revenue 
from selling emission credits.  
 
This study investigates internalization of emission credits, environmental risk, and social 
risk into risk management of 51 Indonesian banks. Specifically, it examines the interplay 
between prices of bank’s product such as loans and 1) risk-return on loans generating 
emission credits, 2) portfolio effect of non-maturity deposits, 3) environmental and social 
performance of borrowing firms. The research problem is as follows: 
How are prices of bank’s products associated with risk-return on CER 
generating loans, environmental risk, and social impact of lending 
activities? 
 
The emission credit considered in this study is Certified Emission Reduction (CER), which 
is the only type of emission credits issued to developing countries such as Indonesia. Risk-
                                                             
3 GHG emissions are six gases whose abundance and concentration changes climate, causing overlong 
drought, extreme winter, and so on (IPCC, 2001).  
4 Emission credits are issued to projects abating GHG emission. 1 unit of emission credit represent 1 tCO2 
equivalent GHG emission reduced from the amount of GHG emitted in business as usual (UNFCCC, 
2011).    
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return on CER generating loans is investigated in the context of CER prices. This study 
borrows from previous work in price dynamics of future price of European Union 
Allowance (EUA), emission credits issued to EU member states. However, bidirectional 
causality presumably exists between business cycle and prices of emission credits and 
energy. Thus, dynamics of CER is studied under VARMAX framework. The spot prices of 
CER are used instead of future prices to tackle debate about convenience yield in future 
prices of emission credits. The results show that positive shocks on the economy of the EU-
27, technology switching cost, and EUA prices increase demand on CER. Extreme hot 
and cold weather also increases demand on CER. The results are robust to measures of 
technological switching costs and business cycle.      
 
The association between emission credits, environmental risk, and social impact of lending 
activities is examined by introducing Dionne and Spaeter’s (2003) idea about environmental 
liability into Ho-Saunder’s (1981) dealership model. Dionne and Spaeter demonstrated that 
when cost to clean up environmental damage influences debt service, banks essentially bear 
part of borrower’s environmental liability. The dealership model is selected as theoretical 
construct since it could capture the association between loan supply and prices, and deposit 
supply and cost. The dealership model is modified to demonstrate portfolio effect of deposit 
and the environmental and social impact of lending activities. The model is tested on 
unbalanced quarterly panel data of 51 banks from March 2005 to December 2010. The 
results confirm the modified dealership model. Supply of non-maturity deposit (i.e. savings 
and demand deposits) increases with spread between prices of maturity deposit (i.e. term 
deposit) and return on invested maturity deposits in money market. On the other hand, 
supply of maturity deposits decreases with spread between prices of maturity deposit and 
return on invested maturity deposits in money market.  
 
Spread between loan and deposit prices, known as intermediation margin, increases with 
market and credit riskiness of bank’s products, environmental and social performance of 
borrowing firms, degree of risk aversion, expected profit, price volatility of emission 
credits, transaction size, and market power. The price spread decreases with operating cost, 
opportunity cost of cash reserve, liquidity reserve requirement, and upper bound of deposit 
prices under mandatory deposit insurance scheme. It is important to note that price volatility 
v 
 
 
of emission credits is not statistically significant in explaining variation in loan prices due to 
small number of banks factor emission credits in loan prices. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of time variables, clustering, and heteroskedasticity in residuals.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Problem Background 
This study investigates statutory approach in internalizing environmental and social impact 
of lending activities into risk management process in banks. Specifically, it examines the 
use of loan prices to factor risk-return on projects generating emission credits, 
environmental risk, and social impact of borrowing firms into risk management of 
lending activities. The study is based on 51 commercial banks in Indonesia that 
represents 90% of total loan in the country. The sample consists of three state owned 
banks, 20 branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks, and 28 of local banks. Below 
explains the necessity of internalization and testing statutory approach for the 
internalization.   
 
Benefits and costs of producing and consuming goods and services are often spilled 
over parties uninvolved in the production and consumption process. For instance, 
electricity production that reduces greenhouse gases (GHG)5 emission costs electricity 
buyers. However, benefit from emission reduction is spilled over parties who do not buy 
the electricity. Another example is conversion of rain forest to palm oil plantation. The 
conversion enormously reduces underground water and costs farmers surrounding the 
plantation. Thus, some costs of producing palm oil are externalized to parties 
uninvolved in trading palm oil. Both examples show that market prices often do not 
reflect full benefits or costs of production and consumption process. Mishan (2007) 
noted four practical approaches to correct such market failure: (1) government’s 
command and control by limiting the amount of pollution or requiring firms to install 
pollution control device, (2) market based approach such as tradable emission credits, 
(3) social norms such as consumers supporting green labelled products, (4) economic 
policy instruments such as tax and subsidy. 
 
                                                             
5 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defined six GHGs emitted from production and 
consumption process whose abundance and concentration changes climate. The climate changes such as 
overlong draught and extreme winter might damage human wellbeing and economic activity. The report 
also highlighted GHG emission abatement as one of two most important measures to tackle climate 
change (IPCC, 2001).  
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This study focuses on using government intervention and market based approach to 
internalize unpriced benefits and cost into cost of fund, loan prices in particular. 
Government intervention takes form environmental legislation and regulation on 
corporate social responsibility mandate parties who are responsible for degrading 
quality of environment and wellbeing of society to amend the damage. Paying the 
victims, cleaning up the contaminated sties, or spending on preventive devices incurs 
additional costs to the firms. The adoption of market-based approach at international 
level such as Emission Trading System (ETS) allows firms operating in countries where 
local ETS does not exist to generate additional revenue. The firms might sell Certified 
Emission Reduction (CER) when their projects or operations produce GHG emission 
less than the amount of emission under business as usual scenario. Either additional cost 
or additional revenue should be taken into account by buyer and seller of goods and 
service as well as fund suppliers on productive and consumptive investment. Otherwise, 
financiers overestimate firms’ financing needs, financial capacity to repay while 
underestimating risks inherent in the funded projects.  
 
In practice, financiers, particularly banks in Europe, the USA and Pacific region are 
aware of the abovementioned cost and revenue. However, they do not have 
benchmarking and reference of best practices to precisely quantify the cost and revenue, 
and transmitted them into prices of bank’s products (Rhee and Lee, 2003; Thomson and 
Crowton, 2004; Köllner et al, 2004; McKenzie and Wolfe, 2004; Weber et al 2008; 
Chave, 2010). Jeucken (2001) and Labatt and White (2002) found that the risk-return on 
trading emission credits is often found missing in pricing loans. Lack of knowledge of 
factors influencing risk-return on trading emission credits and of consolidating small-
scale projects are found to be the main reason. Gouldson and Murphy (1998) argued that 
in such situation regulatory intervention on internalization should be extended from 
borrowing firms to banks. In other word, regulation should also prescribe methodology 
or guidelines for banks to identify, measure and price the externalities.  
        
Gouldson and Murphy’s (1998) idea implies that firms’ liability to mitigate 
environmental and social risk of their activities should be extended to banks. There is a 
growing body of literatures on using regulation to extend firms’ liability to mitigate 
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environmental risk to banks (Jin and Mengqi, 2010; Pitchford, 1995; Boyer and Laffont, 
2007). Dionne and Spaeter (2003) demonstrated a more comprehensive setting of 
mandatory transmission of environmental risk to loan prices. They proposed that when 
banks do not have access to full information about how borrowers allocate fund to 
productive and preventive investment, environmental risk exposure is extended to bank 
with loan size as the upper bound. The model however neglects the notion that loan 
price and supply is dependent on fund supplied to banks. Thus, loan prices and supply 
might also be influenced by factors influencing fund supply such as portfolio effect and 
regulatory costs. It is also important to note that the abovementioned studies do not take 
into account social impact of lending activities and risk-return on loans to projects 
generating positive externalities such as emission credits.        
 
To the author knowledge, the explicit considerations of the risk-return on lending to 
projects generating emission credits together with environmental and social impact of 
lending activities is lacking in practice and economic literature. Few countries might 
mandate banks to manage environmental risk of lending activities but do not govern 
social impact of lending activities. Indonesia, in contrast, has mandated banks to assess 
and price environmental and social risk of lending activities since 2005 (Bank 
Indonesia, 2005). The regulation requires banks operating in Indonesia to reserve 
provision to absorb environmental and social risk of lending activities. The provision, 
which is transmitted into loan prices, should tracks environmental and social 
performance of borrowing firms that is published by Ministry of Environment. The 
firms’ performance is rated based on how important community development in firms’ 
corporate social responsibility initiatives, and how well firms in reducing, reusing, 
recycling, and recovering wastes or pollutants. The rating does not comprise assessment 
on risk and return on trading positive externalities such emission credits. Consequently, 
banks that do not have expertise in and knowledge of ETS do not price risk and return 
on trading emission credits. Clearly, even in country mandating environmental and 
social risk management on lending activities, risk-return associated with trading 
emission credits might be not be factored in loan prices and supply. Understanding 
about price dynamics of emission credits is pivotal to factor emission credits into loan 
prices and supply. 
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Three issues need to be clarified since they form the background information required to 
address the research questions in next section. First, this study aims to correct problem 
in the existing economic model for internalizing environmental risk. Economic 
literatures on internalization of environmental externalities typically ignore 
interdependency between fund supply and demand. From bank perspective, prices of 
fund demanded (loan prices) are dependent on prices of fund supplied (deposit prices). 
Two seminal banking theories have been widely used to explain interdependency 
between fund supply and demand. The first theory is micro-banking model that borrows 
from neoclassical analysis of firms. Banks are assumed as administrators of a country’s 
payment system. Thus, they might raise fund from one economic agent and lend it back 
to another economic agent. Banks set size of loans such that the ratio of net price over 
gross price is equal to inverse elasticity of demand for loan (Pyle, 1971 and 1972; Klein, 
1971; Baltensperger, 1980). The second theory, dealership model correct the assumption 
about banks as price takers. In reality, banks set loan prices to influence the size of 
loans, not the other way around. Banks also expose themselves to interest rate risk by 
taking position in money market whenever demand on loans does not match supply of 
deposits (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Allen, 1998; Maudos and Guevara, 2004). Thus, in 
this study dealership approach is modified to explain how environmental and social risk, 
emission credits and other factors are transmitted to loan prices.       
 
Second issue needs to be addressed is about CER6 prices used in this study. ETS is 
structured such that market price of emission credits is revealed when marginal cost of 
switching from emission intensive technology to low emission technology equals 
marginal benefit from buying emission credits. Therefore, the impact of factors 
irrelevant to technological switch such as project risk and convenience yield are 
removed in this study by using spot price of CER in the secondary market. Thus, this 
study does not resort to previous works concerning CER prices such as Mansanet-
batallier et al (2011) and Chevallier (2011) that focus on prices of future contract and 
consider some measures of project risk. In practice, project risk is not observable in the 
                                                             
6 CER is issued by registry administrator of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a secretariat in the 
United Nation. One unit CER represent one tCO2 equivalent reduction in GHG emission. The reduction 
is calculated from GHG emitted under business as usual (UNFCCC,   
4 
 
 
market since we do not have information about the origin of the project producing CER. 
Moreover, convenience yield embedded in the future price of emission credits has been 
found change in sign when different measure for the yield and statistical techniques are 
employed (Borak et al, 2006; Homburg and Waner, 2007; Daskalakis et al, 2008).   
 
The third concern is related to a growing body of literatures on price dynamics of 
emission credits draws different conclusion about directional relationship between 
prices of emission credits and factors such as business cycle. Business cycle and prices 
of low emission energy has been found important in explaining price dynamics of 
emission credits. Nevertheless, extreme high price of emission credit might slow down 
business activities and increases prices of low emission fuel (Kiriyama and Suzuki, 
2004; Chesney and Tachini, 2008; Ruijen and Vuuren, 2009; Keppler and Bataller, 
2010). These studies concern about future prices of European Union Allowances (EUA) 
that are emission credits issued by the EU ETS and freely allocated to firms in the EU 
member states. However, the conclusion might be drawn from CER price formation 
since more than 80% of demand on CER comes from the EU ETS (UNFCC, 2011).  
 
This study takes into account the possible weakening relationships between CER and 
EUA that is by the inclusion of CER in ETS of countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand. Vector autoregressive with moving average and explanatory variables 
(VARMAX) is considered the most appropriate model to understand dynamics of CER 
prices. There are two phases of data collection in this study. The first phase is banking 
survey in April 2011 that is discussed in details in chapter 3. Electronic questionnaires 
are sent to the executives of 66 banks by adopting purposive sampling. Bank 
supervisors directed the questionnaires to bank personnel responsible for pricing bank 
products and for assessing risks of lending activities. The 66 bank represent 97% of 
total loan in Indonesia and consist of three state owned banks, branches of ten foreign 
banks, subsidiaries of 16 foreign banks, and 37 national banks. The second phase is 
collecting time series of endogenous exogenous variables influencing demand of CER. 
The endogenous variables are technological switching cost, prices of CER substitute 
(i.e. EAU prices), business cycle, and electricity prices. Electricity prices represent 
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demand side from the largest buyers of CER, electricity producers. Exogenous variables 
considered in the model are extreme weather and international policies on CER.  
 
To demonstrate the interplay between risk-return on CER generating lending, 
environmental and social risk, and loan prices and supply, banking data of 51 banks is 
collected from compliance reports. Environmental and social risk rating is retrieved 
from Ministry of Environment database. The regulatory report provides contractual 
prices of bank products which should generates less bias estimation than using 
accounting income and expenses and proxy for prices. The report also provides loss 
provision for each borrowing firms, including loss provision associated with 
environmental and social risk. 
 
 
1.2. Statement of Research Problem 
As discussed above, despite significant interest in risk-return of trading emission credits 
as well as environmental and social risk of lending businesses, there is still a lack of 
research investigating banks’ practices for factoring the three issues into their credit 
processes. Specifically, less research has been conducted in examining the associations 
between three issues and prices of bank products. With the view to filling the gaps in 
previous literature, the purpose of this study is to address the research problem:  
How are product prices (i.e. price of products on asset and liability side of bank) 
associated with risk-return on CER generating lending, environmental risk, and 
social risk of lending activities in Indonesian banks. 
  
Two research questions are developed in order to address this research problem.  
Research Question 1:  
What factors are important in the dynamic of CER price, hence dynamic of CER risk-
return?  
Research Question 2:  
Are risk-return in fund raising and portfolio effect as important as risk aversion, 
transaction size, operating and regulatory costs in pricing loan, and other products?  
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Research Question 3:  
How are price and supply of loan and other products associated with CER risk-return, 
environmental risk, and social impact of lending activities associated with? 
 
  
 
1.3. Contribution 
As mentioned in section 1.1, the economic literatures on environmental externalities 
neglect to address social impact of lending activities, risk-return on loans generating 
emission credits, and interdependency between fund supply and demand. Banking 
literatures might address the latter but fail to capture the first two issues and the impact 
of deposit portfolio selection. Additionally studies on emission credits have focused on 
future prices of EAU. In light of these, as the study likely to be the first to investigate 
the integration of emission credit, environmental risk, and social risk of lending 
activities, this study contributes to theory in several ways.  
 
First, it provides new empirical evidence about the linkage between economic cycle, 
technology switching, emission credit, and energy in the spot market. Hitherto, there is 
no study to investigate the role of fungibility between emission credits on sCER and the 
joint role of energy and emission credits to the economy. Second, it relaxes the 
assumption about deposit in dealership model by introducing non-maturity deposit. 
Thus, the modified dealership model could accommodate high earnings and marketing 
cost on banks heavily depending on non-maturity deposits. Third contribution is 
providing alternative of theoretical construct that represents the internalization of 
environmental and social risk of lending activities as well as risk-return on loans 
generating emission credits. 
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Part II 
Deposit Portfolio Effect on Prices 
 
Part I 
Risk-Return of Emission Credits 
 Conceptual implication of deposit portfolio 
effect on prices and its association with 
traditional risks, under Dealership approach  
 
Case Study: Indonesian Banks 
 
Empirical study on determinants of 
variation in sCER prices under 
VARMAX 
 
Part III 
Internalization of externalities and 
Prices 
 
Conceptual implication of emission credits 
generating loans, and environmental and 
social risk of lending activities on prices, 
under Dealership approach  
 
Case Study: Indonesian Banks 
1.4. The Structure of the Thesis 
Figure 1 illustrates the linkage of the chapters and the mere structure of three major 
parts of the thesis. 
 
Figure 1 Structure of the work and linkage of chapters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first paper (chapter 2) investigates the dynamic linkage between prices of emission 
credits and cost of technology switching, economic cycle and energy in the spot market. 
Vector autoregressive moving average procedure with exogenous variables and 
conditional variance is employed. The second paper (chapter 3) builds on Ho-Saunder’s 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 3: On the Determinants 
of Loan Prices 
Chapter 2: Dynamics of sCER 
Spot Prices 
Chapter 4: Internalization of Environmental 
Externalities and Social Development 
Chapter 5: General Conclusion 
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(1981) idea that banks act as “dealers” in money market when they receive deposits or 
disburse loans. Ho-Saunders (1981) model is extended to capture the impact of deposit 
and earning asset portfolio on price and demand of bank products. The extended model 
is tested on contractual prices of bank products to minimize potential bias estimation. 
The third paper (chapter 4) internalizing the impact of risk-return of CER generating 
loan as well as environmental and social risk of lending activities into the modified 
dealership model in the second paper. The assumption on environmental and social risk 
borrows from extended partial liability theory (Dionne and Spaeter, 2003). This model 
is also tested on Indonesian data. 
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CHAPTER II DYNAMICS OF sCER SPOT PRICES 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Only recently, attention has been paid to price formation of Certified Emission 
Reduction (CER). Even Mansanet-bataller et al (2011) found that their work is the first 
empirical study concerning CER prices. Generally, empirical studies on emission credits 
are devoted to European Union Allowance (EUA). EUA has been traded long before the 
introduction of CER in the EU emission trading system (ETS), and become the world’s 
largest market for emission credits. Thus, market price formation of EUA is relatively 
easier to observe than other types of emission credit. Nonetheless, EUA, like other types 
of Assigned Allowance Unit (AAU) is traded exclusively in the ETS allocating EUA 
(i.e. the EU ETS). In contrast, two other types of emission credits created under the 
Kyoto Protocol, CER and Emission Reduction Unit (ERU)7, can be traded across ETS. 
Therefore, CER market is likely to grow and diverge from EUA market with increasing 
number of new emerging ETS such as Australia and New Zealand ETS. 
 
There are two notably empirical works concerning CER prices. Both works used prices 
of future contract on CER (Mansanet-Bataller et al, 2011; Chevallier, 2011) and 
borrowed from previous works on EUA future prices. Both papers consider the 
fungibility of CER and EUA. The fungibility has helped boost CER market to be the 
world’s second largest market for emission credits after EUA market. The results 
indicated that interdependency between CER and EUA market might exist. This is 
expected since nearly 88.62% of demand on CER in 2011 came from the EU-27 
member states (UNFCC, 2011). Nonetheless, demand is likely to emerge from new ETS 
such as Australia, New Zealand, and Japan where CER is allowed to substitute AAU. 
The implication of CER inclusion into new ETS is not only on market growth of CER 
but also on interdependency between CER and EUA market. In the long run, the two 
                                                             
7 Under emission trading scheme, Removal Units (RMUs), Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs) could be transferred to annex B countries to meet their target in GHGs mitigation. RMUs are 
generated from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) activities, while CERs and ERUs are generated 
from other market based mechanism (UNFCCC). 
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markets might diverge and share fewer common factors, which should be taken into 
account in empirical study on CER prices. 
 
It is important to note that Mansanet-Bataller et al (2011) and Chevallier (2011) 
examined price dynamics of future contract on CER. In practice, CER futures contracts 
assume risk of undelivered CER, which evolves across stages of Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects. The evolution of such risk is difficult to observe since 
market participants in the secondary market can not trace back the origin of CDM 
projects. The use of future prices also raises issues about convenience yield estimation. 
Both papers also have strong assumption about relationship between economic 
activities, energy prices and demand on emission credits which might be implausible 
when we test it against previous works such as Mansanet-Bataller et al (2007), Convery 
and Redmond (2007), Alberola et al (2007, 2008) and Chevallier (2009a). These works 
indicated that directional causality and the sign of relationship between variables might 
change when time series belong to different phase of ETS.  
 
Therefore, the contribution of this study has twofold. Firstly, it provides new empirical 
evidence about the linkage between economic cycle, technology switching, emission 
credit and energy in the spot market. Hitherto, there is no study to investigate the role of 
fungibility between secondary CER (sCER) and EUA in the spot market, and the joint 
role of energy and emission credits to the economy. Secondly, this study employs 
cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Moving Average with eXogenous variables 
(VARMAX) procedures with conditional variance on cointegrated series. This 
methodology allows us to examine the dynamic linkages of variables, in particular are 
the importance of macroeconomic and energy shocks on emission credits.  
 
The results show that prices of EUA and sCER are influenced by the state of the 
economy in the EU-27 since the EU ETS is the biggest market for sCER and EUA. 
Thus, any investment decision associated with sCER needs to take into account business 
cycle in the EU ETS member countries. Second, price dynamics of sCER move in 
conformity with market expectation about fuel switching cost. Third, profit maximizing 
electricity producers should take into account changes in interdependency between 
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emission credits and fuel switching cost. Limit on CER import in the EU ETS might 
explain that the shocks to sCER count for less than 3% of variability in EUA. In 
contrast, EUA shocks count for 8% - 28% of fluctuation in sCER. In the short run, 
positive shocks on CER and EUA put pressure on industrial productivity in the EU-27. 
Business cycle in the EU-27 counts for 1% - 6% while profit margin of electricity 
producers and fuel switching costs explain 7% - 30% of the variability in sCER. These 
factors explain less than 10% - 20% of variability in EUA. The transmission of positive 
shock on CER into electricity prices is much slower than the transmission of positive 
shock on EUA. Shocks on CER put pressure on electricity demand for about six months 
while the impact of EUA shocks takes less than one month before electricity price 
jumps. Positive shocks on CER increases fuel switching cost and put pressure on profit 
margin for electricity producers in the region. Positive shocks on fuel switching cost, 
profit margin for electricity producers, and industrial productivity in the EU-27 
increases CER demand. Positive shocks on electricity price immediately put pressure on 
CER and EUA demand. After one month, CER and EUA demand picks up, which 
indicates that   
 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
2.2.1. Market structure of emission credits and CER issuance 
CER is one of three emission credits created to accommodate developed countries to 
commit to and developing countries to participate in Kyoto Protocol, an international 
treaty that binds industrialized countries to reduce GHG emission. The two other 
emission credits are Emission Reduction Unit (ERU) and Assigned Allowance Unit 
(AAU). AAU comes with different terms across ETS. For instance, EUA is AAU 
allotted to regulated sectors in the EU ETS while Carbon Finance Instrument (CFI) is 
AAU for member states of Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in North America. EUA 
market has become the world’s largest market for emission credits and CER market 
comes second. CER market is considerably younger but more liquid than ERU market, 
which has operated since 2011. One unit of CER is worth the same as one unit of ERU 
or AAU i.e. one metric ton of CO2 equivalent (tCO2–eq).  
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There are at least three distinguishable features of CER. Firstly, CER has been traded 
across ETS. Theoretically, ERU can be traded across ETS but only the EU ETS has 
allowed ERU to substitute AAU. Thus, CER and ERU markets are dependent of 
demand and supply of AAU. In contrast, AAU is traded exclusively where ETS 
regulates the AAU. For instance, EUA is allocated to 11,000 power stations and 
industrial plants in EU-27 member countries, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein8. EUA 
can be traded within the EU ETS and is not valid in ETS such as New Zealand 
Emissions Trading Scheme, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, and Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Therefore, regardless negative signal from Japan, Canada 
and US on international emission abatement beyond 2012, markets for CER and ERU 
might keep growing.  
 
Australia has incorporated project-based mechanism into its emission trading schemes 
for compliance period July 2012 – June 2014 and July 2014 – July 2015. The country 
has not so far imposed restriction on CER import. New Zealand also allows the use of 
CER for unlimited amount during its transition period July 2010 – December 2012 
while capping the price of its AAU, which is known as New Zealand Units. CER import 
is also allowed in Regional GHG Initiative (RGGI), Midwestern GHG Reduction 
Accord (MGGRA), and Western Climate Initiative (WCI) during their compliance 
periods. RGGI is cap-and-trade scheme for CO2 from power plants for compliance 
period January 2009 – December 2018. The scheme comprises some states in 
Northeastern US and provinces in Eastern Canada9. MGGRA has shorter compliance 
period of January 2012 – December 2018 and fewer states member in US and Canada10. 
WCI has the same compliance period as MGGRA but involves different states and 
provinces in US and Canada11.  
                                                             
8 The EU ETS has been extended to airlines in 2012 as well as petrochemical, ammonia and aluminium 
industries in 2013.  
9 RGGI member states are Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, NY, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The scheme also comprises province Pennsylvania, 
Quebec, New Brunswick, Ontario in astern Canada.  
10 MGGRA member states are Iowa, Illinois, Kansan, Manitoba, Michigan, Minnesota plus province 
Wisconsin in Canada.  
11 WCI consists of provinces states British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec in Canada. The US 
states that are also members of the initiates are Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah 
and Washington. 
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The second distinguishable feature of CER is, like ERU, a project based emission credit 
while AAU is allotted to regulated sectors. Although it is difficult to trace back the 
origin of the project once CER enters the market, market prices of future contracts on 
CER and ERU assume project risk. The third feature of CER is its issuance to Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in developing countries, and its sales to GHG 
emitters in developed countries that are listed in annex B of Kyoto Protocol. On the 
other hand, ERU is issued to projects in annex B countries and sold to other annex B 
countries.  
 
Similar to EUA, CER is traded in forward, future and spot market. The first CER 
futures were launched in Nymex in February 2008. EEX, ECX and Bluenext are among 
exchanges followed the suit in 2008. CER spot market was opened in January 2008 by 
Climex and August 2008 in Bluenext. The latter has become the largest spot market for 
CER in terms of trading volume. Where CER is traded implies phase of CDM project 
that generates CER. CER can be traded in forward and future market once CDM 
Executive Board (CDM EB) registers the associated project as CDM project. To be 
registered as CDM project, a project owner should have his Project Design Document 
(PDD) approved by Designated National Authorities (DNA) in host country of the 
project. The document incorporates baseline approach, calculation on net emission 
reductions, monitoring plan, etc. The approved PDD is submitted to Designated 
Operational Entity (DOE)12 that will validate the project. After validating the project, 
DOE submits validation reports and PDD document to CDM Executive Board (CDM 
EB).  
 
Once CDM EB registers the project as CDM project, project owner could initiate the 
project and monitoring plan. At this stage, DOE verifies emission reduction in the 
project and submits verification report to CDM EB. Based on DOE’s report, CDM EB 
issues CER to project owner. Once CER is issued, project owner is able to sell CER in 
the spot market. PointCarbon (2010) found that sometime CDM EB refuses to issue 
                                                             
12 DOE is an independent auditor to validate PPD and assess the implemented projects. DOE is accredited by CDM 
EB (UNFCCC) 
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CER or issues fewer CER than project owner’s calculation. Thus, CDM registration 
does not guarantee issuance of CER.  
 
2.2.2. sCER price formation 
2.2.2.1. Primary and secondary CER (sCER) 
Primary market CER generally facilitates trading on forward contract or Emission 
Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA). Thus, price formation in the primary markets 
results from negotiation between buyer and project owner on the expected emission 
credit from the CDM project. Such price reflects seller’s expectation on market price of 
CER on the delivery date and buyers' risk perception on acquiring emission credit in the 
future. Sellers’ expectation on CER market prices is typically not derived from prices of 
primary CER since this price is not freely available. Instead, they infer CER prices from 
prevailing market price of sCER and floor price imposed by host country’s DNA.  
 
From buyer perspective, risk evolves across stages of project development. This is 
because many registered CDM projects fail to deliver the expected volume of emission 
credits. Therefore, CER prices climb along project’s progress, implying evolution of 
risk of cost overrun, technology and delivery at each stage of project development. 
PointCarbon (2010) estimates prices of CER at PIN/concept stage are within range 
€8.25 – €9.75/tCO2e in January 2010. CER price rises to €9 – €10/tCO2e as project 
progress to PDD or validated stage. When the project is registered as CDM project, 
CER price moves up by €10 – €11.5/tCO2e, and reaches €11 – €12.5/tCO2e once CER is 
issued. Green (2008) noted that risk on primary projects also depends on how candour 
host country of DNA about project procedures and approval, counterparties’ 
creditworthiness, CER distribution as well as buyer’s control  over CER issuance.  
 
Aside from inherent risk across project stages, arrangement of risk sharing between 
buyer and seller also determines prices of primary CER. Buyers will agree on the lowest 
possible price if they bear major risk in each stage of project development and are 
willing to buy credits even if those credits are finally found illegible for CDM. The 
prices rise when sellers are willing to assume more risks and increase commitment to 
deliver fixed volume of CER. Nordseth et al (2007) illustrated that price could be €6 – 
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€8.5/tCO2e higher when buyers assuming most risks than price if sellers assuming all 
risks.  
 
PointCarbon (2010) found that buyers are willing to pay premium price for CER 
produced from particular types of projects. For instance, price of generated CER in wind 
power is higher than that of hydropower due to World Commission on Dam. High 
average transaction cost in small-scale CDM project puts pressure on prices of CER 
from such project. Therefore, it is obvious that discovery of fundamentals of primary 
CER is convoluted. Nonetheless, CER prices are observable once primary CER is 
traded in the secondary market. 
 
Secondary market for CER is created to facilitate trading on delivered CER, guaranteed 
to be delivered CER or CER giving compensation for undelivered emission credits. 
sCER contracts are standardized and generally separated from risk inherent in CDM 
project. The contracts could be futures, spot, options, structured product or secondary 
guaranteed forward contracts. Any form of the contract does not provide buyers access 
to the origin of CDM projects. Thus, buyers might unknowingly buy CER from a bulk 
of CDM projects. Accordingly, prices in sCER market are less likely to be determined 
by types, location and stage of CDM project development as well as country risk, 
political risk, credit risk and risk sharing scheme. Prices tend to be driven by demand 
and supply of CER as well as of that of CER’s substitute.   
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2.2.2.2. sCER spot and derivatives markets 
Of all forms of exchange-traded contracts, futures and spot contracts have been the most 
actively traded contracts. One unit contract in either spot or futures markets, typically 
represents 1,000 units of CER. The failure in delivery usually forces sellers to 
compensation buyers as much as market value of CER at delivery dates. Prices of 
futures contracts imply risk associated with development stages of underlying projects. 
Figure 2 shows futures prices of CER in the three biggest futures market (i.e. Bluenext, 
European Climate Exchange and Nasdaq).  
Figure 2 sCER futures prices 
 
Sources: Bluenext, ECX and Nasdaq OMX 
 
Price disparity of future contracts expired in December 2011 and 2012 were large across 
markets. Futures prices in Nasdaq-OMX (CER_omx) and in Bluenext (CER_bn) were 
extremely higher than prices in ECX future markets (CER_ecx) prior to March 2009. 
Nasdaq-OMX and Bluenext future markets were young during this period. As liquidity of 
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both markets increased, prices in Nasdaq-OMX and Bluenext future markets converge to 
prices in EEX.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates how prices of sCER future contracts expired in December 2011, and 
expired in December 2012 moved in the same direction as sCER spot prices. 
Figure 3 CER spot and futures prices 
 
Source: Bluenext  
 
The price co-movement might be partly driven by the fact that CDM project owners 
often refer to current sCER price as ceiling price for primary CER. The future prices 
also clearly precede dynamic of spot prices. Thus, the expected spot prices might 
significantly determine futures prices.   
 
Unlike other commodities, prices of CER futures have exhibited backwardation 
structure with being temporary flipped to contango. Theoretically, futures prices 
become cheaper than today’s spot contract when there is insufficient supply in the spot 
market. This might not be the case for CER futures markets. Instead of insufficient 
supply, restriction on demand side might be responsible for the backwardation structure. 
The EU ETS as the biggest buyers of CER has imposed CER-import limit. Each country 
member of the scheme allows CER making up only a small percentage of emission 
reduction compliance. Aside from this, regulated sectors might prefer bank CER now at 
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low cost of storage to anticipate the new imposition. The EU ETS allows CER transfer 
between 2008 – 2012 commitment periods and 2013 – 2020 commitment period. CER 
transferability coupled with EU ETS auction on all EUA and EU ETS extension of 
GHGs types as well as regulated sectors, are likely to increase demand on emission 
credits from 2012 onwards. Buyers anticipating a persistent up-trend in spot prices 
might prefer to buy and bank issued CER for unanticipated use in the future. Sellers 
might also find that cashing in CER in spot markets might protect them from adverse 
changes in CER roles in linking directive across nations. Additionally, delivery versus 
payment in the spot market might be also responsible for the high spot prices. 
Immediate exchange of CER instead of future exchange moves delivery risk from 
buyers to sellers. Sellers in the spot markets also expose themselves to the unanticipated 
downshift in prices at delivery date. Hence, premium prices on spot contract 
compensate sellers for bearing delivery and price risks. Therefore, it is clear that price 
fundamental of CER spot contracts is more straightforward than CER futures. Spot 
prices are absent from riskiness of underlying CDM projects, and likely to fully reflect 
supply-demand of CER.  
 
 
2.2.3. Shortcoming in carbon price research 
2.2.3.1. Common factors for sCER and EUA 
Previous studies found empirical evidence that prices of emission credits particularly 
EUA move in tandem with factors such as land temperatures, energy prices, 
macroeconomic indicators and climate change policy (Mansanet-Bataller et al, 2007; 
Alberola and Chevallier, 2007, 2008 and 2009). Among those factors, energy prices 
impact have gained most attention since combustion installation alone makes up more 
than 65% of regulated installations in the EU ETS (European Commission, 2010). 
Energy prices as well as fuel-switching cost evidently correspond to EUA prices (Bailey 
et al, 1998; Montero and Ellerman, 1998; Paolella and Taschini, 2008; Seifert et al, 
2008; Chesney and Tachini, 2008; Lewis, 2008; Blyth et al, 2009; Ruijen and Vuuren, 
2009). Keppler and Bataller (2010) found different fundamentals structure between 
phase I and phase II EU ETS. During phase I, coal and gas prices influenced CO2 
futures prices through the clean dark and spark spread, which in return influenced 
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electricity prices. During phase II EU ETS, the reverse effect was found. In contrast, 
several authors claim that reverse effect was found in Phase I (Kiriyama and Suzuki, 
2004; Blyth et al, 2007; IEA, 2007; Yang et al, 2008). Additionally, Daskalakis and 
Merkellos (2009) show that returns on EUA spot price increases with electricity risk 
premium. Thus, there is some common ground about factors influencing carbon prices. 
Nonetheless, there is no agreement about the sign and magnitude of the effect of each 
factor on carbon prices when different sample periods and proxies are used.  
 
Cointegration between sCER and EUA spot prices is revealed when future prices are 
used in the analysis. Therefore, modelling sCER prices often resorts to price modelling 
for EUA. Mansanet-Bataller et al (2011) claiming their study as the first attempt to 
analyze price determinants of sCER, find that sCER and EUA share common factors. 
The common factors are institutional events, energy prices, weather events and 
macroeconomic variables. Macroeconomic variables are extracted from microstructure 
literatures. Among these variables are indicators of tracking past economic trends, 
economic sector’s sentiment, impact of credit crunch crisis, euro area yield curve, 
aggregate market volatility, and carbon market trend. Nonetheless, only brent, coal and 
gas prices as well as momentum in sCER market and increasing link between European 
and international market for emission credit have statistically significant impact on 
sCER futures prices.  
 
Although the two emission credits might share common factors, Chevallier (2011) 
found that sCER and EUA future prices responded differently to macroeconomics. He 
used latent factors in Bernanke et al (2005) in Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive 
(FAVAR) model setting. Macroeconomic shocks were defined as shocks to 115 
macroeconomic, financial and commodity indicators. The results showed that recession 
shocks pushed EAU futures prices down but simultaneously had driven sCER prices up. 
Intuitively, recession shocks slow down emission economic activity and reduce 
emission production. In result, slacken demand on emission credits pushes price of 
emission credit down. Chevallier did not provide explanation about positive response of 
CER futures prices to recession shocks. The use of future prices might be the reason for 
diverse response between the two emission credits.  
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Future prices for commodity are hypothetically influenced by convenience yield. 
Homburg and Wagner (2007) showed that spot – futures parity within a trading period 
could be explained entirely by the cost-of carry approach, implying negative 
convenience yield. On the other hand, Borak et al (2006) found evidence that future 
contracts issued in phase I and mature within phase II implied significantly positive 
convenience yield. Similarly, Daskalakis et al (2008) provided evidence that prohibiting 
emission banking results in positive convenience yield. Aside from convenience yield, 
future prices are often found to be determined by volatility of prices of underlying 
assets. This might also be the case for sCER future prices as risk varies across CDM 
project stages, location and types. Lastly, the introduction of spread trading which is 
constructed from the spread between EAU future prices and CER future prices also 
influence price behaviour of CER and EUA. Thus, excluding such factors might 
misconstrue the analyses on sCER and EUA future prices.  
 
 
2.2.3.2. Emisison, energy prices and economic cycle exogeneity 
Interestingly, empirical evidences about casualty relationship between economic activity 
and energy prices are ambiguous. Milani (2009) suggested that oil shocks influences 
output and inflation. Further, Brown et al (2011) concluded that energy per capita 
fosters economic growth and development in term of GDP per capita. This oil price 
acceleration – GDP interplay has been increasingly stronger since early 1980s 
(Naccache, 2010). In contrast, Sadorsky (2002) and Naccache (2011) found that 
macroeconomic factors such as dividend yield, T-bills yield and market portfolio excess 
returns, have significant forecast power in oil future markets. Killian and Vigfusson 
(2011) suggested unidirectional causality from energy prices to macro economy. They 
also pointed out asymmetric responses of aggregate real output to positive and negative 
oil price shocks during 1970s and 1980s. Oil price shocks have reallocation effect 
throughout the economy such as shifting to energy efficient goods. The reallocation 
effect boosts the recessionary effects of the loss of purchasing when real oil price 
unexpectedly increases. If the real oil price unexpectedly, the reallocation effect partly 
counterbalance increased expenses due to gains in purchasing power. Interestingly, 
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Belke et al (2010) found different evidence about long run relationship between 
economic growth and energy prices. They investigated real GDP, energy price and 
consumption in 25 OECD countries from 1981 to 2007. They found evidence of mutual 
causal relationship between the three variables.  
 
In a broader setting, Ruijen and Vuuren (2009) gave evidence that energy uses 
decreases during economic recession. Inelastic energy supply coupled with increasing 
energy prices typically put pressure on energy consumption, hence slows down 
economic activity. Therefore, production of GHGs emission usually decreases during 
economic recession. However, when oil and gas prices are extremely high, the impact of 
oil and gas prices is unclear. High oil and gas prices might drive economic agents to 
switch to either coal or cheaper alternative energy. Coal is historically cheaper than oil 
and natural gas for the same heat or energy content, but higher amount of GHGs 
emission. High-energy prices can also have significant impact on other commodities 
e.g. steel used in producing low emission energy such as wind energy. Thus, for 
countries lacking of cheap technology for low emission scenario, high oil and gas prices 
might be followed by up trending prices of emission credits. However, where low 
emission energy can be cheaply produced, high oil and gas prices decreases demand on 
emission credits. Thus, the conclusion about the interplay between energy prices, macro 
economy and carbon prices varies across sample period and methodology. This raises 
possibility of interdependency among the three factors.  
  
 
2.2.3.3. Effect of fungibility among emission credits 
International linking directive adopted in the EU ETS and the ETS in countries such as 
Australia and Canada results in fungibility across types of emission credit. Although the 
EU ETS imposes import limit on CER, other countries do not adopt similar approach. 
This could be the cause of price disparity across emission credits (see figure 4).  
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Figure 4 Spot prices of sCER, EUA and ERU 
 
Prices of EUA, sCER and ERU move in tandem, implying common factors shared 
among three series. Nonetheless, sCER has been traded at discount to EUA in the spot 
markets since their introduction to the EU ETS. On average, sCER prices have been 
slightly higher EUR0.05 than ERU prices on average. Secondary ERU has been traded 
just since early this year; hence, the discount price might not matter to sCER spot 
prices. On the other hand, EUA spot contract has been more expensive by EUR1.89 
than sCER spot contract on average.  
 
Price disparity allows profit-maximizing firms to minimize costs associated with 
emission abatement. The exchange traded outright spreads, futures spreads and futures 
strips enable firms to arbitrage between prices. Interestingly, price disparity between 
EUA and sCER has been growing since the beginning of 2009. CER import limit might 
prevent prices of the two-emission credit from converging. Still, the interplay between 
markets for emission credits might significantly determine spot prices of sCER. 
Although studies on price spread between sCER and EUA usually assume sCER prices 
are determined by EUA (e.g. Mansanet-Bataller et al, 2011 and Chevallier, 2011), there 
has been no evidence to refute the possibility of reverse effects. Moreover, the lack of 
CER import limit in the ETS outside the EU ETS might boost market liquidity of CER; 
reduce correlation between two prices in the long. 
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2.3. Data 
The empirical model is estimated for sample period August 12, 2008 to May 31, 2011, 
which is the longest available series for daily spot prices of sCER during Kyoto 
Protocol compliance period (i.e. from 2008 to 2012). This compliance period coincides 
with phase II the EU ETS allowing bankability and transferability of AAU within 
compliance period. Log return of sCER (cer) and EUA (eua) are calculated from daily 
spot prices of sCER and EUA, which are obtained from Bluenext, the largest spot 
market of sCER, in terms of volume. Other variables are based on the assumption that 
supply and demand sides of electricity are also influenced by technology switching cost 
and stage of the economy respectively. Thus, four dummy variables as exogenous 
variables and 8041 observation for 11 endogenous variables are estimated in VARMAX 
model framework. Summary statistics of all endogenous variables are detailed in table 
1. 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
 cpi ipi cer eua cg og cds cdso css epi 
Mean 111.09 96.02 -0.001 -0.001 -18.160 16.238 15.617 -4.722 1.950 -0.0003 
Median 110.47 95.90 0.000 0.000 -17.232 15.771 12.081 -4.681 -0.630 -0.003 
Max. 115.93 110.44 0.094 0.105 1.615 36.660 49.921 -2.210 32.225 0.351 
Min. 108.24 86.20 -0.102 -0.103 146.152 2.587 -9.557 -7.819 -25.162 -0.365 
Std. Dev. 1.945 5.776 0.022 0.023 10.00 8.176 11.428 0.922 13.537 0.077 
Skewness 0.727 0.381 -0.350 -0.304 -0.274 0.591 0.499 -0.635 0.476 0.195 
Ex. Kurtosis -0.247 -0.626 3.131 2.833 -0.319 -0.428 -0.746 1.684 -0.852 3.281 
Obs. 753 753 753 753 753 753 753 753 753 753 
 
 
 
2.3.1. Electricity prices and energy prices 
Power plants across Europe use different energy sources i.e. coal/peat, crude oil, oil 
products, natural gas, nuclear, hydro, biofuel and waste, wind, etc (IEA, 2011). 
Accordingly, production costs of electricity are determined by energy prices. Variable 
(epi) denotes log return on electricity prices. Since up-scaling electricity production 
calls for more energy, energy prices can be classified as variable cost of electricity 
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production. Kurry and Harrington (2010) found that variable cost of power plants 
operating under emission cap-and-trade regime is also determined by cost associated 
with emission credits. The higher electricity output, the higher amount of energy being 
fired; hence, the amount of emission being emitted moves up as electricity production 
increase. As the power generators are allocated a certain amount of AAUs, they should 
ensure that electricity production does not emit GHGs above their emission cap. 
Otherwise, they should either buy emission credits or switch to low emission 
technology.  
 
Assuming prices of emission credits could be fully passed on end buyer of electricity, 
electricity prices moves in accordance with prices of emission credits as well as energy. 
Nonetheless, for power plants do not use GHGs contained energy such as wind power 
plants, their production costs are independent of prices of emission credits. Thus, 
IPCC’s 2006 list of emission factors is used to determine GHGs contained energy13. The 
list shows that oil (crude oil as well as oil production), natural gas and coal are classified 
as GHGs contained energies. Thus, daily average spot prices of the three energy types 
are specified as exogenous variables. Daily brent oil prices ( oilP ) are daily brent price 
index calculated by Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Spot prices of natural gas ( gasP ) 
and coal ( coalP ) are obtained from European Energy Exchange (EEX) which is the 
biggest spot market for energy in Europe. Richard Bay prices are proxy for coal prices 
since Richard Bay is the Europe’s main sources for coal firing power plants).  
 
As oil, natural gas and coal are among IPCC’s list of GHGs contained energy, the three 
energy types are used as the basis identifying ten biggest electricity markets in EU 
region that might be significantly affected by emission credit prices. Among the ten 
electricity markets, UK, Germany, Spain and Italy rely heavily on coal, gas or oil. The 
fuels compose more than 50% of energy sources in electricity generators in the four 
markets (IEA, 2011). Thus, electricity price is calculated as daily average base load – 
electricity prices in the four markets weighted by trading volume (EEX, OMEL, Elexon, 
                                                             
13 Emission factor is measured in gtCO2-e/J. PCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) is a sub body of 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) which assess 
current stage of climate change and its potential socio-economic and environmental impacts (IPCC) 
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GME). Under the assumption that all power producers are profit maximizing firms, 
electricity price index should move in tandem with prices of emission credits, oilP , gasP  
and coalP  as illustrated in figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Spot prices of energy, emission credits and electricity 
 
Spot prices of coal and oil brent have moved altogether. Identical trend also appears in 
sCER and EUA prices. Thus, the four series might share common factors. Prices of 
energy and emission credits slipped during global financial crises before shifting the 
trend up around December 2008. Electricity prices appear to be lagged behind in 
following the price dynamics of energy and emission credits. Coal prices reached the 
through in March 2009, implying different structural break in the trend across series.   
 
 
2.3.2. Clean dark spread and clean spark spread 
Decision on production schedule of electricity is for the most part determined by cost of 
electricity generation, after taking into account cost of energy/fuel and emission credits. 
This cost is known as clean dark spread for coal firing plants and as clean spark spread 
for natural gas firing plants. Lets’s Pelectricity: electricity prices,TE : thermal efficiency, 
2CO : tCO2-e of GHGs emitted in producing per KWh electricity and 2COP : prices of 
emission credits. Dark spread (ds) and spark spread (ss) are usually calculated in similar 
fashion as follows: 
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fuel
fuel
yelectricit TE
P
Pspread    
Thermal efficiency (TE) is the ratio between the produced heat and heat content of 
consumed fuel as follows: 
10  TE
Q
QTE
in
out   
For the calculation of the spread, average historical thermal efficiency of power plants 
in OECD countries is used. Thermal efficiency of natural gas, crude oil and brown coal 
is 0.4, 0.37 and 0.34 respectively (IEA, 2008). As prices of crude oil are in USD/barrel, 
oil prices are converted to EUR by using daily exchange rate from European Central 
Bank. Nonetheless, oil prices reflect prices of oil per barrel whilst coal prices are in 
EUR/ton. Thus, oil prices in EUR and coal prices are converted into the same unit as 
natural gas prices (i.e. in EUR/MWhtherm) by using IEA’s default conversion factor. 
Thus, using electricity price index as proxy for electricity prices, ds  and ss  become 
while spark spread (ss) is 
993.6
1
34.0
 coal
P
epids kcal/kg 
4.0
gasPepiss   
Then, clean dark spread (cds) is defined as 
22 CO
coal PCOdscds    
and clean spark spread (css) is defined as  
22 CO
gas PCOsscss   
For oil firing power plants, synthetic spread is calculated in similar fashion. Let’s 
denote dso: spread and cdso: clean spread. 
61.1
1
37.0
 coal
P
epidso kcal/kg oil equivalent 
22 CO
oil PCOdsocdso     
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Figure 6 Clean dark spread, clean spark spread and clean spread of oil 
Profit maximizing firms produce electricity on a baseload basis when the spread is 
positive. Figure 5 implies that taking into account prices of fuel and emission credits 
only, coal-firing plants were better off by producing electricity on a baseload basis. On 
the other hand, natural gas and oil power plants made losses by producing electricity on 
a baseload basis. It is important to note that the spreads exclude operational costs and 
other generating costs. Thus, negative spread does not necessarily show loss of revenue 
in producing baseload-electricity. Nonetheless, the spread might give signal that a 
mixed-technology power plant should switch from its normal running scenario to its 
alternative scenario such as running its wind turbine, or vice versa. Additionally, given 
common trend between oil and coal prices, common factors might influence clean spark 
spread and clean dark spread.   
 
 
2.3.3. Cost of technology switching  
Recalling the emission cap-and-trade scheme, the scheme aims a global technology 
switching to low emission technology. Technology switching of a power plant occurs 
when cost to generate low emission electricity is cheaper than generating cost in a 
normal running scenario. Thus, technology switching across power plants might 
influence prices of emission credits and energy. In switching technology, operators 
consider energy prices against the amount of produced energy. It is due to variation in 
energy content across types of energy. The most efficient energy will always be at top 
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of technology choices in a power plant. According to Howell and Buckius (1987) the 
energy efficiency of a power plant is generally proxy as thermal efficiency. In addition 
to thermal efficiency, emission content also varies across types of energy. IPCC (2006) 
set default for emission factor representing the amount of tCO2/MWh in each type of 
energy. Emission factor for oil-fired plants is 0.264tCO2/MWh whilst factors for lignite 
coal fired and gas fired plants are 0.364tCO2/MWh and 0.202tCO2/MWh respectively. 
Therefore, the impact of technology switching is proxy as fuel switching cost.  
 
Estimation of fuel switching cost follows Fehr and Hinz (2007) which principally is 
comparable to Tendances Carbone methodology introduced in Mansanet-Bataller 
(2011) and Chevallier (2011). If the heating rates of fuel i in kcal/kg hi is defined as 
factor conversion
TE
h
i
i 
1  
and the amount of GHGs emitted in producing 1 MWh electricity for each type of fuel   
( iCO2 ) is  
i
ii
TE
EFCO 2  
 where EFi is emission factor of fuel i, then cost to switch from fuel i to fuel j (cij) is 
ij
iijj
ij COCO
PhPh
c
22 

   
 
Figure 7 Fuel-switching, electricity and emission credits spot prices 
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Figure 7 shows that switching cost from oil to gas (c_og) has been more expensive than 
emission credits prior to October 2008. During this period, buying emission credits 
incurs lower cost than abating emission in oil firepower generation. On the other hand, 
cost associated with emission is higher than cost to switch fuel from coal to gas (c_cg) 
for some electricity producers. If high fuel-switching cost is found in most producers, 
high fuel-switching cost will push sCER and EUA demand up. Hence, in the long run 
sCER and EUA prices will move toward the fuel-switching cost (assuming electricity 
prices are stable).  
 
 
2.3.4. Economic cycle 
Emission intensive economic activity influences demand on emission intensive energy. 
Empirically, extreme high-energy prices slowed down the economy, decelerating 
accumulation of GHG emission. Thus, indexes are used as proxy of economic activity. 
The indexes are obtained from data of EU-27 member states since more than 95% 
global demand on emission credits coming from this region (UNFCCC). First index, 
harmonized index of consumer prices (cpi) of all goods and services is a weighted 
average of price indices of countries adopting the euro, aggregated by a harmonized 
methodology and using year 2005 as base year. The index describes inflation in member 
countries of European Union and used in assessing member countries compliance with 
convergence criteria on inflation14. The second index, industrial production index (ipi), 
index theoretically shows the evolution of adjusted output of main industry and uses 
year 2005 as base year. The index is a business cycle indicator measuring changes of 
production output level in the main industry. The main industry comprises intermediate 
goods, capital goods, consumer durable, consumer non-durable and energy sector.  
 
Eurostat provides monthly data for the two variables. Thus, daily data for the two 
variables is reproduced by using Piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating polynomial 
procedure. The routine finds value of an underlying interpolating function f(x) at each 
                                                             
14 The euro convergence criteria or the Maastricht criteria are four main criteria based on article 121(1) of 
the European Community Treaty for any member countries of European Union enter the third stage of European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adopt the euro as their currency (Lipinska, 2008). 
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sub interval ݔ௞ ≤ ݔ ≤ ݔ௞ାଵ, to the given values and certain slopes at the two endpoints. 
Let hk denotes the length of kth sub interval, its first divided difference k   
kkk xxh  1  
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then, the slope of the interpolant at kx  is given by 
)(' kk xPd   
P’(x) is continuous and P”(x) might be jumps at xi. The slope kd at xi should ensure that 
the function P(x) keeps the monotonicity and shape of data. By using piecewise cubic 
Hermite interpolation, function P(x) on the kth  interval is  
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where kxxs  , 1ky  is daily data to be reproduced (Fritsch and Carlson, 1980). Oil 
prices in EUR is denoted as x since a wide range of dynamic general equilibrium models 
such as TIMER model in Ruijen and van Vuuren (2009) found that oil prices and 
economic growth/output move in tandem. 
 
After deriving kd , the interpolant is evaluated using  kkkk bscssdyxP
32)(      
kc  is coefficient of quadratic term given by 
 
h
dd
c kkkk
123 
 , 
and kb  is coefficient of quadratic term given by 
2
12
h
dd
b kkkk

  
The procedure could reproduce daily data closer to observation during sample period, 
than daily data reproduced by procedure such as linear or cubic spline interpolation.  
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Figure 8 Indicators of the economy 
 
Industrial output and market activity dropped to the through during period December 
2008 – March 2009, and have bounced back ever since. Considering energy prices 
started to pick up in December 2008, energy prices might give signals about the 
direction of the economy in the future.  As demand on energy to fuel economic activity 
in the future increases, prices of emission credits expectedly increases.   
 
 
2.3.5. Extreme temperature and the impact of climate change policy 
Consumption of energy and electricity might vary across years due to temperature 
changes. During warm days, people consumption of energy and electricity picks up to 
operate air conditioning system. UK’s default base temperature of 15.5°C and 22°C 
defines when heating and cooling systems are likely to operate (DEFRA).  
Figure 9 Mean temperature in EU-27 countries 
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The heating system is assumed to operate when outside temperature falls below 
threshold for heating day (i.e. below 15.5°C). Simultaneously, cooling system is likely 
to run when outside temperature rises above threshold for cooling day (i.e. above 22°C). 
Variable heating days (hdd) takes value one whenever heating system is assumed to 
operate. Variable cooling day (cdd) takes value one when cooling system is likely to 
run. Daily outside temperature is retrieved from European Climate Agency, averaging 
temperature recorded by 22 stations scattered across the 27 member countries of EU. 
Figure 8 clearly shows that heating system operates only during winter while cooling 
system runs in summer in Europe. Thus, prices of energy, electricity and emission 
credits in Europe are expected to seasonally increase.    
 
Aside from extreme temperature, announcement of EUA allocation to EU member 
countries and countries compliance with emission target might significantly determine 
prices of emission credits (Chevallier et al, 2009b; Bataller and Pardo, 2009). 
Intuitively, other factors associated with the changes in climate change policy and 
realization of global emission target should influence demand and supply of emission 
credits. Thus, a broader measure, news takes value one on any announcement of 
UNFCCC’s climate policy as well as policy associated with AAU and CDM under ETS 
of EU, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada and the USA. The variable also takes 
value one on the posting date of national action plan and GHGs monitoring data.   
 
 
2.4. The Model 
This section describes the econometric strategy used to estimate the parameters of the 
model and the identification method. The model is specified by using the Vector 
AutoRegressive Moving Average with eXogenous variables (VARMAX) procedure. 
The VARMAX could be partitioned into Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) and Vector 
Moving Average (VMA). VAR treats all variables in the model symmetrically by 
including for each variable an equation explaining its evolution based on its own lags 
and the lags of all the other variables in the model. No prior knowledge is required 
except for specifying which variables should enter the system. The VAR(p) refers to 
VAR model of order p with general form 
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௧ܻ = ∑ ܣ௜ ௧ܻି௜௣௜ୀଵ +ݑ௧ , 			ݑ௧~ܹܰ(0, Σ௨)	 (2.4.1) 
where tY  is ݊ × 1 vector of endogenous variables, ܣ௜ is ݊ × ݊  matrix of parameter of 
lagged endogenous variables, and tu  is ݊ × 1  vector of white noise error terms that are 
called structural impulses or innovations. Innovations have zero mean, positive definite 
covariance matrix Σ௨	and no serial correlation across time. Structural innovations are 
identified by assuming recursively contemporaneous interactions among variables, by 
imposing a certain ordering of the variables.  
 
The moving average terms of VARMAX is denoted as VMA(q) where q is the order of 
moving average terms. The basic form of VMA(q) is as follows 
௧ܻ = ߤ௧ + ݑ௧ + ∑ Θ௝ݑ௧ି௝௤௝ୀଵ   (2.4.2) 
where ߤ௧ is the expectation of ௧ܻ, and Θ௝ 	is ݊ × ݊  matrix of parameter of moving 
average terms. Adding Eq.(2.4.2) and r exogenous variables into Eq.(2.4.1), generates 
the VARMAX (p,q,r) process as follows 
௧ܻ = ∑ ܣ௜ ௧ܻି௜ +௣௜ୀଵ ݑ௧൫1 + ∑ Θ௝ݑ௧ି௝௤௝ୀଵ ൯ + ∑ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧௥௠ୀଵ  (2.4.3) 
where tX  is ݉ × 1 vector of exogenous and ϕ௠ is ݊ × 1  vector of coefficient of 
endogenous variables (Lütkepohl, 2005). 
 
In some cases, variance of current innovation u is not a function of the actual size of 
previous innovation but a function of squared of previous innovation. Thus, the 
conditional model is written as the following VARX (p,r) form 
௧ܻ = ∑ ܣ௜ ௧ܻି௜ +௣௜ୀଵ ∑ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧ 	+	ݑ௧௥௠ୀଵ  (2.4.4) 
and 	ݑ௧	 follows AutoRegresive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) process as in 
Engle (1982).  
ݑ௧	 = ߪ௧ݖ௧ 
ߪ௧
ଶ = ߙ଴ + ∑ ߙ௜ݑ௧ି௜ଶ௦௜ୀଵ  (2.4.5) 
where ߙ଴ > 0, ߙ௜ ≥ 0. 
ߪ௧denotes time dependent standard deviation, ݖ௧ is a random variable drawn from a 
Gaussian distribution such that ݖ௧~݅. ݅. ݀(0,1), and s is the order of ARCH lag.  
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Eq.(2.4.4) is constructed under the assumption of stationary time series I(0). 
Differencing I(d) variables d times is a common approach to work in VARMAX setting. 
Nonetheless, differencing often distorts the interplay between the original variables. If 
two or more variables might share a common stochastic drift, the linear combination 
between I(d) and I(0) variables are stationary. In section 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, graphical 
presentation of time series indicates that EUA, sCER, clean dark spread, and clean spark 
spread prices might be cointegrated. Thus, the possibility of the presence of 
cointegration should be taken into account instead of fitting VARMAX model upon 
differencing. Assuming multiple time series are cointegrated of order d, the data 
generating process can be represented as a vector error correction model (VECM) of the 
form 
∆ ௧ܻ = Π ௧ܻିଵ + ∑ Γ௕∆ ௧ܻି௕ାଵௗ௕ୀଵ + ∑ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧ 	+	ݑ௧௥௠ୀଵ  (2.4.6) 
which also can be written as 
௧ܻ = (1 + Π + Γଵ) ௧ܻିଵ − ∑ (Γ௜ିଵ − Γ௜) ௧ܻି௜ௗାଵ௜ୀଶ + ∑ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧ 	+	ݑ௧௥௠ୀଵ  (2.4.7) 
 
Eq.2.7 can be rearranged in VARX(p,r) representation 
௧ܻ = (ܫ + ߙߚ′) ௧ܻିଵ + ∑ ܣ௜ ௧ܻି௜௣௜ୀଵ −∑ ܣ௝ ௧ܻି௝௣௝ୀ௜ାଵ + ∑ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧ 	+	ݑ௧௥௠ୀଵ  (2.4.8) 
where ݌ = ݀ + 1. 
 
Thus, Γ௜ and Π in eq. 2.6 can be expressed as Γ௜ = −∑ ܣ௝௣௝ୀ௜ାଵ   
 Π = ∑ ܣ௜ − ܫ௣௜ୀଵ 	  
Matrix ߙߚ′ represents error correction term and	ݑ௧	 is assumed to be ARCH(s)  process. 
ߚ is ݊ × ݀ cointegration matrix representing the long run behavior of endogenous 
variables whilst ߙ is ݊ × ݀ marix of adjustment parameters. Matrix of Γ௜ represents 
݊ × ݊  matrix of the speed of short run adjustments of each endogenous variable to the 
long run equilibrium.  
 
In the identification stage, preliminary estimates for d are obtained using Johansen 
(1995) cointegration test. The test does not need pre-test variables in the system to 
determine integration order of variables. The space of a cointegrating vector is spanned 
by stationary variables in the model. Thus, through the vector, a stationary variable will 
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reveal itself that it is I(0) instead of I(1). Defining Π = (ܫ + ߙߚ′−Γଵ), four assumptions 
are considered as follows  
ܪଵ(݀):		Π ௧ܻିଵ + ෍ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧ = ߙߚ′ ௧ܻିଵ௥
௠ୀଵ
 
ܪଵ(݀):		Π ௧ܻିଵ + ෍ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧ = ߙ(ߚ′ ௧ܻିଵ + ߩ଴)௥
௠ୀଵ
 
ܪଵ(݀):		Π ௧ܻିଵ + ෍ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧ = ߙ(ߚ′ ௧ܻିଵ + ߩ଴) + ߙୄߛ଴௥
௠ୀଵ
 
ܪଵ(݀):		Π ௧ܻିଵ + ෍ ϕ௠ܺ௠,௧ = ߙ(ߚᇱ ௧ܻିଵ + ߩ଴ + ߩଵݐ) + ߙୄߛ଴௥
௠ୀଵ
 
 
Theoretically, stationary variables in the system will not raise a problem albeit the 
methodology is usually used when all variables in the system are I(1). The Johansen’s 
test however is used in the setting where structural break does not present in the 
variables. In the previous section, structural breaks appear in some variables during 
global crisis in 2008. Thus, cointegration test introduced in Arai and Kurozumi (2010) 
is used to confirm results of Johansen’s test.  Arai and Kurozumi tested null hypothesis 
of cointegration with unknown structural break against no cointegration relationship. In 
this test, a dummy variable is defined as 
߮௧ = ൜0					݂݅	ݐ ≤ [݊߬]1					݂݅	ݐ > [݊߬] 
where [݊߬] denotes break dates and ߬	represents break fraction. 
Three forms of a structural break are considered 
ݕଵ௧ = ߤଵ + ߤଶ߮௧ఛ + ߚ′ݕଶ௧ + ݁௧,														ݐ = 1,⋯ , ݊ 
ݕଵ௧ = ߤଵ + ߤଶ߮௧ఛ + ߙݐ + ߚ′ݕଶ௧ + ݁௧,														ݐ = 1,⋯ ,݊ 
ݕଵ௧ = ߤଵ + ߤଶ߮௧ఛ+ߚ′ଵݕଶ௧ + +ߚ′ଶݕଶ௧߮௧ఛ + ݁௧,														ݐ = 1,⋯ ,݊ 
For each assumption, ∆ݕଶ௧ = ݒଶ௧ , 
݁௧ = ߛ௧ + ݒଵ௧ , 
ߛ௧ = ߛ௧ିଵ + ݑ௧, 
ߛ଴ = 0. 
The null hypothesis corresponds to ݁௧ = ݒଵ௧ 
36 
 
 
 
Subsequently residuals from the models undergo diagnostic checks to determine 
whether the residuals behave like white noise. In the case of autocorreleated or 
heteroskedastic residuals, preliminary estimates for s are obtained using simultaneous 
inspection of auto and partial correlations functions (Box and Jenkins,1976).   
 
Based on the abovementioned preliminary values, the actual VARMAX(p,q,r) 
parameters are estimated using linear procedures by transforming Eq.(2.4.8) into state 
space model supported by MATLAB.  
ܨܴ(ܤ)ܨܵ(ܤ௦௘௔௦௢௡) ௧ܻ = ܩ(ܤ)ݑ௧ + ܣܴ(ܤ)ܣܵ(ܤ௦௘௔௦௢௡)ݖ௧ 
B is the lag operator, ݑ௧ represents exogenous variables and ݖ௧ is innovation which are 
defined by 
ܩ(ܤ) = ܩ଴ + ܩଵܤଶ + ܩଶܤଷ + ⋯+ ܩ௣(ܤ௣) 
ܣܴ(ܤ) = ܫ + ܣܴଵܤଶ + ܣܴଶܤଷ + ⋯+ ܣܴ௤ܤ௤ 
ܣܵ(ܤ) = ܫ + ܣ ଵܵܤ௦௘௔௦௢௡ + ܣܵଶܤଶ௦௘௔௦௢௡ + ⋯+ ܣܵ௣ିଵ(ܤொ௦௘௔௦௢௡) 
while endogenous variables ௧ܻ are defined by their lagged values 
ܨܴ(ܤ) = ܫ + ܨܴଵܤଶ + ܨܴଶܤଷ + ⋯+ ܨܴ௣(ܤ௣) 
and the seasonal effects 
ܨܵ(ܤ) = ܫ + ܨ ଵܵܤ௦௘௔௦௢௡ + ܨܵଶܤଶ௦௘௔௦௢௡ + ⋯+ ܨܴ௣ܤ௣௦௘௔௦௢௡ 
Thus, VMA term is represented as ܣܴ(ܤ) and ܣܵ(ܤ)	represents seasonality in 
innovations. The conditional moment of innovations are also transformed into state 
space model in the same fashion.  
 
To interpret the cointegrated VARMAX(p,q,r) model, structural form of the model is 
summarized in impulse response functions and variance decomposition. The impulse 
response function describes the in-sample effect of a typical shock to the system and can 
provide economic interpretation of the behaviour of the system. As deterministic terms 
and exogenous variables do not influence impulse response analysis, such terms do not 
have effects on the main results. The impulse response functions refer to the coefficient 
matrices of the vector moving-average (VMA) representation of the structural model. 
Thus, plotting the impulse response functions against time allow visual examination on 
the dynamic behaviour of variables in response to various structural shocks. In addition, 
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the vector moving-average representations imply that the forecast errors are a linear 
combination of structural shocks. Variance decomposition on the other hand is typically 
used to decompose the forecast error variances into the proportions due to each 
structural shock to examine the roles played by structural shocks in causing the 
fluctuations of a variable at different time horizons. Thus, variance decomposition 
illustrates the importance or relative share of variance that each structural shock 
contributes to the total variance of each variable.  
 
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Empirical model estimates 
Stationarity of endogenous variables are tested under Augmented-Dickey Fuller and 
Phillip Perron unit root test, with null hypothesis that each variable is I(1). The test 
results are confirmed by KPSS stationary test (Kwiatkowski et al, 1992), ERS Point 
Optimal (Elliot et al, 1996) and Ng-Perron test (Ng and Perron, 2001).  
Table 2 Unit root and stationarity test 
  
cpi ipi cer eua cg og cds cdso css epi
ADF -5.272*** -4.220*** -3.152*** -2.960*** -1.190 -3.576*** -4.546*** -3.245*** -2.015** -0.869963
ADF - c -5.269*** -4.224*** -3.152** -2.960** -1.727 -3.576*** -4.544*** -3.245*** -2.008 -2.436442
ADF - t -5.269*** -4.242*** -2.910 -2.780 -1.699 -3.582** -4.548*** -3.249* -2.555 -2.490850
Ng-Perron (MZa) - c -2.076 -2.779 0.124 0.006 -1.908 -0.093 -2.882 -0.054 -7.878* -3.23104
Ng-Perron (MZt) - c -0.997 -1.103 0.112 0.005 -0.902 -0.094 -1.022 -0.051 -1.973* -1.22273
Ng-Perron (MSB) - c 0.480 0.397 0.909 0.898 0.473 1.014 0.355 0.940 0.250* 0.37843
Ng-Perron (MPT) - c 11.596 8.590 48.875 46.562 11.988 56.012 8.085 49.664 3.157* 7.53855
Ng-Perron (MZa) - t -5.614 -8.285 -2.363 -1.937 -6.164 -1.205 -10.801 -1.528 -8.26903 -12.2505
Ng-Perron (MZt) - t -1.554 -2.012 -1.055 -0.952 -1.704 -0.691 -2.323 -0.829 -2.03008 -2.4072
Ng-Perron (MSB) - t 0.277 0.243 0.447 0.491 0.276 0.574 0.215 0.542 0.2455 0.1965
Ng-Perron (MPT) - t 15.985 11.077 37.197 44.927 14.766 63.046 8.441 55.092 11.0312 7.81858
KPSS  - c 0.403  0.538** 0.567* 0.380* 1.473*** 0.392** 0.544** 0.302 1.613*** 1.707***
KPSS  - t 0.403***  0.538*** 0.284*** 0.349*** 0.625*** 0.392*** 0.544*** 0.302*** 0.437*** 0.726***
c: non zero mean in the test specification
t: deterministic time trend in the test specification
Ho: series has unit root
Ho: series is stationary
Reject Ho at 1% level of significance(***), 5%(**), 10%(*)
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The ADF unit root contradicts results from KPSS stationarity tests except for epi and 
css. ADF unit root test indicates that all series except for css and epi are stationary. 
KPSS stationary test however suggests that all series are non stationary. Ng-Perron unit 
root test gives the same results as KPSS stationary tests that unit root presents in all 
series. Ng-Perron test works when structural breaks present in the series, but the test 
requires deterministic break points that sometimes could be tricky. Therefore, unit root 
test introduce in Zivot and Andrew (1992) is employed to confirm the three tests. This 
test assumes one data dependent – break, meaning “a priori” knowledge of position of 
break points is not necessary. The test is superior to test assuming two break points such 
as Lumisdaine and Papell (1997). Test assuming two break points do not specify break 
dates in null hypothesis, hence tends to accept alternative hypothesis of stationarity with 
breaks (Glynn et al, 2007). Moreover, the unit root test sufficiently minimizes failure to 
reject unit root hypothesis when the series is actually stationary around the structural 
breaks. The position of the break point is determined by the test equation as follows 
- Mean shift at possible break dates  
Δݕ௧ = ܿ + ߙݕ௧ିଵ + ߚݐ + ߛܦܫ௧ + ݀∆ݕ௧ିଵ + ݁௧ 
- Trend shift at possible break dates  
	Δݕ௧ = ܿ + ߙݕ௧ିଵ + ߚݐ + ߠܦ ௧ܶ + ݀∆ݕ௧ିଵ + ݁௧ 
- Mean and trend shift at possible break dates  
	Δݕ௧ = ܿ + ߙݕ௧ିଵ + ߚݐ + ߛܦܫ௧ + ߠܦ ௧ܶ + ݀∆ݕ௧ିଵ + ݁௧ 
where tDI  is dummy variable for a mean shift occurring at each possible break date and 
tDT  corresponds to trend shift at each possible break point.  


 

otherwise
breakpoint tif
DI t 0
1
                                      


 

otherwise
breakpoint tifbreakpointt
DTt 0
 
Rudebusch (1993) argued that Zivot-Andrews test indecisiveness might occur when it is 
not possible to reject neither unit root null hypothesis nor alternative hypothesis of trend 
stationary with one unknown break. The following table summarizes t-statistics from 
Zivot-Andrews unit root test and shows that indecisiveness does not occur in this case.  
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Table 3 Unit root test (Zivot and Andrew, 1992) 
  
 
The unit root test clearly indicates that all variables except cg are trend stationary with 
one time break in the trend dependently identified by data. The potential break point in 
October 2008 implies that prices of energy and emission credits fell following weaker 
purchasing power of consumers. The lower gross profit generated by electricity 
producers also slowed down emission intensive economic activity, pushing prices for 
emission credits down. As economic started to pick up in early 2009, prices of energy 
and emission credits bounced back afterward.  
 
The cointegration test on the ten variables indicates that some variables are cointegrated 
assuming an unknown structural break in the series as summarized in table 4. The table 
also summarizes preliminary estimates of cointegration rank d. 
  
cer eua cpi ipi epi og cg css cds cdso
Deterministic terms
intercept
test stat -5.844*** -5.718*** -7.551*** -8.072*** -5.680*** -5.270** -3.687 -5.781*** -7.283*** -5.838***
time trend
test stat -4.805** -5.317*** -7.653*** -8.377*** -7.194*** -4.976*** -4.373* -5.609*** -7.627*** -5.488**
intercept and time trend
test stat -8.200*** -5.794*** -7.646 -8.391*** -7.224*** -5.287** -5.306** -6.243*** -7.670*** -5.834**
Ho: time series are not stationary
H1: time series are trend strationary with one unknown structural break in the trend
Rejection of Ho at level of significance 10%(*), 5%(**), 1%(***)
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Table 4 Preliminary estimates of cointegration rank d (Johansen, 1995; Arai and 
Kurozumi, 2010) 
 
 
Assuming there is no deterministic terms in VARX and vector error correction, trace 
statistics and maximum eigenvalue indicates cointegration rank of 5.  However, figure 4 
in section 2 indicates drift and linear trend in the VARX and vector error correction. 
Trace statistics suggests cointegration rank of 5 if linear trend and drift are specified in 
vector error correction while VARX does not contain linear trend. For the same 
assumption, maximum eigenvalue indicates cointegration rank of 3. Stability test on 
cointegrated VARMAX is summarized in table 5. 
 
Table 5 Stability test 
 
Trace-stat Critical value Max. Eigenvalue Critical value
no intercept & trend 5 48.2690 60.0614 20.0578 30.43961
intercept in VEC 5 71.4089 76.9728 26.5658 34.80587
intercept in VEC & VAR 4 101.6671 95.7537 37.2851 40.07757
5 64.3820 69.8189
intercept & trend in VEC, no 
intercept in VAR
3 172.7776 150.5585 48.9740 50.59985
5 83.1672 88.8038
Notes:
r : number of cointegration equation
Prob**: MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-value
Test Specification Cointegration rank
Unrestricted cointegration rank test 
(Max eigenvalue)
Unrestricted cointegration rank 
test (trace)
Specification AR Stable
VARMAX(4,0,3) - diag 1
VARMAX(4,0,3) - full 1
VARMAX(6,0,3) - diag 1
VARMAX(6,0,3) - full 1
VARMAX(7,0,3) - diag 1
VARMAX(7,0,3) - full 1
1: Autoregression is stable
0: autoregression is not stable
diag: diagonal autoregressive and covariance matrix
full: full autoregressive and covariance matrix
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VARMAX(4,0,3) is in favour as indicated in AIC results. 
 
Table 6. Akaike information criteria (AIC) 
 
 
The process of innovations of VARMAX(4,0,3) is tested by using Ljung-Box and 
ARCH-LM tests which indicate autocorrelation and heterosckedasticity in the 
innovations.  
 
Table 7 Residuals test on VARMAX(4,0,3) 
 
Thus, it can be inferred that current innovation u is a function of squared of previous 
innovation. Residual tests on the model after specifying conditional variance are 
summarized in table 8, indicating ARCH(4) process of innovations. 
Specification Log likelihood ratio
VARMAX(4,0,3) - diag 18.475
VARMAX(4,0,3) - full 10.295
VARMAX(6,0,3) - diag 18.619
VARMAX(6,0,3) - full 10.422
VARMAX(7,0,3) - diag 18.674
VARMAX(7,0,3) - full 10.425
diag: diagonal autoregressive and covariance matrix
full: full autoregressive and covariance matrix
Lag order Q-stat
lag =1 2.257***
lag =2 8.720***
lag =3 20.949***
lag =4 33.969***
lag =5 124.422*
lag =6 222.935
Chi-sq ARCH LM test Jarque Bera
8008.464*** 1430.737***
Ho (Q-stat): no autocorrelation in residuals
Ho (LM-stat): residuals are multivariate homoskedastic
Ho (Jarque Bera): residuals are multivariate normal
Reject Ho at level of significance 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*)
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Table 8 Residuals test on VARMAX(4,0,3) – ARCH(4) 
 
The estimates of parameters are detailed in appendix. The results show that extreme 
temperature and changes in climate policy are not significant in explaining business 
cycle as well as dynamics of emission credits, clean dark spread, clean spark spread, 
fuel switching cost and electricity prices. The interplay between emission credits, clean 
dark spread, clean spark spread, fuel switching cost and electricity prices is analyzed 
from forecast error variance decomposition and impulse response function.    
 
 
2.5.2. Forecast error variance decomposition 
Forecast error variance decomposition measures the proportion of forecast variance of a 
particular variable due to shocks in the variables of the VARMAX model at different 
time horizons. As such, variance decomposition is used to estimate the significance of 
energy prices and technology and shocks as well as economic cycle as a source of 
variability in prices of emission credits. Figures 9 to 18 summarize the variance 
decompositions. Variance decomposition measures the proportion of forecast variance 
of a particular variable due to shocks in the variables of the VARMAX model at 
different time horizons. As such, variance decomposition is used to estimate the 
significance of energy prices and technology and shocks as well as economic cycle as a 
source of variability in prices of emission credits. The decomposition is shown for a 
Equation Q-stat                (lag 
order = 16)
Chi-sq ARCH LM test 
(lag order  10)
Jarque Bera
cer 13.065 0.470536 181.304***
ipi 26.455 1.112701 285.783***
eua 9.3135 0.998839 18.516***
cer 19.363 1.789514 175.639***
cds 12.953 0.762072 146.620***
css 13.738 0.24914 175.484***
cdso 7.339 0.889618 5.854***
cg 8.4364 0.377086 315.647***
og 2.8511 0.642047 10.031***
epi 13.19 0.58047 204.822***
Ho (Q-stat): no autocorrelation in residuals
Ho (LM-stat): residuals are homoskedastic
Ho (Jarque Bera): residuals are normally distributed
Reject Ho at level of significance 1%(***), 5%(**), 10%(*)
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forecast horizon of 90-th trading day ahead to reflect the long run effects of shocks to 
various variables on emission credits. The portion of variance in sCER due to shocks to 
various variables is depicted in figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 . Variance decomposition of sCER 
 
The result shows that each variable explains only a small portion of sCER innovations. 
About 10% - 60% of sCER innovation is explained by its own shocks. Business cycle 
coupled with shocks to gross margin for electricity producers are as important as EUA 
shocks in explaining sCER innovations. Business cycle counts for 1% - 6% of the 
variability in sCER. Import limit on sCER might diminish the impact of shocks to the 
EU-27 economy on sCER fluctuation. The allocation of EUA might also too much that 
growing economy does not significantly influence demand side of sCER. Shocks to 
clean dark spread and clean spark spread explain 8% - 22% of the variability in sCER. 
In contrast, EUA shocks count for 8% - 28% of fluctuation in sCER. This result 
suggests that EUA is not exogenous in the regression on sCER. Technology shocks 
explain about 2% - 10% of variation in sCER. Shocks to switching cost from oil to gas 
appear to be as important as shocks to switching cost from coal to gas in explaining 
sCER innovations. The possible explanation would be that switching to low emission 
technology takes months to influence demand side of sCER. Variance decomposition is 
also used to gauge which emission credit shocks is important to the variability of 
another emission credits.  
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Figure 11 shows the percentage of variance of the t-th trading day ahead forecast error 
of the level of EUA that is attributable to each structural shocks for t = 1, 2, …, 90.  
More than half of variation in EUA is explained by its own shocks. The shocks to sCER 
count for less than 3% of variability in EUA due to the EU’s import limit on sCER. 
Thus, demand on sCER is considerably sensitive to the fluctuation of EUA prices in the 
EU–ETS market. Demand on EUA on the other hand is less sensitive to the fluctuation 
of sCER prices in the EU–ETS market.  
Figure 11. Variance decomposition of EUA 
 
Shocks to the economy explain about 2% - 8% of variation in EUA. Theoretically, 
economic growth accelerates GHGs emission, which in turn increases demand on 
emission credits. It follows that macroeconomic shocks should have a large share in the 
variation of emission credits. Thus, the small impact of macroeconomic shocks 
indicates that the allocation of EUA has made demand on emission credits less 
responsive to the state of emission intensive economic activity. Shocks to clean dark 
spread and clean spark spread count are as important as technology shocks in explaining 
EUA innovations. Shocks to clean dark spread and clean spark spread count for 7% - 
10% of variability in EUA. Shocks to fuel switching cost explain EUA innovations by 
the same magnitude. The shocks to switching cost from coal to gas are more important 
to EUA innovation than shocks to switching cost from oil to gas. The costlier oil fired 
plants causes changes in switching cost from oil to gas does not count much on the 
demand side of EUA.   
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Clean dark spread (CDS) takes into prices of emission credits, coal and gas. Thus, 
shocks to prices of emission credits are important in forecasting clean dark spread and 
electricity production schedule. Variance decomposition of clean dark spread in figure 
12 specifically measures how important shocks to prices of emission credits to the 
variability of clean dark spread. 
 
Figure 12. Variance decomposition of CDS 
 
Variability in clean dark spread is more responsive to its own shocks than shocks to 
other variables. About 50% - 90% of variation in clean dark spread is explained by its 
own shocks. Shocks to emission credits on the other hand, explain 3% - 10% of the 
variation in clean dark spread, indicating that cost associated with emission credit is 
fully pass on electricity buyers. Technology shocks are more important than shocks to 
the economy in explaining variation in clean dark spread. Technology shocks count for 
about 5% - 24% of fluctuation in clean dark spread. More than 90% of this portion 
belongs to shocks to switching cost from coal to gas as switching cost from coal to gas 
and clean dark spread are influenced by coal prices. Shocks to the economy explains 
only about 2% - 3% of variation in clean dark spread, suggesting that shocks on demand 
side do not count much in gross margin for coal fired plants.   
 
Clean spark spread also takes into prices of emission credits, coal and gas. It is expected 
that shocks to prices of emission credits are also significant to forecast of clean spark 
spread and electricity production schedule. Figure 13 shows the long run effects of 
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shocks to emission credits and other variables on innovations of clean spark spread. 
Emission credits count for 3% - 23% of the variability in clean spark spread. The result 
is in lined with variance decomposition of clean dark spread. Electricity producers in the 
EU-27 region have market power to pass cost associated with emission credits on 
electricity buyers.  
 
Figure 13. Variance decomposition of CSS 
 
About 16% - 62% of variation in clean spark spread is explained by its own shocks. 
Shocks to clean dark spread explain about 20% - 60% of variation in clean dark spread 
as some power producers use mixed-coal-and-gas technology. Shocks to the economy 
are less important than shocks to emission credits and fuel switching cost in explaining 
variation in clean spark spread. Shocks to the economy explain only about 2% - 3% of 
variation in clean spark spread. This means that business cycle, which influence demand 
side of electricity, does not matter much for gross margin of oil-fired plants. Technology 
shock counts for 3% - 26% of variation in gross margin for gas fired plants. More than 
80% of this portion belongs to shocks to switching cost from coal to gas.  
 
The oil is relatively costlier than coal and gas for producing electricity. Accordingly, oil 
is less popular energy sources for power generation than coal and gas in EU-27 area. 
Emission and energy content of oil makes gross margin for oil fired plants is more 
sensitive to fluctuation in prices of emission credits than to other variables. Figure 14 
shows that the results support this view.  
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Figure 14. Variance decomposition of CDSO 
 
The portion of shocks to emission credits count for 47% - 86% of variability in gross 
margin for oil fired power generators. Only about 5% - 17% of variation in gross margin 
for oil fired power generators is explained by its own shocks. The shocks to technology 
switching cost are less important than macroeconomic shocks to the innovations of 
synthetic clean dark spread. Technology shocks explain about 1% - 4% of fluctuation in 
gross margin for oil fired power generators. Recalling variance decomposition of clean 
dark spread and clean spark spread, technology shocks apparently take longer time to 
influence gross margin of oil-fired plants than gross margin of coal and gas fired plants. 
Simultaneously, macroeconomic shocks count for about 4% - 9% of variation in gross 
margin for oil fired power generators.  
 
The importance of shocks to other variables to the variation in switching cost from coal 
to gas is depicted in figure 15. About 34% - 90% of variation in switching cost from 
coal to gas is explained by its own shocks. Shocks to clean dark spread and clean spark 
spread counts for about 7% - 9% of variation in switching cost from coal to gas. More 
than half of this portion comes from the shocks to clean dark spread and clean spark 
spread. This result corresponds to coal and gas prices that influences clean dark spread, 
clean spark spread and switching cost from coal to gas.  
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Figure 15. Variance decomposition of CG 
 
Shock to emission credits explains about 1% - 18% of variability in switching cost from 
coal to gas. More than two third of this portion comes from sCER shocks. 
Macroeconomic shocks counts for less than 2% of variability in switching cost from 
coal to gas. The low degree of technology switching in coal-fired plants might explain 
that macroeconomic fluctuation does not count much in the changes of switching cost 
from coal to gas.   
 
Results of variance decomposition of switching cost from oil to gas (OG) are depicted 
in figure 16. Shocks to switching cost from oil to gas count for 10% - 63% of variability 
in this variable. Shocks to clean dark spread and clean spark spread are more important 
than shocks to the economy and emission credits in explaining variability in switching 
cost from oil to gas.  
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Figure 16. Variance decomposition of OG 
 
Shocks to clean dark spread and clean spark spread explain for 19% - 60% in the 
fluctuation of switching cost from oil to gas. Naturally, more than 90% of this portion 
comes from shocks to synthetic clean dark spread for oil fired plants. This result 
corresponds to the fact that fuel-switching cost from oil to gas and gross margin for oil-
fired power plant is determined by oil prices. Shocks to emission credits count for 6% - 
10% of variability in the switching cost from oil to gas. Shocks to the economy explain 
6% - 8% of variation in the switching cost from oil to gas. Interestingly, shocks to 
electricity prices could explain 1% - 5% of fluctuation in the switching cost from oil to 
gas. The possible explanation for this result is that the expected electricity prices 
influence firm’s decision to switch fuel from oil to gas.     
 
Variance decomposition of consume price index is depicted in figure 17. More than a 
half of variation in consumer price index is explained by its own shocks. Shocks to 
clean dark spread and clean spark spread count for 2.6% - 16.5% of the innovations of 
consumer price index. More than a half of this portion comes from shocks to gross 
margin for oil-fired plants. Shocks to emission credits explain only about 0.4% - 6.7% 
of variation in consumer price index. Technology shocks counts for only 1% of 
consumer price index variation and about two third of this is attributable to shocks to 
switching cost from oil to gas. The impact of shocks to electricity prices is not 
significant.  
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Figure 17. Variance decomposition of CPI 
 
 
The results shows that shocks to clean dark spread and clean spark spread is more 
important than shocks to emission credits to the variability in consumer price index. 
This implies directional causality from energy prices to macro economy during sample 
period. Shocks to gross margin of oil fired power plant dominates the portion of shocks 
to clean dark spread and clean spark spread in the variation of consumer price index. 
Shocks EUA is as important as shocks sCER shocks to the fluctuation in consumer price 
index. The small share of the two shocks in the innovations of consumer price index 
suggests that emission cap-and trade regime does not hamper economic growth. The 
small portion of shocks to fuel switching cost in the variability of consumer price index 
suggests that the impact of technology shocks to the economy takes more than three 
months.          
 
Similar result is also found in the variance decomposition of industrial productivity 
index in figure 18. More than half of variation in industrial productivity index is 
explained by its own shocks. Shocks to clean dark spread and clean spark spread count 
for 6% - 13% of IPI innovations. Shocks to emission credits explain about 2.5% - 13% 
of the variance in productivity index, and two third of that portion comes from sCER 
shocks. The impact of technology shocks counts for about 1% - 9.6% of variability 
productivity index. The shocks to switching cost from oil to gas make up for more than 
98% of the portion of technology shocks.   
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Figure 18.  Variance decomposition of IPI 
 
 
The result supports findings in the variance analysis on consumer price index. First, 
shocks to clean dark spread and clean spark spread are more important than shocks to 
emission credit to variation in industrial productivity index. Second, directional 
causality exists from energy prices (particularly oil prices) to the macro economy during 
sample period. Third, shocks to electricity prices also do not matter to the fluctuation in 
industrial productivity index, counting less than 1% of innovations of industrial 
productivity index. Lastly, shocks are EUA is as important as sCER shocks to the 
variation in industrial price index.           
  
Variance decomposition analysis on electricity prices should provide evidence whether 
fluctuation in electricity prices is responsive to shocks to gross margin for electricity 
installation, emission credits and macro economy. Figure 19 shows that shocks to 
electricity prices are less important than shocks to emission credit, clean dark spread, 
cleans spark spread and fuel switching cost. Electricity own shocks explain only 1.3% - 
12.3% variation in electricity prices. On the other hand, shocks to clean dark spread and 
clean spark spread count for 48% - 90% variation in electricity prices. Expectedly, about 
75% of this portion comes from shocks to clean dark spread as electricity production in 
EU-27 countries is still dominated by coal-fired plants.  
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Figure 19. Variance decomposition of EPI 
 
  
Shocks to emission credits explain about1% - 15% of variability in electricity prices, 
implying that cost associated with emission credits is fully passed on electricity buyers. 
Noticeably, about third quarter of shocks to emission credits is attributable to sCER 
shocks. The importance of sCER shocks to the variation in electricity prices suggests 
that demand on sCER in EU-27 area mostly comes from power installation. The portion 
of shock to emission credit, which is smaller than portion of shocks to gross margin for 
producing electricity, implies that fluctuation in gross margin for power producers is 
likely to be more affected by energy price shocks than shocks to emission credits.    
 
Technology shocks count for 4% - 8% to the variation in electricity prices. Shocks to 
switching cost from oil to gas appear as important as shocks to switching cost from coal 
to gas to the variation in electricity prices. The low portion of the effect of technology 
shock indicates the low level of technology switching to low emission technology 
across power installation in the EU-27 area. Shocks to consumer price index and 
industrial productivity index explain only about 1% - 5% of variability in electricity 
prices. The small portion of macroeconomic shocks to innovation of electricity prices 
implies price rigidity of electricity to the economy activity.      
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2.5.3. Impulse response  
The impulse responses are used to assess the signs and magnitudes of responses to 
specific shocks in a two-year horizon as illustrated in figure 19 to 28. By using 
bootstrapping based on 100drawn, one standard deviation of confidence bands around 
the point estimates have been estimated (depicted by the two dashed lines). Figure 20 
shows the responses of consumer price index, industrial production index, clean dark 
spread, clean spark spread, fuel switching cost, EUA and electricity prices to one 
standard deviation shock in sCER. 
 
Figure 20. Impulse response function of the variables to 
one standard deviation of sCER shocks 
 
The figure reveals that EUA response to sCER shock is negligible. Consumer price 
index and industrial productivity responded negatively to a one-standard-deviation 
shock in sCER, suggesting emission cap-and-trade regime hampers the economic 
activity. The impact of sCER shocks is more profound for business than for household 
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as response of industrial productivity index is stronger than response of consumer price 
index. Clean dark spread and clean spark spread respond negatively to sCER shocks. 
Thus, an increase in the price of emission credit put pressure on the gross margin for 
electricity producers by small magnitude. The response of technology switching cost to 
sCER shock depends on the type of fuel. Switching cost from coal to gas responds 
positively to sCER shock while switching cost from oil to gas show the opposite 
response to the same shock. This could be explained by difference in emission content 
as well as energy content between coal and oil. Interestingly, electricity price responds 
negatively to sCER shock as cost associated with emission credits compose production 
cost of electricity.  
 
Similar to EUA response to sCER shocks, sCER response to EUA shocks is also 
insignificant as indicated by the error band. Clean dark spread and clean spark spread 
respond negatively to sCER shocks.  The EU ETS’s limit on CER import leads the 
magnitude of the clean dark spread and clean spark spread to respond to EUA shocks by 
greater than response of the two variables to sCER shocks.  
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Figure 21. Impulse response function of the variables to  
one standard deviation of EUA shocks 
 
Fuel switching cost negatively responds to EUA shocks with magnitude depending on 
fuel type. The impact of EUA shocks is more profound on switching cost from coal to 
gas than switching cost from oil to gas. Thus, it is far cheaper to switch from coal to gas 
than from oil to gas when EUA prices increases. Industrial productivity index and 
consumer price index respond positively to EUA shocks for the firs 40 trading days but 
in the long run the index negatively respond to the shocks. The result support finding in 
the impulse response from sCER that emission cap-and-trade hurts business rather than 
household. Electricity prices respond negatively to EUA shocks in the first 15 trading 
days respond negatively to the shocks in the long run. This could be reflective of market 
power of electricity producers to pass EUA prices to electricity buyers.  
 
Fuel switching cost responds positively to shocks to clean dark spread as the increase of 
gross margin for coal fired plants increases opportunity cost to adopt low emission 
technology. The response of emission credits to shocks to clean dark spread is not 
discernible as shown by the error band. The electricity prices respond positively in the 
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first 30 trading days, implying that market power of electricity producers are able to 
keep gross margin high in the short run by increasing electricity prices. In the long run, 
the shocks will hurt demand side of electricity which is translated into negative response 
of electricity prices to the shocks.   
 
Figure 22. Impulse response function of the variables to 
one standard deviation of CDS shocks 
 
Industrial productivity index and consumer price index have positive-immediate 
response to shocks to clean dark spread although by small magnitude. Positive shocks to 
gross margin for coal-fired plants surely increase price-adjusted output from energy 
sector, pushing industrial productivity index for all sectors up. As high gross margin 
puts pressure on electricity price in the long run, the same occur to industrial 
productivity index, particularly index of energy sector.  
 
Figure 23 shows contradictory response of macroeconomic indicators to the shocks to 
clean spark spread. Consumer price index and industrial productivity index have 
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immediately negative response to shocks to clean spark spread. In the long run, both 
variables respond positively but negligibly to the same shocks. Other variables respond 
to shocks to clean spark spread in the same fashion as their response to shocks to clean 
dark spread.  
Figure 23. Impulse response function of the variables to  
one standard deviation of CSS shocks 
 
Fuel switching cost responds positively to shocks to clean spark spread. The magnitude 
of the response is significantly smaller than its response to shocks to clean dark spread. 
The response of emission credits to shocks to clean dark spread is not discernible as 
shown by the error band. The electricity prices respond positively in the first eight 
trading days, and turn to negative response afterward. This result support previous 
finding that in the long run the shocks will hurt demand side of electricity. 
 
The response of variables to the shocks to gross margin for oil-fired plants is 
summarized in figure 24. It is important to note that the sign of synthetic clean dark 
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spread CDSO is negative and oil fired plants share a very small portion in electricity 
production in the EU-27 area.  
Figure 24. Impulse response function of the variables to 
one standard deviation of CDSO shocks 
 
Electricity prices respond positively to the shocks to synthetic clean dark spread to make 
up increasing negative gross margin. The increasing price however put pressure on the 
demand side of electricity in the long run that is translated to negative response of 
electricity prices. The response of macroeconomic indicators corresponds to the 
response of electricity prices. Response of electricity prices is immediately transmitted 
to prices of goods acquired by household and price adjusted output. Thus, in the long 
run, increasing negative profit margin of oil-fired plants put pressure on industrial 
productivity index and prices of goods acquired by household. Shocks to gross margin 
for oil-fired plants dampen emission intensive economic activity, which in turn 
decreases demand on emission credits. The response of fuel switching costs to the 
shocks to synthetic clean dark spread is close to their response to the shocks to clean 
dark spread. The opposite sign corresponds to negative gross margin for oil-fired plants. 
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All variables except for clean spark spread and emission credits respond negatively to 
the shocks to switching cost from coal to gas. Figure 25 shows that Emission credits 
respond positively to the shocks, implying that equilibrium prices of emission credits 
are about cost for switching technology.    
Figure 25. Impulse response function of the variables to  
one standard deviation of CG shocks 
 
Under emission cap-and-trade regime, increasing fuel switching cost squeeze gross 
margin for electricity producers, which is transmitted to price adjusted output and 
demand side of electricity. 
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Figure 26. Impulse response function of the variables to 
 one standard deviation of OG shocks 
 
Figure 26 illustrates the response of variable to the shocks to switching cost from oil to 
gas. The impact of the shocks is negligible except for industrial productivity index, 
clean dark spread, clean spark spread, switching cost from coal to gas and electricity 
prices. Industrial productivity index and consumer price index respond positively to the 
shocks. The possible explanation is that oil fired plants are almost as expensive as gas 
fired plants; hence the shocks do not put pressure on price adjusted output and prices of 
goods acquired by household. In the long run clean dark spread and clean spark spread 
positively respond to the shocks, suggesting that high switching cost induces electricity 
producers to keep up emission intensive - electricity production. The response is also 
reflected in positive response of electricity prices. 
 
Emission credits respond positively but insignificantly to the shocks to consumer price 
index. This result supports the notion that economic expansion increases emission 
production, hence increasing demand on emission credits. Accordingly, shocks to 
consumer prices index are negatively responded by clean dark spread and clean spark 
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spread in the long run. The response is very strong since increasing energy prices also 
puts pressure on gross margin for electricity producers as illustrated in figure 27.  
Figure 27. Impulse response function of the variables to  
one standard deviation of CPI shocks 
 
On the other hand, growing economy increases demand on electricity, increasing 
electricity prices. In the end, price adjusted output picks up as shrinking gross margin is 
off set by increasing sales volume. Additionally, positive response of emission credits 
coupled with increasing energy prices yields positive response of fuel switching cost to 
the shocks to consumer price index.   
 
Figure 28 shows that variables have the same response to the shocks on industrial price 
index as shocks on consumer price index.  
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Figure 28. Impulse response function of the variables to 
one standard deviation of IPI shocks 
 
Figure 28 shows that economic expansion increases demand on emission credits. As 
emission credits are counted in clean dark spread and clean spark spread, economic 
expansion is negatively responded by clean dark spread and clean spark spread in the 
long run. Electricity prices respond positively to the shocks to industrial productivity 
index. Apparently, economic expansion boosts demand on electricity. Positive shocks to 
adjusted price of output appear to move up fuel switching cost, which is possibly 
triggered by higher prices for energy and emission credits. 
 
Figure 29 shows that all variables except for switching cost from coal to gas respond 
positively to the shocks to electricity prices. This result implies that electricity 
producers are “compensated” from switching to low emission fuel when electricity 
prices are high. 
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Figure 29. Impulse response function of the variables to 
one standard deviation of EPI shocks 
 
A jump in electricity prices naturally increases price-adjusted output for main industry 
and prices of goods acquired by household. As the economy expands, shocks to 
electricity prices also increases demand on emission credits. Therefore, EUA and sCER 
respond positively to the shocks to consumer price index. Lastly, shocks to electricity 
prices take months to positively influence gross margin for electricity producers.  
 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion  
The primary interest of this study lies in the description of the response of emission 
credits to variables. Estimation technique of structural cointegrated VARX with 
conditional variance is used. The techniques allows interdependency of the variables 
and for exogenous shocks. This has been a critical issue in the empirical investigation of 
prices of emission credits. Some of the resent research concerned with the 
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macroeconomic effects on sCER prices rule out the possibility of bidirectional causality 
between some variables. The technique is also not theoretic which can be used when 
theory does not yield a clear prediction, but its estimated parameters have structural 
interpretation and economic meaning. Using VARX with conditional variance requires 
the decomposition of the estimated variance-covariance matrix of innovations.   
 
In order to assess the empirical significance of recursivity assumption, reasonable 
contemporaneous structures of relationship between variables is defined. The basic 
purpose of the research is not to establish the validity of any particular set of structural 
priors but to explore the sensitivity of conclusions to identifications of matrix A. The 
structures implied by matrix A are exactly identified and recoverable from the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix of the cointegrated VARX residuals. Spot prices of emission 
credit are assumed to have no automatic response to changes in gross margin for 
electricity producers, electricity prices, and fuel switching costs. The automatic response 
of macroeconomic indicators to changes in prices of emission credits, gross margin for 
electricity producers, electricity prices, and fuel switching costs also does not exist.    
 
The empirical analysis carried out on spot prices seems somewhat not supporting 
conclusion from analysis does of future prices in Mansanet-Bataller et al (2011) and 
Chevallier (2011). Economic expansion has the same effect on EUA and sCER. 
Economic expansion increase emission production that in turn boosts demand on EUA 
and sCER. On the other hand, sCER and EUA respond differently to the shocks to the 
economy. A jump in sCER prices moves up price adjusted output and prices of goods 
acquired by household. A jump in EUA prices however put pressure on price adjusted 
output and prices of goods acquired by household. Interdependent relationship between 
EUA and sCER exists. EUA responds negatively to the shocks to sCER and vice versa. 
This implies that demand on one emission credits influences demand on another 
emission credit. Extreme weather and changes in climate policy are not significant in 
the price dynamics of emission credits. 
 
EUA and sCER prices respond positively to technology shocks, suggesting that 
equilibrium price for emission credit mimic dynamics of fuel switching cost. Another 
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important finding is that clean dark spread and clean spark spread are most important in 
the fluctuation of electricity prices. Further, technology shocks put pressure on 
electricity prices shocks while shocks to emission credits are fully passed on electricity 
buyers. Economic expansion expectedly moves up demand on electricity up and energy 
prices that are translated into higher fuel switching cost.  
 
Briefly, prices of EUA and sCER are influenced by the state of the economy in the EU-
27 are since the EU ETS is the biggest market for sCER and EUA. Thus, any 
investment decision associated with sCER needs to take into account business cycle in 
the EU ETS member countries. Second, price dynamics of sCER move in conformity 
with market expectation about fuel switching cost. Thus, spot prices of sCER could be 
reference prices of projects associated with CER. Third, profit maximizing electricity 
producers should take into account interdependency between emission credits and 
dynamics of fuel switching cost.  
  
66 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 ON THE PRICE DETERMINANTS OF BANK LOANS 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Banking regulation in Indonesia requires banks to set loss provision to absorb 
environmental and social impact of lending activities. Thus, environmental and social 
performance of borrowing firms influences loan prices through loan provision. Loans 
prices are widely studied under banking firm and dealership framework. The latter has 
been increasingly popular in empirical studies on European banks and banks operating 
in emerging countries. Dealership approach was introduced by Ho and Saunders in 1981 
and had been extended to portfolio effect on the asset side of banks (Allen, 1998; 
Maudos and Guevara, 2004).  
 
To identify whether dealership model represents banking practice in the Indonesia, 
banking survey was carried out in April 2011. The respondents are 66 banks accounted 
for 97% of total loans in Indonesia that comprises state owned banks, local banks, 
branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks (Bank Indonesia, 2011). The results show 
that dealership model mimics product pricing and liquidity management in Indonesian 
banks. However, the existing dealership model can not capture the fact that some 
respondents have earned more by heavily depending on non interest-bearing deposits. 
Previous works using dealership models assume single deposit i.e. term deposit. In 
practice, some banks prefer to depend heavily on non-maturity deposit such as demand 
deposit and saving, through marketing strategy and investment in payment system. Such 
banks bear high operating cost but pay very low cost of fund. In other word, deposit 
portfolio might be important in wealth maximizing-loan prices. 
 
Considering the significance of non-maturity deposit in some bank respondents, this 
study contemplates portfolio effect of deposits in wealth maximization of a bank. The 
wealth maximization problem in Allan (1998) and Maudos and Guevara (2004) is 
extended to non-interest bearing deposits as so-called non-maturity deposits in this 
study. The first order condition should imply wealth-maximizing prices of loan and 
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other banks’ products. This extended theoretical model is tested on unbalanced quarterly 
data of contractual prices, accounting based prices and other data of 51 banks in 
Indonesia from March 2005 to December 2010. The use of Indonesian banking data is 
for the following reasons. First, some banks have involved in climate finance. Second, 
there has been massive merger and increasing foreign ownership on Indonesian banks 
during the sample period. As a result, banks’ pricing model as well as asset and liability 
management tends to converge to that of parent banks operating in other developing or 
developed countries. In other word, what has been observed on product pricing and 
portfolio effect of deposit in Indonesia is likely to occur in other developing and 
developed countries.  
 
One of the focuses of this study is determining whether non-maturity deposits could 
yield higher wealth than maturity deposits. The second objective is to identify whether 
competitive advantage of loans suggested by Maudos and Saunders (2004) holds when 
portfolio effect of deposit enters wealth maximization problem. The third objective is to 
demonstrate whether accounting data of interest income and expenses biases the 
estimation, and whether contractual prices of bank products could negate the problem. 
Accounting revenues and expenses are typically used to derive prices of banks’ products 
in many dealership models. However, accounting revenue and cost recognition is often 
come later than that of price determinants of bank’s products. For instance, interest 
income and expense is likely to be recorded later while determinants of loan prices such 
as loan size are recognized when loans are disbursed.  
 
Clearly, the contribution of this study takes two folds. First, it introduces competitive 
advantage of non-maturity deposit into dealership model. By doing this, dealership 
model could accommodate potential high earnings from non-maturity deposits or 
technology based payment service. The second contribution is to provide empirical 
evidence that using accounting data of income and expenses to derive product prices 
could raise potential bias estimation. Contractual prices of bank products are proposed 
to eliminate bias estimation. The problem of using accounting data has been highlighted 
in some papers such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). Nonetheless, empirical 
evidence supporting this argument barely exists.  
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The results about the impact of non-maturity deposit are presented in section 3.3.1.2. 
The non-maturity deposits give competitive advantage to banks whose per unit 
operating cost is lower than return on money market fund. The introduction of non-
maturity deposit into the wealth maximization problem does not change competitive 
advantage of loans specified in Maudos and Saunders (2004). Loans make banks better 
off when per unit operating cost of non-loan earning assets is higher than relative 
immediacy fees of non-loan earning assets. This extended model is tested on the data set 
by using static and dynamic panel model with standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity.  
 
The results indicate that the spread between loan prices and deposit prices (i.e. the 
intermediation margin), increases with market power, credit risk and interest rate risk, 
degree of risk aversion, opportunity cost of regulatory capital, expected profit margin, 
and size of new interest bearing earning assets as well as total earning assets. The 
margin is negatively related to operating cost, deposit insurance premium, opportunity 
cost or reserve requirement, lower bound of deposit price under deposit insurance 
scheme, past value of intermediation margin, and size of new loans. The results are 
robust to time dummies. The sign of estimators however are not consistent and standard 
error of coefficients is high when accounting margin is used as proxy for intermediation 
margin. This result supports the argument that accounting margin raises potential bias 
estimation and contractual prices should avoid such problem. 
 
 
3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. Microeconomics of the banking-firm approach and dealership approach 
Dealership model was developed from microeconomic of the banking firm model. The 
banking firm model views banks as administrators of a country’s payment system that 
attract funds from surplus spending unit and transmit funds to deficit spending units. 
Banks hold loans, liability deposits, and reserves. Central bank influences loan supply 
schedule by changing its reserve. Although banks might finance themselves with non-
deposit source of funds to insulate their loan supply from reserve changes, capital 
market imperfection makes shocks to banks' deposit is not frictionless counteracted by 
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other sources of financing. Thus, reserve changes still influences loan supply in 
imperfect capital market setting associated with barrier to entry.  
 
In the environment characterized by risk or uncertainty, banks seek to maximize their 
utility of profit (wealth). Banks set loan size and deposit size to influence loan and 
deposit prices. This implies that banks are monopolist and banks can make decision on 
optimal deposit prices independent of loan prices and vice versa. Bank intermediary 
exists when positive risk premium for loans and negative premium for deposits present 
(Pyle, 1971 and 1972; Baltensperger, 1980; Stanhouse and Stock, 2004). Klein (1971) 
suggested that such risk premium represents minimum price to induce banks to provide 
intermediary services and bear risks such as funding risk (Zarruck, 1989), credit risk 
(Zarruck and Madura, 1992), interest rate risk (Wong, 1997), and prepayment risk 
(Stanhouse and stock, 2004) .  
 
Dealership model retains some assumption in the banking firm model but extends the 
later to the adjustment of risk premium to the volatility of market interest rates. Ho and 
Saunders (1981) suggested that the size of risk premium, called as immediacy fees in 
their paper, increases with the volatility of interest rate in money market. The effect of 
volatility of market interest rate could be explained by hedging behavior of banks. 
Banks tend to match their maturity of their asset and liability, and enter money market 
for any surplus or deficit. This exposes banks to reinvestment and financing risk. 
Therefore, risk premium or immediacy fees are required to compensate bank as 
financial intermediary. The financial intermediary exists as long as sufficient immediacy 
fees make up loan and deposit prices. The sum of immediacy fees of loans and deposits 
is called as intermediation margin. This margin is assumed interdependent with banks’ 
financial constraints and financial management problem.  
 
Clearly, the dealership model implies that as dealers who demand one type of deposit, 
supply one type of loan, and bear interest rate risk. Bank hold either long or short 
position in the short term money market, and demand positive interest spread for 
bearing risks. Therefore, banks’ decision problem is determining utility of wealth-
maximizing loan and deposit prices.  
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It is important to note that model in Ho and Saunders (1981) is constructed under the 
assumption that deposit is consists of interest bearing deposit only. Thus, non-interest 
bearing deposit such as demand deposit is not taken into account. Other models 
extended model of Ho and Saunders (1981) are also built on the same assumption. Allen 
(1988) extended Ho and Saunders (1981) model by assuming heterogeneous loans. His 
model incorporates two types of loans and one type of deposit i.e. maturity deposit. He 
demonstrates cross-elasticity demand across types of loans. For instance, if ܾ of loan 1 
increases, interest rate charged on loan 2 will increase. He found that interest rate spread 
as so-called intermediation margin, depends on monopoly power of a bank, risk 
premium and multi loan product diversification.  
 
Different setting for dealership model is introduced by Angbazo (1996). He incorporates 
interaction between default risk and interest risk, and investigates the effect of off 
balance sheet exposures on intermediation margin. His model defines deposit as 
maturity deposit. He suggests that credit risk premium on loan is higher and margin is 
lower when periods of tight credit market coincides with increasing aggregate risk. This 
credit rationing drives interest rate on loans less sensitive to market interest rates. He 
also argues that off balance sheet activities might affect risk exposure of a bank, hence 
influence bank’s intermediation margin. He found that margin increases with credit risk, 
liquidity risk, and interest rate risk exposure. Evidently, barriers to branch expansion 
reduces margin and off balance sheet exposure does not increase default risk.  
 
Dealership model in multi-country analysis is introduced in Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000). Instead of default risk premium, capital requirement for credit risk exposure is 
used in a two-step model. The first step is to focus on the behavior of pure 
intermediation margin by controlling institutional cost, regulatory cost and credit risk 
exposure cost. The second step uses dealership model to relate adjusted measure of pure 
intermediation margin to competitive structure of different countries and interest rate 
volatility. Maudos and Guevara (2004) extends this model by introducing operating 
costs, direct measure of market power, and alternative measure of risk aversion. Their 
model defined deposit as maturity deposit. 
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Most variables in the abovementioned dealership models are integrated in Valverde and 
Fernández (2007). They expand Ho and Saunders (1981) by mixing traditional measure 
of intermediation margin, wider accounting margin, and broader measure of margin and 
product diversification. They also expand Allen (1988) model by assuming bank’s asset 
portfolio is composed of loan, other earning assets, and fee income activities. The 
deposit is assumed to be maturity deposit. In this setting, bank seeks to match deposit 
supply, loan demand, other earning assets, and fee income activities across period. They 
find that financial innovation, market power and risk parameter appear to alter interest 
margin. Banks with low operating efficiency tend to operate with higher margin. Banks 
specialized in lending activities tend to offer low margin. Additionally, market power 
decreases with ratio of deposit to total liabilities. Using the same model framework, 
Lepetit et al (2006) investigate the impact of earning asset diversification on lending 
rates. They also investigate whether potential cross selling induces diversified banks to 
under price loans. They find that borrowers’ default risk is underpriced in the lending 
rates of banks having higher fee based income. Moreover, more diversified banks reveal 
weaker link between expected loan losses and provision for expected loan losses.    
 
Maud’s and Solis (2009) suggest a more comprehensive setting. They adopt interest and 
gross margin specification of Valverde and Fernández (2007), and operating cost 
function of Maudos and Guevara (2004). They also adopt explanatory variables in Ho 
and Saunders (1981), Angbazo (1997) and Saunders and Schumacher (2000). The 
model also incorporates variables controlling possible effect of macroeconomic 
variables on intermediation margin referring to Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), 
Brock and Rojas (2000), Drakos (2002), Martínez and Mody (2004), Gelos (2006), and 
Claeys and Venner (2008). It is important to note that all studies explained in this 
section use accounting based interest margin as proxy for intermediation margin. 
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3.2.2. The impact of non-maturity deposit, ex-post margin and upper bound 
deposit rates on the intermediation margin  
The previous sub section revealed that the existing dealership models assume single 
deposit i.e. term deposit. However, in real world application, non-maturity deposit 
might matter in maximizing banks’ utility of wealth. For the purpose of this study, term 
deposit in the only type of maturity deposit. Non-maturity deposits are composed of 
demand deposit and saving account. Non-maturity deposits do not have maturity date 
and pay very low interest rates. However, non-maturity deposit is attractive to banks’ 
customers who are in need of payment services or electronic banking. Thus, motive for 
depositing fund as well return on one type of deposit relative to other influences 
customers’ choice on banks’ deposit. This could be represented as cross elasticity of 
demand or marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between non-maturity and maturity 
deposit.  
 
Figure 30 shows that deposit portfolio might influence and asset selection. Non-maturity 
deposit reduces cost of fund of banks but exposes them to high liquidity risk. The 
deposit could be withdrawn anytime driving banks to invest it in liquid assets such as 
fixed income securities and money market fund. Expectedly, Indonesian banks are less 
likely to supply loans when they are more dependent of non-maturity deposits.  
Figure 30 Deposit and earning assets portfolio 
 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (2011) 
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The red line (LOAN_EA) is the ratio of loan over total earning assets while the blue line 
(NON_MAT) is the ratio of non-maturity deposits over total deposits. Thus, earning 
assets allocation corresponds to deposit portfolio. In other word, marginal rate 
substitution between maturity and non-maturity deposits should be taken into account in 
the dealership model framework.  
 
Another problem observed from existing dealership model is the use of ex-post margin 
as proxy for intermediation margin. The ex-post intermediary margin is not 
inconformity with the assumption in Ho and Saunders (1981) that banks presumably set 
interest rate before a transaction enters the planning horizon. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) argue that ex-post margin is easy to observed and more consistent. The 
margin might also explain that risky loans are more likely to default in banks with high 
yield. Nevertheless, they acknowledge the fact that interest income typically does not 
materialize in the same period as loss on the associated loan. Therefore, ex-ante 
intermediation margin such as contractual margin should be considered to test 
robustness of model specification. Contractual margin, which is derived from product 
prices on the contract, implies bank’s expectation on profit, risk premium and other 
factors associated with intermediary activities.  
 
When ex-ante margin is used as proxy for intermediation margin, loan administration 
cost (Wong, 1997) might be more relevant than operating cost (Maudos and Guevara, 
2004; Maudos and Solis, 2009) in the analysis of margin determinants. Nevertheless, 
data on loan administration cost is not easily observable. Moreover, Lepetit et al (2006) 
Found evidence that diversified banks tend to set low margin. Thus, ex-ante margin 
does not exclusively correspond to loan administration cost. Instead costs on supporting 
functional activities such as IT, legal and accounting division are also allocated 
accordingly to lending, other earning assets and fee based activities. Therefore, 
operating cost proxy in Maudos and Guevara (2004), and Maudos and Solis (2009) 
might prove more relevant in the analysis of ex-ante margin determinants.  
 
Lastly, deposit insurance agencies often impose restriction on which deposits will be 
fully covered by the insurance. Such restriction is often ignored in the empirical studies 
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on bank margin. The restriction might be an upper bound for either deposit prices or 
deposit sizes. The former should directly influences prices of bank products since any 
deposits paying interest rates higher than the upper bound, will not be covered by the 
insurance scheme. In other word, banks always pay interest rates not higher than the 
upper bound to the risk-averse savers. Thus, the empirical model in this study illustrates 
how the upper bound of deposit prices influences intermediation margin and identifies 
whether the upper bound composes cost of fund or cost of loanable fund. If the upper 
bound composes cost of fund, the upper bound puts pressure on bank margin. In 
contrast, the bank margin increases with the upper bound if the upper bound could be 
fully passed on borrowers (i.e. if the upper bound composes cost of loanable fund).   
 
 
3.3. The Model 
3.3.1 Theoretical model 
3.3.1.1.Dealerships model 
This section explains multi-product framework in Allen (1998) as well as Maudos and 
Guevara (2004) which will be extended in this study. Model in Allen (1998) extended 
Ho-Saunders model to two types of loans whilst model in Maudos and Guevara (2004) 
suggested that operating costs influences wealth of banks. The two extended models 
used the same assumption as in Ho-Saunders model. Bank is an intermediary between 
deposit suppliers and loan demanders. Supply and demand function is assumed linear 
for at least two reasons. First, marginal effect of price changes in a product and its 
competing product, and other factors are allowed to be constant. Second, elasticity of 
demand or supply might change at different points along linear demand or supply curve. 
Other forms of demand and supply function such as log-linear function do not have this 
property. Furthermore, bank products are not in the category of absolute necessity. 
Thus, the proper combination rule is utility maximization, using the ceteris paribus 
condition as in Ho and Saunders (1981).  
 
There are many forms of utility function, but the expected utility is the most convenient 
form for the following reason. The expected utility in the context of choice under 
uncertainty is the expected value form. The additive form representation will not be 
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destroyed when the expected utility function is subjected to an affine transformation e.g. 
ݒ(ݑ) = ܽݑ + ܾ where ܽ > 0. The new expected utility function will represent the same 
preferences. The most compelling reason of choosing the expected utility in the context 
of choice under uncertainty is that the outcome of random choices are products to be 
demanded or supplied in different state implies only of the outcomes will actually occur. 
When one considers the tradeoff between wealth now and one of the possible outcomes, 
the decision should be independent of how much he will demand or supply in other 
states (Gollier, 1999). The assumption might be violated when people consider a choice 
between two things, the amount of third thing matters. Gollier (1999) suggests that this 
independence leads to special structure of utility for contingent assumption i.e. additive 
utility function across different contingent wealth bundles. Thus, utility can be written 
as a sum of utility function in each state, weighted by probabilities. If marginal rate of 
substitution (MRS) between goods 1 and 2 takes form 
ܯܴ ଵܵଶ = −∆ܷ(ܿଵ, ܿଶ, ܿଷ)/∆ܿଵ∆ܷ(ܿଵ, ܿଶ, ܿଷ)/∆ܿଶ = −ߨଵ∆ݑ(ܿଵ)/∆ܿଵߨଶ∆ݑ(ܿଶ)/∆ܿଶ 
then the expected utility function satisfies the property that MRS between two goods is 
independent of third good. 
 
Banks always seek to maximize their expected utility of terminal wealth whilst being 
risk averse. The risk aversion of banks is due to randomness of the flow of loans and 
deposits. Bank borrows from money market to supply new loans when there is no 
inflow of deposits. On the other hand, banks invest deposit incoming when there is no 
new demand on loans. By taking this position in money market, banks exposing 
themselves to refinancing risk i.e. risk of borrowing cost in money market at the end of 
period is higher than deposit price. Aside from refinancing risk, taking position in 
money market raises reinvestment risk i.e. risk of return in money market at the end of 
period is lower than loan prices. Therefore, banks require immediacy fee to compensate 
them for bearing interest rate risk. Prices of loans and deposits depend on this 
immediacy fee as follows 
ݎ஽ = ݎ + ܽ               (3.3.1.1.1) 
ݎ௅ = ݎ − ܾ 
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where rD, r and a are prices of maturity deposit, interest rates in money market and 
immediacy fee respectively. If intermediation margin is defined as the spread between 
loan price and deposit price (s), then the intermediation margin is calculated as 
ݏ = ݎ௅ − ݎ஽ 
ݏ = (ݎ + ܽ) − (ݎ − ܾ) = ܽ − ܾ 
This implies that bank intermediation runs as long as the margin s is positive. 
 
The probability of that outgoing loans and incoming deposits depends on factors 
influencing savers and borrowers’ willingness to buy the bank products. The savers 
(borrowers) will supply (demand) deposit (loan) when the ratio of marginal utility over 
price (MU/P) of deposit (loan) is greater than or equal to their personal MU/P 
indifference point. Therefore, Ho and Saunders (1981) assumed that arrival rate of new 
loan and deposit follows Poison distribution with immediacy fee dependent parameter. 
Nonetheless, Allen (1998) showed that customers’ willingness to buy is also influenced 
by marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between two products when two products are 
perfect substitute. Therefore, rate arrival of one product also depends on immediacy fees 
of its substitute as follows  
ߣ(ܾ௠) = ߙ௠ − ߚܾ௠ + ߜ௡ܾ௡    
ߣ(ܾ௡) = ߙ௡ − ߚܾ௡ + ߜ௠ܾ௠    
Demand on loan type m is influenced by prices of loan type n. Similarly, demand on 
loan type n is influenced by prices of loan type m. Thus, arrival rate of new loan is 
influenced by cross elasticity of demand on loan m and n. Instead of two types of loans, 
banks might have one type of loan and non-loan earning assets in their asset portfolio. 
Thus, Maudos and Guevara (2004) constructed model classifying earning assets into 
loan and non-traditional activities. Thus, the rate of arrival of new loan becomes 
ߣ(ܾ௅) = ߙ௅ − ߚܾ௅ + ߜேܾே              (3.3.1.1.2) 
Where ߜ denotes cross elasticity of demand between two products. Subscript L indicates 
loan while subscript N is associated with non-traditional activities 
Accordingly, arrival rate of new non-traditional activities is estimated as 
ߣ(ܾே) = ߙே − ߚܾே + ߜ௅ܾ௅  
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Allen (1998) as well as Maudos and Guevara (2004) used the same definition of bank 
wealth as in Ho-Saunders model. Initial wealth of a bank (W0) is composed of net 
position in money market (M0) and net credit inventory (I0) whereas I0 is calculated as 
follows 
ܫ଴ = ܮ଴ −ܦ଴ 
ܮ଴ is initial loan size and ܦ଴ is initial deposit size. Assuming new deposit and new loan 
has the same size Q, net credit inventory after new flow of deposit (I) becomes 
ܫ = ܫ଴ − ܳ 
Net credit inventory after new flow of loan (I) becomes 
ܫ = ܫ଴ + ܳ 
Accordingly, net position in money market (M) changes with new arrival of deposit 
ܯ = ܯ଴ + ܳ 
New demand on loan changes net position in money market (M) into  
ܯ = ܯ଴ − ܳ 
 
Wealth at the end of period (W) is determined by return on credit inventory (rI) and 
interest rate in money market (r), interest rate risk in money market (̃ݖெ)  and the risk 
that counterparties fail to repay the loans or non-loan activities ( Iz~ ).  
ܹ = ܫ଴(1 + ݎூ + ̃ݖூ) + ܯ଴(1 + ݎ + ̃ݖெ) 
where ݎூ = ݎ௅ ௅బ௅బି஽బ − ݎ஽ ஽బ௅బି஽బ 
̃ݖூ = ̃ݖ௅ ܮ଴ܮ଴ −ܦ଴ − ̃ݖ஽ ܦ଴ܮ଴ −ܦ଴ 
 ̃ݖ௅ , ̃ݖ஽  and ̃ݖெ represent randomness of flow of loan, deposit and money market 
fund. From bank perspective, credit risk of deposits (̃ݖ஽) is assumed to be 
negligible. 
 
Maudos and Guevara (2004) proposed that wealth at the end of period is also influenced 
by operating cost of initial credit inventory C(I0). 
Thus, wealth at the end of period (W) becomes 
ܹ = ܫ଴(1 + ݎூ + ̃ݖூ) + ܯ଴(1 + ݎ + ̃ݖெ) − ܥ(ܫ଴)           (3.3.1.1.3) 
where  ܥ(ܫ) = ܥ(ܮ) + ܥ(ܦ) 
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C(L) is operating cost of supplying loans while C(D) is operating cost of receiving 
deposit. It follows that the inflow of new deposit with size Q generates wealth at the end 
of period as follows 
ܹ = ܫ଴(1 + ݎூ + ̃ݖூ) −ܳ(1 + ݎ஽) + (ܯ଴ + ܳ)(1 + ݎ + ̃ݖெ) − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܳ) 
Similarly, the outflow of new loan with size Q generates terminal wealth as follows 
ܹ = ܫ଴(1 + ݎூ + ̃ݖூ) + ܳ(1 + ݎ௅) + (ܯ଴ −ܳ)(1 + ݎ + ̃ݖெ) − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܳ) 
 
Recall that banks always try to maximize their expected utility of wealth or profit. 
Expected utility of banks’ wealth is summation of product between probability and 
expected utility of banks’ wealth associated with each type of banks’ products. Using 
Taylor expansion to express expected utility of wealth, first order condition with respect 
to immediacy fee of each type of banks’ products produces wealth-maximizing prices of 
banks’ products. 
 
Clearly, the extended dealership model particularly in Allen (1998) as well as in 
Maudos and Guevara (2004) consider portfolio effect on the asset side of banks. In 
practice, portfolio effect on deposit side might also influence prices of bank products 
and intermediation margin. Recalling figure 1, maturity profile appears to be important 
in earning assets and deposit allocation. The higher the weight of long maturity deposits 
in the deposit portfolio of a bank, the higher is the weight of long maturity earning 
assets such loan in banks’ asset portfolio. Further, non-maturity deposit such as saving 
and demand deposits appear to be cheaper than maturity deposit such as term deposit. 
Table 9 indicates that banks having more maturity deposits than non-maturity deposits 
tend to have higher weighted average deposit prices and lower marketing costs.  
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Table 9 Deposit price, intermediation margin, and marketing expenditure 
 
Weighted average 
deposit price 
Gross margin  
(spread of contractual 
prices between earning 
assets and deposits) 
Marketing 
cost/total asset 
Full size sample (51 Banks) 
Mean 0.0724 0.0741 0.0012 
Median 0.0663 0.0770 0.0008 
Sub sample: Non-maturity deposits > maturity deposits 
Mean 0.0584 0.0829 0.0047 
Median 0.0565 0.0854 0.0008 
Sub sample: Maturity deposits > non-maturity deposits 
Mean 0.0695 0.0750 0.0023 
Median 0.0782 0.0793 0.0007 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (2011) 
 
Thus, banks heavily depending on maturity deposits might use deposit price and 
immediacy to raise deposits while others leaning on their marketing strategy to raise 
deposits. Therefore, in the next section, dealership model is proposed to consider the 
effect of cross elasticity of demand between non-maturity and maturity deposits on the 
arrival rate of new deposits. The extended model proposed in the next section should be 
able to explain how intermediation margin differs across banks with different earning 
asset and deposit portfolio. 
 
 
3.3.1.2.The extended dealership model: The impact of non-maturity deposit 
This section aims to extend dealership model in the previous section. The proposed 
model in this section retains assumption in Ho and Saunders (1981). Banks are risk 
averse and seek to maximize their utility of wealth. The utility function is monotonic 
increasing and twice differentiable. The utility function is expressed as expected utility 
by using Taylor expansionTo match earning asset portfolio across bank in the sample, 
earning assets portfolio is assumed be consist of three types of loans and non-loan 
earning assets. The three types of loans are investment loans, working-capital loans, and 
consumer loans. Investment loans are loans to finance borrowers’ capital purchases, 
construct factory, investment outlay, and so on. Therefore, investment loans are often 
associated with term loans. Working-capital loans on the other hand are disbursed for 
borrowers’ operational purchases such as raw materials in production process. Working-
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capital loans have shorter time maturity than investment loans and typically revolving. 
Consumer loans are loans disbursed to borrowers purchasing consumption goods. Other 
earning assets such as fixed income securities, bank guarantee, and financial derivatives 
are classified as non-loan earning assets. 
 
Now, the loan prices in Eq.(3.3.1.1.2) are defined as follows 
ݎ௜௡௩ = ݎ + ௜ܾ௡௩                 (3.3.1.2.1) 
ݎ௪௢௥௞ = ݎ + ܾ௪௢௥௞              (3.3.1.2.2) 
ݎ௖௢௡௦ = ݎ + ܾ௖௢௡௦               (3.3.1.2.3) 
Prices of non-loan earning assets are  
ݎ௙௜ = ݎ + ௙ܾ௜                    (3.3.1.2.4) 
Subscript inv, work, cons, and fi represent prices of investment loans, working-capital 
loans, consumer loans, and non-loan earning assets. Interest rates in money market and 
immediacy fees are denoted as r and b respectively. Assuming portfolio effect of 
deposit presents, deposit portfolio is classified into non-maturity deposits (Dn) and 
maturity deposit (Di). Non-maturity deposits comprise demand deposit and non-interest 
bearing saving that is not locked up for a certain period. Maturity deposits are term 
deposits and other interest bearing deposits. Then, price of maturity deposit (rd) 
replicates Eq.(3.3.1.1.1) as follows 
ݎௗ = ݎ − ܽ௜                 (3.1.2.5) 
where ai is immediacy fee of maturity deposit.    
 
As a starting point, the arrival rate of each product is assumed to follow Poisson 
distribution with immediacy fee dependent parameter. 
ܲݎ(ܦ௜ = ݀௜) = ݁ିఒߣௗ೔݀௜! ,								݀௜ = 0,1,2,⋯					 
ߣ௝(ܦ௜) = ݁ఈ೔ିఉ௔೔ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ , ݊      (3.3.1.2.6) 
ߣ௝(ܦ௡) = ݁ఈ೙ାఋ೔௥ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ ,݊      (3.3.1.2.7) 
ߣ௝(ܨܫ) = ݁ఈ೑೔ିఉ௕೑೔ାఋ೔೙ೡ(௕೔೙ೡି௦)ାఋೢ೚ೝೖ(௕ೢ೚ೝೖೡି௦)ାఋ೎೚೙ೞ௕೎೚೙ೞ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ ,݊ (3.3.1.2.8) 
ߣ௝(ܮ௖௢௡௦) = ݁ఈ೑೔ିఉ௕೎೚೙ೞାఋ೔೙ೡ(௕೔೙ೡି௦)ାఋೢ೚ೝೖ(௕ೢ೚ೝೖೡି௦)ାఋ೑೔௕೑೔ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ ,݊ (3.3.1.2.9) 
ߣ௝(ܮ௜௡௩) = ݁ఈ೑೔ିఉ(௕೔೙ೡି௦)ାఋೢ೚ೝೖ(௕ೢ೚ೝೖೡି௦)ାఋ೎೚೙ೞ௕೎೚೙ೞାఋ೑೔௕೑೔ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ , ݊ (3.3.1.2.10) 
ߣ௝(ܮ௪௢௥௞) = ݁ఈ೑೔ିఉ(௕ೢ೚ೝೖೡି௦)ାఋ೔೙ೡ(௕೔೙ೡି௦)ାఋ೎೚೙ೞ௕೎೚೙ೞାఋ೑೔௕೑೔ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ ,݊ (3.3.1.2.11) 
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Unlike model in Allen (1998) as well as in Maudos and Saunders (2004), the 
assumption about size of transaction is relaxed in this study. Initial net credit inventory 
I0 comprises three types of loans, non-loan earning assets and two types of deposits.   
ܫ଴ = ܮ௜௡௩,଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞,଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦,଴ + ܨܫ଴ −ܦ௜,଴ −ܦ௡,଴	                                           (3.1.2.12) 
Thus, returns on net credit inventory are the weighted average prices of the six products. 
ݎூ = ݎ௜௡௩ ܮ௜௡௩,଴ܫ଴ + ݎ௪௢௥௞ ܮ௪௢௥௞,଴ܫ଴ + ݎ௖௢௡௦ ܮ௖௢௡௦,଴ܫ଴ + ݎ௙௜ ܨܫ଴ܫ଴ − ݎௗ ܦ௜,଴ܫ଴  
Recalling that Eq.(3.3.1.1.3) assumes that deposits do not bear credit risk, then credit 
riskiness of net credit inventory is expressed in the following way.  
 ̃ݖூ = ̃ݖ௜௡௩ ௅೔೙ೡ,బூబ + ̃ݖ௪௢௥௞ ௅ೢ೚ೝೖ,బூబ + ̃ݖ௖௢௡௦ ௅೎೚೙ೞ,బூబ + ̃ݖ௙௜ ிூబூబ                                      (3.3.1.2.13) 
 
If wealth of bank at the end of one period (ܹ) is influenced by operating cost ܥ(ܫ଴) 
associated with net earning asset inventory ܫ଴ as in Maudos and Guevara (2004), and 
influenced by interest rate risk (̃ݖெ) as well as credit risk of net credit inventory, ܹ is 
calculated as follows 
ܹ = ܫ଴(1 + ݎூ + ̃ݖூ) + ܯ଴(1 + ݎ + ̃ݖெ) − ܥ(ܫ଴)      
ܹ can be written as 
ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܫ଴̃ݖூ + ܯ଴̃ݖெ − ܥ(ܫ଴)    (3.3.1.2.14) 
where ݎௐ = ݎூ ூబௐబ + ݎெబௐబ; and  
଴ܹ = ܫ଴ +ܯ଴. 
 
When new non-maturity deposit with size ܦ௡ comes, I and M becomes 
ܫ = ܫ଴ − ܦ௡ 
ܯ = ܯ଴ + ܦ௡ 
Wealth at the end period with ܦ௡ new inflow of non-maturity deposit is calculated as 
ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ݎܦ௡ + ܫ଴̃ݖூ + (ܯ଴ + ܦ௡)̃ݖெ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܦ௡)               (3.3.1.2.15) 
However, wealth at the end period with ܦ௜ new inflow of maturity deposit is influenced 
by ri as follows 
ܹ = ܫ଴(1 + ݎூ + ̃ݖூ) −ܦ௜(1 + ݎௗ) + (ܯ଴ + ܦ௜)(1 + ݎ + ̃ݖெ) − 
ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܦ௜)                                                                                        (3.3.1.2.16) 
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By substituting Eq.(3.3.1.2.5) into Eq.(3.3.1.2.16) W can be written as  
ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܽ௜ܦ௜ + ܫ଴̃ݖூ + (ܯ଴ + ܦ௜)̃ݖெ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܦ௜) (3.3.1.2.17)                       
   
The outflow of new loan Linv changes net earning asset inventory I and net position in 
money market M into 
ܫ = ܫ଴ + ܮ௜௡௩ 
ܯ = ܯ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩ 
Net earning asset inventory and net position money market also change in similar way 
when each earning asset is outgoing. 
Wealth at the end period with the inv outflow of credit lines for seed capital or 
investment outlay is calculated as 
ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܫ଴̃ݖூ + ܯ଴̃ݖெ − ܮ௜௡௩(1 + ݎ) + ܮ௜௡௩(1 + ݎ௜௡௩) − 
ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(݅݊ݒ)                                                                                        (3.3.1.2.18) 
Substituting Eq. (3.3.1.2.1) into Eq. (3.3.1.2.18) will generate  
ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ௜ܾ௡௩ܮ௜௡௩ + (ܫ଴ + ܮ௜௡௩)̃ݖூ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩)̃ݖெ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩)                 
  
Accordingly, ܹ with new outflow of other earning assets is defined as follows 
ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܾ௪௢௥௞ܮ௪௢௥௞ + (ܫ଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞)̃ݖூ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞)̃ݖெ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − 
ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞) 
ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܾ௖௢௡௦ܮ௖௢௡௦ + (ܫ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦)̃ݖூ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௖௢௡௦)̃ݖெ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − 
ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦) 
ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ௙ܾ௜ܨܫ + (ܫ଴ + ܨܫ)̃ݖூ + (ܯ଴ − ܨܫ)̃ݖெ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܨܫ) 
 
Using Taylor expansion, expected utility of wealth at the end of period E[U(W)] is 
derived as 
ܧܷ(ܹ) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )ܧ[ܹ− ഥܹ ] + ଵ
ଶ
	ܷ"( ഥܹ )ܧ[ܹ− ഥܹ ]ଶ                  (3.3.1.2.19) 
Following assumption in Maudos and Guevara (2004), utility function is continuously 
doubly differentiable with U’ > 0  
U” < 0, 
ഥܹ = ܧ(ܹ); and  
ܹ− ഥܹ = ܮ଴̃ݖ௅ + ܯ଴̃ݖெ . 
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Substituting Eq.(3.3.1.2.14) to Eq. (3.3.1.2.19) produces 
ܧܷ(ܹ) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ଵ
ଶ
	ܷ"( ഥܹ )(ܫ଴ଶߪூଶ + ܯ଴ଶߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ܯ଴ߪூெ)                         (3.3.1.2.20) 
where ܫ଴̃ݖூ  = ܮ௜௡௩,଴̃ݖ௜௡௩ + ܮ௪௢௥௞,଴̃ݖ௪௢௥௞ + ܮ௖௢௡௦,଴̃ݖ௖௢௡௦ + ܨܫ଴̃ݖ௙௜ 
 
Accordingly, expected utility of wealth at the end of period when there is new flow of a 
product, is written as follows 
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௡) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ݎܦ௡ − ܥ(ܦ௡)] + ଵଶ 	ܷ"( ഥܹ )[ܫ଴ଶߪூଶ +                                                  (ܯ଴ + ܦ௡)ଶߪெଶ2(ܯ଴ + ܦ௡)ܫ଴ߪூெ]                                        (3.3.1.2.21)                                       
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௜) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܽ௜ܦ௜ − ܥ(ܦ௜)] + ଵଶ 	ܷ"( ഥܹ )[ܫ଴ଶߪூଶ +                                                               
					 (ܯ଴ + ܦ௜)ଶߪெଶ + 2(ܯ଴ + ܦ௜)ܫ଴ߪூெ]                                    (3.3.1.2.22)                                   
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ ௜ܾ௡௩ܮ௜௡௩ − ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩)] +        
 ଵ
ଶ
	ܷ"( ഥܹ )[(ܫ଴ + ܮ௜௡௩)ଶߪூଶ +(ܯ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩)ଶߪெଶ + 2(ܫ଴ + ܮ௜௡௩)(ܯ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩)ߪூெ]                                               (3.3.1.2.23)             
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܾ௪௢௥௞ܮ௪௢௥௞ − ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞)] + 12 	ܷ"( ഥܹ )[(ܫ଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞)ଶߪூଶ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞)ଶߪெଶ + 2(ܫ଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞)(ܯ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞)ߪூெ]                                       (3.3.1.2.24) 
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܾ௖௢௡௦ܮ௖௢௡௦ − ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦)] + 
ଵ
ଶ
	ܷ"( ഥܹ )[(ܫ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦)ଶߪூଶ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௖௢௡௦)ଶߪெଶ +                2(ܫ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦)(ܯ଴ − ܮ௖௢௡௦)ߪூெ]                                         (3.3.1.2.25) 
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܨܫ) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )ൣ ௙ܾ௜ܨܫ − ܥ(ܨܫ)൧ +           
ଵ
ଶ
	ܷ"( ഥܹ )[(ܫ଴ + ܨܫ)ଶߪூଶ + (ܯ଴ − ܨܫ)ଶߪெଶ +            2(ܫ଴ + ܨܫ)(ܯ଴ − ܨܫ)ߪூெ]                                                      (3.3.1.2.26)                                                                                                       
   
The changes of expected utility of wealth at the end of period due to new flow of each 
product (i.e. ∆ܧ[ܷ(ܹ)])  is derived as follows 
∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௡) = Eq. (3.3.1.2.21) – Eq. (3.3.1.2.20) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ݎܦ௡ − ܥ(ܦ௡)] + ଵଶ 	ܷ"( ഥܹ )[ܦ௡(ܦ௡ + 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ +          2ܫ଴ܦ௡ߪூெ]	                                                                            (3.3.1.2.27) 
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∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௜) 						= Eq. (3.3.1.2.22) – Eq. (3.3.1.2.20) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܽ௜ܦ௜ − ܥ(ܦ௜)] + ଵଶ 	ܷ"( ഥܹ )[ܦ௜(ܦ௜ + 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ +                     2ܫ଴ܦ௜ߪூெ]	                                                                        (3.3.1.2.28) 
∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩) 					= Eq. (3.3.1.2.23) – Eq. (3.3.1.2.20) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ ௜ܾ௡௩ܮ௜௡௩ − ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩)] + ଵଶ 	ܷ"( ഥܹ ) ଵܺ                   (3.3.1.2.29) 
∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) 	= Eq. (3.3.1.2.24) – Eq. (3.3.1.2.20)) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܾ௪௢௥௞ܮ௪௢௥௞ − ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞)] + ଵଶ 	ܷ"( ഥܹ )ܺଶ           (3.3.1.2.30) 
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) 		= Eq. (3.3.1.2.25) – Eq. (3.3.1.2.20) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܾ௖௢௡௦ܮ௖௢௡௦ − ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦)] + ଵଶ 	ܷ"( ഥܹ )ܺଷ              (3.3.1.2.31) 
∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܨܫ) 							= Eq. (3.3.1.2.26) – Eq. (3.3.1.2.20) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )ൣ ௙ܾ௜ܨܫ − ܥ(ܨܫ)൧ + ଵଶ 	ܷ"( ഥܹ )ܺସ                           (3.3.1.2.32) 
and ଵܺ = ܮ௜௡௩(ܫ଴ + 2ܮ௜௡௩)ߪூଶ + ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܮ௜௡௩(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩)ߪூெ 
ܺଶ = ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܫ଴ + 2ܮ௪௢௥௞)ߪூଶ + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ +  2ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞)ߪூெ 
ܺଷ = ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܫ଴ + 2ܮ௖௢௡௦)ߪூଶ + ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ +  2ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௖௢௡௦)ߪூெ 
ܺସ = ܨܫ(2ܫ଴ + ܨܫ)ߪூଶ + ܨܫ(ܨܫ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܨܫ(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܨܫ)ߪூெ 
 
Expected utility maximization problem is expressed as follows 
ܯܽݔ௔೔,௕೑೔,௕೎೚೙ೞ,௕ೢ೚ೝೖ ,௕೔೙ೡ ,ܧܷ(ܹ) = Prܦ௜ ∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௜) + Prܦ௡ ∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௡) + Prܨܫ ∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܨܫ) + Pr ܮ௖௢௡௦ ∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) + Pr ܮ௪௢௥௞ ∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) + Pr ܮ௜௡௩ ∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩)   
First order condition of ܧ[ܷ(ܹ)] with respect of immediacy fees gives intermediation 
margin that maximizes the expected utility of wealth.   
߲ܧܷ(ܹ)
߲ܽ௜
= −ߚ௜ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.27) + (ߙ௜ − ߚ௜ܽ௜)ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )ܦ௜ + ߜ௜ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.28) = 0 
߲ܧܷ(ܹ)
߲ ௜ܾ௡௩
= ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )݅݊ݒ൫ߙ௜௡௩ − ߚ௜௡௩ ௜ܾ௡௩ + ߜ௪௢௥௞ܾ௪௢௥௞ + ߜ௖௢௡௦ܾ௖௢௡௦ + ߜ௙௜ ௙ܾ௜൯ − 
ߚ௜௡௩ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.29) + ߜ௜௡௩(ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.30) + ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.31) + 
ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.32)) = 0 
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߲ܧܷ(ܹ)
߲ܾ௪௢௥௞
= ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )ݓ݋ݎ݇൫ߙ௪௢௥௞ − ߚ௪௢௥௞ܾ௪௢௥௞ + ߜ௜௡௩ ௜ܾ௡௩ + ߜ௖௢௡௦ܾ௖௢௡௦ + ߜ௙௜ ௙ܾ௜൯ − 
ߚ௪௢௥௞ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.30)+ߜ௪௢௥௞(ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.29) + ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.31) +
ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.32)) = 0 
 
߲ܧܷ(ܹ)
߲ܾ௖௢௡௦
= ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )ܿ݋݊ݏ൫ߙ௖௢௡௦ − ߚ௖௢௡௦ܾ௖௢௡௦ + ߜ௜௡௩ ௜ܾ௡௩ + ߜ௪௢௥௞ܾ௪௢௥௞ + ߜ௙௜ ௙ܾ௜൯ − 
ߚ௖௢௡௦ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.31) + ߜ௖௢௡௦(ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.29) + 
ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.30) + ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.32)) = 0 
 
߲ܧܷ(ܹ)
߲ ௙ܾ௜
= ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )݊൫ߙ௡ − ߚ௙௜ ௙ܾ௜ + ߜ௜௡௩ ௜ܾ௡௩ + ߜ௪௢௥௞ܾ௪௢௥௞ + ߜ௖௢௡௦ܾ௖௢௡௦൯ − 
ߚ௡ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.32) + ߜ௡(ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.29) + ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.30) + 
ܧݍ. (3.3.1.2.31)) = 0 
 
If − ௎"(ௐഥ )
௎ᇱ(ௐഥ ) = ܴ is absolute risk aversion, then 
ܽ௜ = ଵଶ ఈ೔ఉ + ଵଶ ஼(஽೔)஽೔ + ோସ {(ܦ௜ + 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ߪூெ} + ଵଶ ఋ೔ఉ ቀ஽೙஽೔ ቄݎ − ஼(஽೙)஽೙ −   
ோ
ଶ
൫(ܦ௡ + 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ߪூெ൯ቅቁ                                                              (3.3.1.2.33)    
                                    
௜ܾ௡௩ = 12ߙ௜௡௩ߚ௜௡௩ + 12ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩)ܮ௜௡௩ + ܴ4 ଵܺܮ௜௡௩ + ߜ௜௡௩2ߚ௜௡௩ ൜ܾ௪௢௥௞ ൬ߜ௪௢௥௞ߜ௜௡௩ − ܮ௪௢௥௞ܮ௜௡௩ ൰ + 
ܾ௖௢௡௦ ൬
ߜ௖௢௡௦
ߜ௜௡௩
−
ܮ௖௢௡௦
ܮ௜௡௩
൰ + ௙ܾ௜ ቆ ߜ௙௜ߜ௜௡௩ − ܨܫܮ௜௡௩ቇ − 
஼(௅ೢ೚ೝೖ)ା஼(௅೎೚೙ೞ)ା஼(ிூ)
௅೔೙ೡ
−
ଵ
ଶ
ோ
௅೔೙ೡ
(ܺଶ + ܺଷ + ܺସ)ቅ                                    (3.3.1.2.34) 
 
ܾ௪௢௥௞ = 12ߙ௪௢௥௞ߚ௪௢௥௞ + 12ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞)ܮ௪௢௥௞ + ܴ4 ܺଶܮ௪௢௥௞ + ߜ௪௢௥௞2ߚ௪௢௥௞ ൜ ௜ܾ௡௩ ൬ ߜ௜௡௩ߜ௪௢௥௞ − 
ܮ௜௡௩
ܮ௪௢௥௞
൰ + ܾ௖௢௡௦ ൬ߜ௖௢௡௦ߜ௪௢௥௞ − ܮ௖௢௡௦ܮ௪௢௥௞൰ + ܾ௙௜ ൬ ߜ௘௔ߜ௪௢௥௞ − ܨܫܮ௪௢௥௞൰ − 
஼(௅೔೙ೡ)ା஼(௅೎೚೙ೞ)ା஼(ிூ)
௅ೢ೚ೝೖ
+ ଵ
ଶ
ோ
௅ೢ೚ೝೖ
( ଵܺ + ܺଷ + ܺସ)ቅ                                    (3.3.1.2.35) 
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ܾ௖௢௡௦ = 12ߙ௖௢௡௦ߚ௖௢௡௦ + ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦)2ܮ௖௢௡௦ + ܴ4 ܺଷܮ௖௢௡௦ + ߜ௖௢௡௦2ߚ௖௢௡௦ ൜ ௜ܾ௡௩ ൬ ߜ௜௡௩ߜ௖௢௡௦ − ܮ௜௡௩ܮ௖௢௡௦൰ + 
ܾ௪௢௥௞ ൬
ߜ௪௢௥௞
ߜ௖௢௡௦
−
ܮ௜௡௩
ܮ௖௢௡௦
൰ + ܾ௙௜ ቆ ߜ௙௜ߜ௖௢௡௦ − ܨܫܮ௖௢௡௦ቇ − 
஼(௅೔೙ೡ)ା஼(௅ೢ೚ೝೖ)ା஼(ிூ)
௅೎೚೙ೞ
−
ோ
ଶ
(௑భା௑మା௑ర)
௅೎೚೙ೞ
ቅ                                                    (3.3.1.2.36) 
 
௙ܾ௜ = 12ߙ௡ߚ௡ + ܥ(ܨܫ)2ܨܫ + ܴ4 ܺସܨܫ + ߜ௙௜2ߚ௙௜ ቊ ௜ܾ௡௩ ቆߜ௜௡௩ߜ௙௜ − ܮ௜௡௩ܨܫ ቇ + ܾ௪௢௥௞ ቆߜ௪௢௥௞ߜ௙௜ − ܮ௜௡௩ܨܫ ቇ + 
ܾ௖௢௡௦ ቆ
ߜ௖௢௡௦
ߜ௙௜
−
ܮ௖௢௡௦
ܨܫ
ቇ −
ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩) + ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞) + ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦)
ܨܫ
− 
+ ோ
ଶ
(௑భା௑మା௑య)
ிூ
ቅ                                                                                       (3.3.1.2.37) 
where degree of risk aversion ܴ = −ܷ"(ܹ)/ܷ′(ܹ) 
 
Intermediation margin is summation of price spread across the six products. Thus, 
intermediation margin that maximizes expected utility of banks’ terminal wealth is 
margin = Eq.(3.3.1.2.33) + Eq.(3.3.1.2.34) + Eq. (3.3.1.2.35) +  
   Eq. (3.3.1.2.36) + Eq. (3.3.1.2.37)                                                    (3.3.1.2.38)                                           
 This implies that non-maturity deposits makes bank better off when per unit operating 
cost and risk premium of non maturity deposit is higher than return on money market 
fund. 
ݎ > ோ
ଶ
൫(2ܯ଴ + ܦ௡)ߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ߪூெ൯ + ஼(஽೙)஽೙   
 
Introducing non-maturity deposits does not change condition of competitive advantage 
of non-loan earning assets gives. Non-loan earning assets give bank competitive 
advantage if relative immediacy fee of loans is lower than summation of per unit 
operating cost and risk premium of loan.   
௜ܾ௡௩ ቆܮ௪௢௥௞ + ߜ௜௡௩ߜ௙௜ ቇ + ܾ௪௢௥௞ ቆܮ௪௢௥௞ + ߜ௪௢௥௞ߜ௙௜ ቇ + ܾ௖௢௡௦ ቆܮ௖௢௡௦ + ߜ௖௢௡௦ߜ௙௜ ቇ < 
ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩) + ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞) + ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦) + ܴ2 ( ଵܺ + ܺଶ + ܺଷ) 
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3.3.2 Banking survey 
The proposed model that is summarized in Eq.(3.1.2.38) is tested on unbalance panel 
data derived from quarterly data of 51 Indonesian banks, representing 90% of total loans 
in the country. To identify proxies for variables specified in the proposed model and 
variables overlooked in the proposed model, a banking survey was carried out from 
March 2011 to April 2011 on 66 bank respondents. The survey becomes important since 
literatures concerning intermediation margin imply that margin determinants might vary 
across countries.  
 
The 66 bank respondents represent 97% of total loans in Indonesia. The respondents 
consist of three state owned banks, branches of ten foreign banks, subsidiaries of 16 
foreign banks, and 37 national banks. The foreign banks operate in Europe, USA, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Asia, and Japan. Survey is designed as explanatory 
research to determine variables influencing intermediary margin and bank’s decision on 
loan disbursement during period 2005 - 2010. Method to collect data is email survey 
and personal interview. Information about the objective of survey, definition of 
terminology and motivation to answer is provided in the questioner. The quality of the 
questionnaire was tested in February 2011 on ten banks representing state owned banks, 
branches of foreign banks, subsidiaries of foreign banks, national banks and regional 
banks. Results of the survey are summarized in table 2 and 3. Table 2 shows financial 
products, which are frequently used in managing liquidity of a bank. Thus, uncertainty 
in money market should regard volatility of interest rates of financial instruments in 
table 10. 
Table 10 Financial instrument used in liquidity management 
Lending/ 
Investment
Borrowing
Interbank call money 66 57
T-bills (SBI) 54 N/A
Government bonds 21 N/A
SBI reverse repo/repo 12 18
Gov. bonds reverse repo/repo 9 24
Other central bank's liquidity facility 48 45
Liquidity Management Intruments
Number of Respondents
 
Sources: Indonesian banking survey (March-April 2011) 
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Table 11 summarizes factors influencing banks’ pricing decision on loan and deposit. 
Evidently, holding liquidity reserves is also considered loosing opportunity to make 
profit. Interest rate published by deposit insurance agency, which is called Lembaga 
Penjamin Simpanan (LPS), also influences deposit prices. The deposit insurance scheme 
insures or guarantees deposit to be paid back only if the interest on the deposit is not 
higher than interest rate published by LPS. It is important to note that more than 75% of 
branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks in the sample adopt pricing methodology, 
which is designed by their parent banks.    
Table 11 Determinants of deposit rates and loan rates 
Determinants/Factors Number of banks 
Deposit prices:  
LPS’s rate in the previous period 45 
Interest rate in money market 42 
Loan and deposit prices in the previous quarter 15 
  
Cost of funds:  
Deposit prices 51 
Deposit insurance premium 51 
Cost of liquidity reserve requirement 39 
Cost of cash reserve 3 
  
Cost of loanable funds:  
Cost of fund 51 
Cost of capital charge 9 
Operating cost 51 
Risk premium 54 
  
Loan prices:  
Cost of loanable fund 51 
Required profit margin (including premium 
for indirect risks) 
9 
Sources: Indonesian banking survey (March-April 2011) 
 
Concerning criteria for project bankability, all respondents agree that financial capacity 
and credit worthiness of prospective borrowers are the main factors in credit approval. 
48 respondents consider tradability and value of collateral in the credit approval. Two 
interesting findings are the effects of size and novelty of project/investment on bank 
decision. 18 respondents said that size of prospective project or investment determines 
bankability of project or investment. Three respondents said that they do not disburse 
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loans to projects or investments in need of venture capital. Additionally, only 12 banks 
involve in projects or investments associated with emission abatement initiatives. 
 
 
3.3.3 Empirical model 
Finding of Indonesian banking survey, which is summarized in table 11, shows that 
some banks consider loan and deposit prices in the previous quarter. This implies that 
past value of intermediation margin i.e. spread between earning asset prices and deposit 
might be relevant to current value of intermediation margin. Therefore, dynamic panel 
model and static panel model are estimated and compared. Section 3.3.3.1 explains 
empirical application of Ho and Saunders (1981) model by Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000). Empirical application of Maudos and Guevara (2004) using regression model in 
Maudos and Solis (2009) is also described. The two empirical models are compared 
with empirical application of extended dealers model previously described in section 
3.3.1.2.  
 
Three static panel data models are considered to test the extended model i.e. pooled 
regression, fixed effects model, and random effects model, with heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors and cluster robust standard errors. Model selection is based on 
specification test of Hausman and Taylor (1981) and of Breush-Pagan (1971). Section 
3.3.3.2 illustrates panel data model used in Maudos and Solis (2009). The results are 
compared with results from system GMM for extended dealership model described in 
section 3.3.1.2. Techniques to reduce instrument count in this system GMM are also 
described. The condensed instrument set should avoid overfit endogenous variables and 
strengthen instrument-joint validity test of Hansen (1982) and two step Sargan test 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991).   
 
Time dummies are included in the static and dynamic panel model to pick out and 
control for seasonal variation in data. Time dummy variables for each quarter, which 
will net out the average change in a variable resulting from any seasonal fluctuations. 
Hence, Q1 is 1 if data belong to the first quarter of year and 0 otherwise, and so on. 
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Seasonal movements in series such as asset building and restated unused loss provision 
in Q4 of each year might occur and influence the results.  
 
 
3.3.3.1 Static panel data model 
A two-step pooled ordinary least square (pooled OLS) is suggested in Ho and Saunders 
(1981). The first step pooled OLS estimates the following regression. 
ܲ ௜ܵ௧ = ߛ௧ + ߚଵܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߚଶܴܴ௜,௧ + ߚଷܥܣ ௜ܲ,௧ + ݁௜௧,    
 i = 1,…,N; t = 1,…,T                                                                                (3.3.3.1.1) 
where i denotes individual bank and t denotes time. PS denotes pure margin (i.e. spread 
between interest income and interest expense), IMPLICIT denotes implicit interest rate, 
and CAP denotes opportunity cost of capital. ߚ is 13  coefficient matrix. The second 
step pooled OLS estimates  
ܲ ௜ܵ௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܯ ௧ܲ + ߚଶܯܴ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴ௜,௧ + ߚସܳ௜,௧ + ݁௜௧                                      (3.3.3.1.2) 
where MP is the estimated deterministic term t  in Eq.(3.3.3.1.1), MR is market risk 
exposure, R is degree of risk aversion, and Q is size of new loan. 
 
If unitary pooled disturbance ݁௜௧ is decomposed in the following way  
݁௜௧ = ߤ௜ + ݒ௜௧                                                                                                      (3.3.3.1.3) 
with time invariant unobservable individual-specific effect ߤ௜ and remainder disturbance 
ݒ௜௧ and individual specific effect ( i ) is correlated with the explanatory variables, fixed 
effect or random effect model should be considered (Batalgi, 2005). Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000) eliminates i  by using within transformation as follows 
ܲ ௜ܵ௧ − ܲܵതതതത௜ = ߙ + ߚଵ(ܯ ௜ܲ௧ −ܯܲതതതതത௜) + ߚଶ(ܯܴ௜௧ −ܯܴതതതതത௜) + 
ߚଷ(ܴ௜௧ − തܴ௜) + ߚସ(ܳ௜௧ − തܳ௜) + ν̈it         (3.3.3.1.4) 
 where 


iT
t
it
i
i PST
PS
1
1
 
 
Maudos and Solis (2009) used more variables in their fixed effect model. One of 
variables in the fixed effect model i.e. market power (MP) calculated as the spread 
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between product price and marginal cost, divided by product price. Marginal cost is 
estimated by using OLS as follows. 
lnܶܥ௜,௧ = ߙ +ߙ௝෍ݓ௜,௧௝ଷ
௝ୀଵ
+ 12෍෍ߙ௝௞ lnݓ௜,௧௝ ݓ௜,௧௞ଷ
௞ୀଵ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
+ ߚଵ ln ௜ܻ,௧ + 
ଵ
ଶ
ߚଶ൫ln ௜ܻ,௧൯ଶ + ∑ ߚଷ௝ ln ௜ܻ,௧ lnݓ௜,௧௝ଷ௝ୀଵ + ߛଵ௧ܶ + ଵଶ ߛଶ௧ܶଶ +   
∑ ߛଷ௧
ଷ
௝ୀଵ lnݓ௜,௧௝ + ߛସ௧ ln ௜ܻ,௧ + ߤ௜ + ݒ௜௧                                               (3.3.3.1.5) 
Where TC is total cost, w1 is labor price, w2 is price of loanable fund, w3 is other 
operating cost, Y is total asset, T is time trend capturing technical progress, and 
ߤ	caputres individual fixed effect. Market power (MP) is calculated as The second step 
is to include MP into four equation which is estimated by using OLS with fixed effect.   
ܫܯ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ,௧ + ߚଶܥ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴ௜,௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜,௧ + ߚହܥܴ௜,௧ + ߚ଺ܳ௜,௧ + 
ߚ଻ܥܥܯ௜,௧ + ߚ଼ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߚଽܴܴ௜,௧ + ߚଵ଴ܯܩ ௜ܶ,௧ + ݁௜,௧                    (3.3.3.1.6) 
ܫܯ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ,௧ + ߚଶܥ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴ௜,௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜,௧ + ߚହܥܴ௜,௧ + ߚ଺ܳ௜,௧ + 
ߚ଻ܥܥܯ௜,௧ + ߚ଼ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߚଽܴ௜,௧ + ߚଵ଴ܯܩ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߚଵଵܴܶܣܦܧ௜,௧ + 
ߚଵଶܨܧܧ௜,௧ + ݁௜௧                                                                                      (3.3.3.1.7) 
ܫܯ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ,௧ + ߚଶܥ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴ௜,௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜,௧ + ߚହܥܴ௜,௧ + ߚ଺ܳ௜,௧ + 
ߚ଻ܥܥܯ௜,௧ + ߚ଼ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߚଽܴ௜,௧ + ߚଵ଴ܯܩ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߚଵଵܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ + ݁௜,௧  (3.3.3.1.8) 
ܫܯ௜௧ = ߙ + ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ,௧ + ߚଶܥ௜,௧ + ߚଷܴ௜,௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜,௧ + ߚହܥܴ௜,௧ + ߚ଺ܳ௜,௧ + 
ߚ଻ܥܥܯ௜,௧ + ߚ଼ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߚଽܴ௜,௧ + ߚଵ଴ܯܩ ௜ܶ,௧ + ߚଵଵܮܧ ௜ܸ,௧ + 
ߚଵଶܩܦ ௧ܲ + ߚଵଷܫܰܨ௧ + ߚଵସܨܧܧ௜,௧ + ߚଵହܴܶܣܦܧ௜,௧ + ݁௜௧                       (3.3.3.1.9) 
where C denotes operating cost, CR denotes credit risk, CCM denotes interaction 
between market risk and credit risk, MGT denotes management efficiency, LEV is 
leverage, GDP is gross domestic product, FEE is fee based income, TRADE is net 
income from trading portfolio, INF is inflation.   
 
Considering fixed effect model might be the appropriate structure of the model 
(Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; Maudos and Solis, 2009), the proposed model 
Eq.(3.3.1.2.38) is estimated by using regression with fixed effects and robust estimates 
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of standard errors.  The estimates of standard errors are obtained by using method as in 
Arellano (1987) allowing a general variance-covariance matrix on ݒ௜௧ as in White 
(1980). The general form of regression for Eq.(3.3.1.2.38) is written as follows 
 
ܷܴܲܧ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଶܥܱܵ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଷܴܣ௜௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜௧ + ߚହܥܴܮ௜௧ + 
ߚ଺ܮܱܣ ௜ܰ௧ + ߚ଻ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚ଼ܮܲ ௜ܵ௧ + ߚଽܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + ߚଵ଴ܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜௧ + 
ߚଵଵܲܯ௜௧ + ߚଵଶܳ1௜௧ + ߚଵଷܳ2௜௧ + ߚଵସܳ3௜௧ + ߚଵହܳ4௜௧ + ݁௜௧   (3.3.3.1.10) 
 
ܰܫܯ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଶܥܱܵ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଷܴܣ௜௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜௧ + ߚହܥܴܧܣ௜௧ + 
ߚ଺ܫܧܣ௜௧ + ߚ଻ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚ଼ܮܲ ௜ܵ௧ + ߚଽܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + ߚଵ଴ܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜௧ + 
ߚଵଵܲܯ௜௧ + ߚଵଶܳ1௜௧ + ߚଵଷܳ2௜௧ + ߚଵସܳ3௜௧ + ߚଵହܳ4௜௧ + ݁௜௧ (3.3.3.1.11) 
 
ܩܯ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଶܥܱܵ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଷܴܣ௜௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜௧ + ߚହܥܴܧܣ௜௧ + 
ߚ଺ܧܣ௜௧ + ߚ଻ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚ଼ܮܲ ௜ܵ௧ + ߚଽܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + ߚଵ଴ܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜௧ + 
ߚଵଵܲܯ௜௧ + ߚଵଶܳ1௜௧ + ߚଵଷܳ2௜௧ + ߚଵସܳ3௜௧ + ߚଵହܳ4௜௧ + ݁௜௧  (3.3.3.1.12) 
Each variable is transformed in the same way as Eq.(3.3.3.1.4), so ߚ and estimators (ߙ + ߤ௜) are the best linear unbiased estimators given that ݒ௜௧ is the standard classical 
disturbance with zero mean and variance-covariance matrix ߪ௩ଶ. Qi is 1 if data belong to 
the i-th quarter of year and 0 otherwise, for i = 1,2,3,4.. 
 
The Eq.(3.3.3.1.10), Eq.(3.3.3.1.11), and Eq.(3.3.3.1.12) are viewed as a set of 
individual equation with the following general form 
ݕ௜ = ݖ௜ߜ + ߤ௜ߡ் + ݒ௜         (3.3.3.1.13) 
with ܧ[ݒ௜ݒ௜ᇱ] = Ω௜ , ݅ = 1,⋯ ,ܰ  
 ܧൣݒ௜ݒ௝ᇱ൧ ≠ 0 for ݅ ≠ ݆ 
PUREi  is ܶ × 1 vector, ݖ௜ = [ߡ் ,ݔ௜],  ݔ௜ is ܶ × ݇ matrix of exogenous variables, ݒ௜ is 
ܶ × 1 vector, ߤ௜ is a scalar and ߜ = [ߙ,ߚ′]. The asymptotic results are performed for T 
fixed and ܰ → ∞. The Within transformation on the equation gives 
ݕො௜ = ݔො௜ߚ + ݒො௜                                                                                                    (3.3.3.1.14) 
with ݕො = ܳݕ, ݔො = ܳݔ,		and 	ݒො = ܳݒ 
ݕො = (ݕොଵ′,⋯ ,ݕොே′)ᇱ, ݕො௜ = (ܫ் − ܬ்̅ )ݕ௜ and ݔො௜ = (ܫ் − ܬ்̅ )ݔ௜. 
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By restricting that individual equations have the same ߚ, the asymptotic distribution of 
the Within estimator of ߚ is 
ܰଵ/ଶ൫ߚመ − ߚ൯~ܰ(0,ܯିଵܸܯିଵ) 
where ܯ = ݌݈݅݉(ݔො′ݔො)/ܰ  
 ܸ = ݌݈݅݉∑ (ݔො௜′Ω୧ݔො௜)/ܰே௜ୀଵ  
 ෠ܸ = ∑ (ݔො௜′݁̂௜݁̂௜′ݔො௜)/ܰே௜ୀଵ  
݁̂௜ = ݕො௜ − ݔො௜ߚ 
ݔොᇱܳ݀݅ܽ݃[Ω୧]ܳݔො = ݔො′݀݅ܽ݃[Ω୧]ݔො 
 
Thus, the robust asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of ߚ is estimated as 
ܸܥܧ൫ߚመ൯ = (ݔො′ݔො)ିଵ(∑ ݔො௜′ே௜ୀଵ ݁̂௜݁̂௜′ݔො௜)(ݔො௜′ݔො௜)ିଵ.  
while cluster robust variance-covariance matrix of ߚ is 
ܸܥܧ൫ߚመ൯ = (ݔො′ݔො)ିଵ ቆ෍ ݑො௝′ݑො௝௡೎
௝ୀଵ
ቇ (ݔො௜′ݔො௜)ିଵ 
where ݑො௝ = ∑ ݁̂௜ݔො௜௝೎೗ೠೞ೟೐ೝ  and nc is the total number of clusters 
The cluster robust covariance matrix relaxes the i.i.d. assumption of independent errors 
by allowing for arbitrary correlation between errors within clusters of observations. 
Cameron and Miller (2010) suggested that the estimation of covariance matrix without 
controlling for clustering might lead to understated standard errors and overstated 
statistical significance. 
  
Fixed effect estimators are consistent and efficient when individual groups/times have 
different intercept in the regression equation. The estimators however are not efficient 
when individual groups/time have different disturbance. The model can not estimate the 
effect of any time-invariant variables since such variables are wiped out by the 
deviations from means transformation (Batalgi, 2005). If individual groups/times have 
different disturbance, regression with random effect should be considered to estimate 
Eq.(3.3.3.1.2) and equation from Eq.(3.3.3.1.6) to Eq.(3.3.3.1.9), and Eq.(3.3.3.1.10) to 
Eq.(3.3.3.1.12). If the general form of regression is written as follows 
ititiit vXy          (3.3.3.1.13) 
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ߤ௜ are assumed to be random that ߤ௜~݅. ݅.݀(0,ߪఓଶ) with ݒ௜௧~݅. ݅. ݀(0,ߪ௩ଶ) and ߤ௜ are 
independent of ݒ௜௧.  Explanatory variables is assumed to be independent of ߤ௜ and ݒ௜௧ 
for all i and t. 	To obtain generalized least square (GLS) estimator of the regression 
coefficients, variance of covariance matrix Ω-1. 
Ω = ܶߪఓଶ(ܫே⨂ܬ்̅ ) + ߪ௩ଶ(ܫே⨂ܧ்) + ߪ௩ଶ(ܫே⨂ܬ்̅ ) = ߪଵଶܲ + ߪ௩ଶܳ 
where ܧ் ≡ (ܫ் − ܬ்̅ ) and ߪଵଶ = ܶߪఓଶ + ߪ௩ଶ                                                        
The best quadratic unbiased estimators of the variance components are 
ߪො௩ଶ = ∑ ∑ (௨೔೟ି௨ഥ೔)మ೅೟సభಿ೔సభ ே(்ିଵ)   and 
ߪොଵ
ଶ = ܶ∑ ݑത௜ଶே௜ୀଵ
ܰ
 
 
Following Swamy and Arora (1972), two regressions are run to get estimates of the 
variance components from the corresponding mean square error of the regression. The 
first regression is  
ݏଶ = ߪො෠௩ଶ = ௬ᇲொ௬ି௬ᇱொ௫൫௫ᇲொ௫൯షభ௫ᇱொ௬ே(்ିଵ)ି௞   
The second regression is the Between regression running regression of average across 
time 
ݕത௜ = ߙ + ̅ݔ௜ߚ + ݑത௜,			݅ = 1,⋯ ,ܰ 
which produces  
ݏଶ = ߪො෠ଵଶ = ݕᇱܲݕ − ݕ′ܲݖ(ݖᇱܲݖ)ିଵݖ′ܲݕܰ − ݇ − 1  
Thus, the two regressions are transformed into 
൬
ܳݕ
ܲݕ൰ = ቀܳݖܲݖቁߜ + ቀܳݑܲݑቁ  
with zero mean transformed error and variance covariance matrix ൬
ߪ௩ଶܳ 00 ߪଵଶܲ൰. 
 
It follows that ߚመீ௅ௌ is weighted average of ߚመௐ௜௧௛௜௡ and ߚመ஻௘௧௪௘௘௡ (i.e. each estimator is 
weighted by the inverse of its corresponding variance) that 
ߚመீ௅ௌ = ଵܹߚመௐ௜௧௛௜௡ + ଶܹߚመ஻௘௧௪௘௘௡ 
with ଵܹ = ( ௫ܹ௫ + ߶ଶܤ௫௫)ିଵ ௫ܹ௫ 
ଶܹ = ܫ − ଵܹ 
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௫ܹ௫ = ݔ′ܳݔ  
ܤ௫௫ = ݔᇱ(ܲ − ܬே்̅)ݔ 
߶ଶ = ߪ௩ଶ/ߪଵଶ 
Then, ݒܽݎ൫ߚመீ௅ௌ൯ = ߪ௩ଶ( ௫ܹ௫ + ߶ଶܤ௫௫)ିଵ 
 
The likelihood function under normality of disturbances can be written as 
ܮ(ߙ,ߚ,߶ଶ,ߪ௩ଶ) = ܿ݋݊ݏݐ − ܰܶ2 ݈݋݃ߪ௩ଶ + ܰ2 ݈݋݃߶ଶ − 12ߪ௩ଶ ݑ′Σିଵݑ 
߶ଶ = ఙೡమ
ఙభ
మ ,Ω = ߪ௩ଶ and Σ = ܳ + ߶ିଶܲ. The likelihood with respect to ߙ and ߪ௩ଶ as in 
Breusch (1987) is 
ߙොெ௅ா = ݕത − ̅ݔ′ߚመெ௅ா , and ߪ௩,ெ௅ாଶ = ( ଵே்)ݑො′Σ෠ିଵݑො 
Σ෠  and ݑො are based on maximum likelihood estimates of ߚ,߶ଶ	and ߙ.  
 
If = ݕ − ݔߚመெ௅ா  , ߙොெ௅ா = ( ଵே்)ߡே்ᇱ ݀  and ݑො = ݀ − ܬே்̅݀. Thus, ߪ௩,ெ௅ாଶ 	 can be expressed 
as ߪ௩,ெ௅ாଶ = ௗᇱቀொାథమ(௉ି௃̅ಿ ೅)ቁௗே் 	, hence the concentrated likelihood is expressed as 
ܮ஼(ߚ,߶ଶ) = ܿ݋݊ݏݐ − ே்ଶ ݈݋݃൫݀′൫ܳ + ߶ଶ(ܿ)൯݀൯+ ேଶ ݈݋݃߶ଶ. 
Maximizing ܮ஼(ߚ,߶ଶ) with respect to ߶ଶ and ߚ produces 
߶෠ଶ = ∑∑൫݀௜௧ − ݀̅௜൯ଶ
ܶ(ܶ − 1)∑൫݀௜ − ݀̅௜൯ଶ 
ߚመெ௅ா = ൫ݔ′൫ܳ + ߶ଶ(ܲ − ܬே்̅)൯ݔ൯ିଵݔ′൫ܳ + ߶ଶ(ܲ − ܬே்̅)൯ݕ 
The possibility of a local maximum is negated by starting iteration from ߚመௐ௜௧௛௜௡ and 
ߚመ஻௘௧௪௘௘௡ . The global maximum is reached when the two sequences converge to the 
same maximum.   
 
Hausman and Taylor (1981) proposed specification test to select between pooled OLS 
and fixed effect model by partitioning explanatory variables into time variant variables 
(X) and time invariant variables (Z). The assumption of the test is at least one X and one 
Z are not correlated with individual effect i . The null hypothesis is as follows 
iiti ZXH ,:0   
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If null hypothesis is true, fixed effect and random effect estimators are consistent. 
However, only random effect estimators are efficient. 
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In the case that null hypothesis is rejected, a Lagrange Multiplier test is proposed by 
Breusch and Pagan (1978). 
ܮܯ = ൫∑ ௜ܶே௜ୀଵ ൯ଶ2∑ ௜ܶே௜ୀଵ ( ௜ܶ − 1) ቎∑ ൫∑ ݁̂௜௧்೔௧ୀଵ ൯ଶே௜ୀଵ∑ ∑ ݁̂௜௧ଶ்೔௜ୀଵே௜ୀଵ − 1቏
ଶ ~߯ଶ(1) 
ܪ଴:√ܮܯ~ܰ(0,1) 
Fixed effect estimators are consistent and efficient if null hypothesis is rejected. 
Otherwise, pooled OLS should be the model structure.  
 
 
3.3.3.2 Dynamic panel data model 
In the beginning of previous section, it is noted that past value of intermediation margin 
influences current value of intermediation margin in some banks. Arrellano and Bond 
(1991) suggested a two step GMM estimator with lagged values of explanatory 
variables in levels as instrumental variables. The estimators are estimated using GMM 
framework by reproducing static model of 11 independent variables as follows 
 
ܷܴܲܧ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚଵܷܴܲܧ௜௧ + ߚଶܯ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଷܥܱܵ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚସܴܣ௜௧ + ߚହܯܴ௜௧ + ߚ଺ܥܴܮ௜௧ + 
ߚ଻ܮܱܣ ௜ܰ௧ + ߚ଼ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଽܮܲ ௜ܵ௧ + ߚଵ଴ܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + ߚଵଵܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜௧ + 
ߚଵଶܲܯ௜௧ + ߚଵଷܳ1௜௧ + ߚଵସܳ2௜௧ + ߚଵହܳ3௜௧ + ߚଵ଺ܳ4௜௧ + ݁௜௧       (3.3.3.2.1) 
 
ܰܫܯ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚଵܷܴܲܧ௜௧ + ߚଶܯ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଷܥܱܵ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚସܴܣ௜௧ + ߚହܯܴ௜௧ + ߚ଺ܥܴܫ௜௧ + 
ߚ଻ܫܧܣ௜௧ + ߚ଼ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଽܮܲ ௜ܵ௧ + ߚଵ଴ܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + ߚଵଵܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜௧ + 
ߚଵଶܲܯ௜௧ + ߚଵଷܳ1௜௧ + ߚଵସܳ2௜௧ + ߚଵହܳ3௜௧ + ߚଵ଺ܳ4௜௧ + ݁௜௧      (3.3.3.2.1) 
 
ܩܯ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚଵܷܴܲܧ௜௧ + ߚଶܯ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଷܥܱܵ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚସܴܣ௜௧ + ߚହܯܴ௜௧ + ߚ଺ܥܴܧ௜௧ + 
ߚ଻ܧܣ௜௧ + ߚ଼ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଽܮܲ ௜ܵ௧ + ߚଵ଴ܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + ߚଵଵܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜௧ + 
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ߚଵଶܲܯ௜௧ + ߚଵଷܳ1௜௧ + ߚଵସܳ2௜௧ + ߚଵହܳ3௜௧ + ߚଵ଺ܳ4௜௧ + ݁௜௧    (3.3.3.2.1) 
 
The three abovementioned regressions can be written in the following general form  
ݕ௜௧ = ߙݕ௜௧ିଵ + ߚݔ′௜௧ + ߛܼ′௜ + ݑ௜௧                                                                  (3.3.3.2.3) 
where ߙ and ߛ are ݍ × 1 matrix and ߚ is ܭ × 1 matrix. ݔ௜௧ varies over time and 
individuals while ܼ௜ vary over time. Disturbance ݑ௜௧ is a one way error component of 
ݑ௜௧ = ߤ௜ߡ் + ݒ௜௧. 
 ܧ[ݑ௜ݑᇱ௜/इ௜] depends on इ௜. इ௜ = [ݔ′௜଴,⋯ , ݔ′௜் ,ܼ′௜]ᇱ	whereas ݐ = 0 is the first 
observation. The cross-sectional homoskedasticity is defined as ܧ[ݑ௜ݑᇱ௜] = Ω where 
ߗ = ߪ௩ଶܫ் + ߪఓଶߡ்ߡ′். The T system of equation in (3.3.2.3) is transformed by using the 
following nonsingular transformation. 
ܪ = ൤ ܥߡ′்/ܶ൨ 
C is (ܶ − 1) × ܶ  matrix with rank (ܶ − 1) such that ܥఐ் = 0. Thus, C could be the first (ܶ − 1) rows of the Within group operator or of the first difference operator. The 
transformed disturbances ݑ௜ା = ܪݑ௜ = ൤ܥݑ௜ݑത௜ ൨ with the first (ܶ − 1) free of ߤ௜ .  
Therefore, all exogenous variables are valid instruments for the first (ܶ − 1) equations. 
If mi is subset of इ௜ which is uncorrelated in level with ߤ௜, a valid IV for the 
transformed system is as follows 
ܯ௜ =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎡
(इ′௜, ݕ௜଴) ⋯
⋮ ⋱ (इ′௜, ݕ௜଴, ݕ௜ଵ,⋯ ,ݕ௜்ିଶ)			0⋮
	 0																																																										 		݉′௜⎦⎥⎥
⎤
  
with moment condition ܧ[ܯ′௜ܪݑ௜] = 0. If N is number of individuals, = ൫ݕᇱଵ,⋯ , ݕᇱே൯ᇱ, ݕ௜(ିଵ) = (ݕ௜଴,⋯ , ݕ௜்ିଵ, )ᇱ, ܯ = (ܯ′ଵ,⋯ ,ܯ′ே), ܪഥ = ܫே ⊗ܪ and 
Ωഥ = ܫே ⊗Ω, the product between ܯ′ܪഥ and equation (3.3.2.3) produces 
ܯ′ܪഥݕ = ܯ′ܪഥ൫ߙݕ(ିଵ) + ߚݔ′ + ߛܼ௜൯ + ܯ′ܪഥ                                                       (3.3.3.2.4) 
 
If ௜ܹ = ൫ݕ௜(ିଵ),ݔ௜, ߡ்ܼ′௜൯ and ߟ = (ߙ,ߚ,ߛ), running GLS on Eq.(3.3.3.2.4) will 
generate estimators proposed in Arellano and Bover (1995)  
̂ߟ = [ܹ′ܪഥ′ܯ(ܯ′ܪഥΩഥܪഥ′ܯ)ିଵܯ′ܪഥܹ]ିଵܹ′ܪഥ′ܯ(ܯ′ܪഥΩഥܪഥ′ܯ)ିଵܯ′ܪഥݕ 
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Replacing covariance matrix of the transformed system (i.e.ܪഥΩഥܪഥ) by consistent 
estimator Ω෡ା = ∑ ݑො௜ାݑො௜ାᇱ/ܰே௜ୀଵ  will get estimators given by 
̂ߟ = ቂܹ′ܪഥ′ܯ൫ܯ′Ω෡ାܯ൯ିଵܯ′ܪഥܹቃିଵܹ′ܪഥ′ܯ൫ܯ′Ω෡ାܯ൯ିଵܯ′ܪഥݕ. 
 
Nonetheless such approach had been criticized to exacerbate measurement error bias 
(Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Blundell and Bond (1997) suggested the use of 
regression in differences jointly with regression in levels such in Arellano and Bover 
(1995). The estimator could reduce potential biases in finite samples as well as reduces 
asymptotic imprecision due to difference estimator. The regression for the proposed 
theoretical model If matrix of instrument set in the difference GMM (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995) for Eq.(3.3.3.2.1) is written in the following way 
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then the system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1997) adds instruments to the set as follows 
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This implies that the system GMM has additional orthogonality condition 
ܧ[∆ܷܴܲܧ௜௧ିଵ݁௜௧] = ܧ[∆ܷܴܲܧ௜௧ିଵߤ௜] + ܧ[ܷܴܲܧ௜௧ିଵݒ௜௧]− ܧ[ܷܴܲܧ௜௧ିଶݒ௜௧] = 0    
  
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed two step Sargan test for over-identifying restriction 
as follows 
݉ = ∆ݒොᇱܹ ൥෍ܹᇱ௜(∆ݒො௜)(∆ݒො௜)ᇱௐ೔ே
௜ୀଵ
൩
ିଵ
ܹᇱ(∆ݒො)~߯௣ି௄ିଵଶ  
where ∆ݒො is ̂ߟ and p is number of column in W. Other tests being proposed are Wald 
joint test, first order serial correlation test and second order serial correlation test. 
Batalgi (2005) suggested that first order serial correlation test does not matter. Attention 
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should be centered on Wald joint test and second order serial correlation test. The 
second order serial correlation test shows whether or not the original untransformed 
disturbances of the first-differenced equation are serially correlated.   
 
Roodman (2009) argued that the system GMM might handle fixed effects, endogeneity 
of regressors and dynamic panel bias. However, the instrument counts grow 
quadratically with respect to T. The estimator of difference GMM (Arellano and Bond) 
exploits, for each endogenous variable, (T-2)(T-1)/2 moment condition for 
Eq.(3.3.3.1.10) in first difference. The estimator of system GMM (Blundell and Bond) 
exploits, for each endogenous variable, the additional non-redundant T-2 orthogonality 
conditions for Eq.(3.3.3.1.10) in level. As the number of instruments becomes too large, 
there is the trade off between over fitting of endogenous variables (bias) and additional 
moment conditions (efficiency). This also gives an imprecise estimate of the 
variance/covariance matrix of the moments, lowers the power of specification test of 
Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) test of over-identifying restriction, and exacerbates 
the weak instruments problem. Thus, collapsing the instrument set, limiting the lag 
depth of the instrument set, or combination of both might transform instrument matrix 
to the optimal set of instruments. By limiting the lag depth, serial correlation will be low 
after a few periods, even if the autoregressive parameter is high. However, some 
important information in the instrument set might be lost. On the other hand, collapsing 
the instrument set retains important information whilst condensing it into a lower 
number of instruments. Thus, collapsing the instrument set for the system GMM is 
selected, producing the following instrument matrix for Eq.(3.3.3.1.10) in first 
difference 
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The collapsed instrument set for Eq.(3.3.3.1.10) in level is summarized in the following 
matrix 
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The estimation of system GMM uses heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
explained in section 3.3.3.1. 
  
 
3.4. Data 
The empirical model is estimated on quarterly data of 51 of 66 bank respondents in the 
survey. The 51 commercial banks count for 90% of total loans in Indonesia. Problem 
banks are excluded from sample since such banks typically have different asset and 
liquidity management. Besides, such banks often deal with restriction imposed by bank 
supervisory authorities such as curbing loan growth. Banks with more than 90% of their 
loan portfolio are mortgage loans are also excluded from sample. Banks focusing on 
mortgage loans are assumed to be lack of expertise in project finance. All data are 
retrieved from quarterly financial statement of banks except for contractual interest 
rates. Quarterly contractual loan rate and deposit rate are retrieved from quarterly 
regulatory report.  
 
The dependent variable in the model is intermediation margin, composing of net interest 
margin and net non interest margin. To investigate the plausibility of using contractual 
interest rates, pure margin (PURE) is calculated for contractual net interest margin and 
accounting interest margin. Contractual PURE is the spread between contractual loan 
price (rL) and contractual deposit prices (ri) Accounting PURE is the spread between 
annualized interest revenue per unit of loans and interest expenses per unit of deposits. 
Table 12 shows descriptive statistics of pure margin for the unbalanced data (PURE) as 
well as sub sample of banks with core competence in the seed capital or investment 
outlay financing (PURE_inv), working-capital loans (PURE_work), consumer loans 
(PURE_cons), non-maturity deposit (PURE_ni), and non loan earning assets (PURE_n).  
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Table 12 Descriptive statistics of contractual pure margin 
variable mean median max min st.dev skewness kurtosis
pure 0.075832 0.071287 0.325928 0.002879 0.039644 2.034688 10.56832
pure (D i ) 0.07751 0.080492 0.258887 0.002879 0.038659 1.029614 5.329747
pure (L inv ) 0.038415 0.027395 0.089432 0.015021 0.025987 1.037529 2.434597
pure (L work ) 0.070673 0.067427 0.200127 0.002879 0.033441 1.088666 5.040352
pure (L cons ) 0.127129 0.115596 0.325928 0.045346 0.067423 1.681538 5.133822
pure (FI) 0.071381 0.068546 0.325275 0.002879 0.038105 1.899199 11.15896  
Banks heavily depending on non-maturity deposits have higher interest margin than 
banks on the average. Banks with high share of consumer loans have slightly higher 
pure margin than banks with high share of investment loans or credit lines for working 
capital. Expectedly, banks holding more non loan earning assets have lower pure margin 
than average during low interest rate period.   
 
Net interest margin (NIM) is composed of pure margin and spread between yield of 
fixed income securities on the asset side and yield of fixed income securities on the 
liability side. Accounting nim is simply spread between annualized interest revenue and 
expenses. Gross margin (GM) which is composed of NIM and net income per unit from 
other intermediary activities is likely to mimic the interest margin behavior. Contractual 
and accounting NIM and GM are summarized in table 13.  
 
Table 13 Descriptive statistics of contractual and accounting  
net interest margin and gross margin 
mean median max min std. dev skewness kurtosis
nim_c 0.062852 0.067978 0.315725 0.02770 0.073415 -6.89918 97.68808
im_c 0.213706 0.192323 0.952873 0.031583 0.412521 -29.176 947.7851
nim_a 0.032959 0.028017 0.551075 0.075706 0.028173 5.817789 100.9995
im_a 0.064053 0.030971 19.66632 0.037108 0.649628 26.79755 761.3717  
 
Other variables estimated from the theoretical model Eq.(3.1.1.38) are as follow: 
a. Market power (MKTPWR) 
Following Maudos and Guevara (2004) procedure to estimate bank’s market power, 
Lerner Index is used to estimate ߙ ߚ⁄   in Eq.(3.1.1.38). Lerner Index has been 
widely used in banking study to estimate degree of competition and calculated as 
follows 
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ܯ ௜ܲ,௧ = ௜ܲ,௧ −ܯܥ௜,௧
௜ܲ,௧  
where Pi,t is price per unit for bank i and MCt is marginal cost to produce the 
products for bank i. The index takes value from 0 to 1. Price per unit is proxied by 
total revenue over total assets whilst marginal cost is similar way as in Eq.(3.3.1.5). 
lnܶܥ௜,௧ = ߙ଴,௜ + ߙଵ,௜ lnܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧ + 12ߙଶ,௜(lnܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜)ଶ + ෍ߚ௝,௜ lnݓ௝,௜ +ଷ
௝ୀଵ
 
12෍෍ߚ௝௞,௜ lnݓ௝,௜ lnݓ௞,௜ + 12ଷ
௞ୀଵ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
෍ߛ௝ ,௜ lnܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ lnݓ௝,௜ + ߤଵ,௜ܶݎ݁݊݀ +ଷ
௝ୀଵ
 
ߤଶ,௜ 12ܶݎ݁݊݀ଶ + ߤଷ,௜ܶݎ݁݊݀ lnܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧ + ෍ߣ௝ܶݎ݁݊݀ lnݓ௝,௜ + ߤ௜ + ݁௜,௧ଷ
௝ୀଵ
 
Lerner (1934) showed that elasticity of demand on a product can be written as 
ି୔
୑େି୔
. Thus, Lerner Index also shows how profit margin depends on elasticity 
demand on bank’s products. The higher elasticity of demand on a product, the more 
likely consumers find substitutes when a bank increases prices of that product. 
Hence, bank’s profit margin is low when elasticity of demand high, making the 
index closer to 0. In other word, the intermediation margin is expected to be low 
when Lerner Index is low. 
b. Degree of risk aversion (RA) 
Maudos and Solis (2009) suggested that excess regulatory capital might be a better 
proxy for degree of risk aversion than equity to asset (E/A) ratio. Nevertheless, the 
study did not provide evidence whether the former is a better proxy than the later. 
The following figure indicates that banks’ excess capital might not be a good proxy. 
Minimum regulatory capital should increase with Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). 
Given that there is no stock issue, excess capital is likely to decrease as RWA 
increase. However, during the sample period, excess capital often increases when 
RWA increases. Therefore, instead of using excess capital as proxy for degree of 
risk aversion, E/A ratio and ratio of RWA over total assets are considered in the 
empirical model. RWA takes value of 0% to 100% of asset size. The RWA reflects 
credit, operational and credit risk exposure in a bank. Details for the calculation of 
RWA are in the appendix.    
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c. Size of new transaction (LOAN, IEA, EA) 
Data of size of new transaction could not be retrieved from banks’ financial 
statement. Thus, following Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and Maudos and Solis 
(2009) natural logarithm of data is used a proxy of new transaction. Translog of 
loan (LOAN) is used in regression on PURE while translog of interest bearing assets 
(IEA) is used in regression on NIM. Translog of earning asset (EA) is considered in 
regression on GM since gross margin is generated from all types of earning assets, 
including fee based activities. 
d. Credit risk (CRL, CRI, CRE) 
Since intermediation margin is composed of gross margin on all of bank’s business 
lines, credit risk ߪ௘௔,௜ଶ  in equation (3.1.1.38) is defined as a bank’s risk of all earning 
assets at default. Thus, credit risk comprises loss arising from a bank’s borrowers as 
well as other counterparties who fail to make payment on the promised principal as 
well as the promised return. Other counterparties are firms issuing financial 
instruments such as money market funds, stocks and derivatives. CRL is the ratio of 
loan loss provision over total loan while CRI is loss provision for interest bearing 
assets over total interest bearing assets. CRE is calculated as loss provision of 
earning assets over total earning assets. The higher credit riskiness of banks’ 
portfolio, the higher is bank’s potential loss exposure. Thus, high intermediation 
margin is expected to compensate high credit risk exposure.  
e. Market risk (MR) 
Market risk ߪெ,௧ଶ  in equation (3.1.1.38) is a bank’s loss arising from decreasing 
value of maturity assets due to variability of interest rates. Market risk is proxied as 
annual standard deviation of monthly real interest rates on one month – Sertifikat 
Bank Indonesia (SBI). Interest rates on one month – SBI are considered since this 
instrument is the most liquid T-bills in Indonesia, and most banks’ term deposits are 
one month – term deposits. Similar to credit risk case, intermediation margin is 
expected to be high to compensate high market risk exposure.  
f. Operating cost (COST) 
Operating cost is calculated as annualized total operating costs over average total 
assets as follows 
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ܥ௜,௧ = ସ஼೔,೟೜଴.ହ௧(௔௦௦௘௧௦೟ି௔௦௦௘௧௦೟షభ) ,   t = 1,2,3,4 
where ܥ௜,௧௤  is operating cost of bank i at quarter t. The operating cost puts pressure 
on intermediation margin. Thus, intermediation margin is expected to be low when 
operating cost is high. 
 
In addition to variables specified in the theoretical model, the survey revealed other 
variables as follows: 
a. Opportunity cost of holding minimum reserve requirement and deposit insurance 
premium (IMPLICIT) 
Banks are required to hold minimum liquidity reserves in the form of demand 
deposit in Central Bank as well as T-bills and T-bonds which could not be either 
sold or lent. By holding the required liquidity reserves, banks loss opportunity to 
gain from investing the fund. The opportunity cost of holding the reserves is often 
treated as implicit cost of fund. Thus, the higher opportunity cost, the higher is 
implicit cost of deposits. In other word, the intermediation margin decreases with 
the opportunity cost of holding reserve requirement. Jakarta Interbank Offered Rate 
(JIBOR) 1 month is proxy for the opportunity cost since 1 month interbank call 
money is the most liquid money market fund. Thus, implicit_rates is summation of 
deposit insurance premium and the product between JIBOR 1 month and reserve 
requirement over earning assets, divided by deposit size.  
b. Opportunity cost of holding cash (CASH) 
Banks convert some of their earning assets into cash in vault to anticipate 
customer’s cash withdrawal. Failure to satisfy customer’s need of cash might divert 
customers to other banks for a more satisfying service. In an extreme scenario such 
as financial crisis, problem in cash withdrawal might lead to “rush”. Thus, holding 
sufficient cash in vault is one of way to retain customer’s loyalty but costs banks. 
Banks lose opportunity to gain return from investing assets in other instruments 
instead of converting the assets in cash. The opportunity cost of holding cash is 
proxied as the product between cash and weighted average of interest rate on 
deposits.      
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c. Opportunity cost of holding minimum capital (CAPITAL) 
The minimum capital is the product between minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR) and Risk Weighted Assets (RWA). Central Bank Indonesia had required 
banks to hold 8% of a bank’s RWA. The RWA is the estimates of credit, market 
and operational risk exposure in a bank’s asset portfolio. The RWA calculation is 
illustrated in the appendix. The higher investment on risky assets, the higher is 
RWA. Thus, increasing investment on risky assets might boost bank’s profit but 
increases minimum regulatory capital. The sample also shows that banks having 
higher RWA tend to have lower Returns On Equity (ROE). Therefore, opportunity 
cost of holding minimum capital CAPITAL is the product between ROE and ratio of 
minimum regulatory capital over equity. The opportunity cost of holding minimum 
capital is typically passed on borrowers as implicit cost of loanable fund. Thus, 
intermediation margin is expected to increase with opportunity cost of holding 
minimum capital. 
d. Interest rates published by deposit insurance agency (LPS)     
Lembaga Penjamin Simpanan (LPS) is an Indonesian deposit insurance agency 
which publishes interest rate on insured deposits. Any deposit paying higher than 
this published rate will not be covered in the deposit insurance scheme. Therefore, 
customers who are unwilling to risk their deposits will choose to invest in deposit 
paying interest rate not higher than the published rate. To fit target on deposit size, 
banks take into account LPS in pricing their deposits, and intermediation margin 
should increase with lps. 
e. Expected profit margin (PM) 
The expected profit margin comprises expected return on banks’ net investment and 
any externalities that can not be accounted for directly but can impact wealth of 
bank such as price risk of emission credits in lending activities, reputational risk, 
and legal risk. PM is passed on banks’ customers; hence, PM is expected to 
positively related to intermediation margin..The empirical application of the 
extended dealership model will use the same proxy for PM as all bank respondents 
i.e. ROA. 
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Table 14 Summary statistics for all explanatory 
mean median max min std.dev skewness kurtosis
cost 0.046633 0.032346 0.980485 5.08E-05 0.056721 7.21798 101.4956
implicit_rates 0.005637 0.00522 0.077249 0.001065 0.003617 10.41367 181.6905
lps 0.88887 0.083333 0.12775 0.07000 0.018592 0.91879 2.64004
cost_cash 0.007533 0.00664 0.035364 0.00032 0.004434 1.542614 7.119256
cost_capital 8.259842 0.228561 429.6093 0.111162 327.3874 -33.5527 1138.542
cr 0.015857 0.006588 6.125523 0.68521 0.181116 32.89 1111.722
mr 0.015303 0.015364 0.03627 0.000732 0.010444 0.355452 2.00119
epm 0.055408 0.0489 2.930509 0.067019 0.088334 29.62052 963.4132
R 1.367378 0.760332 282.1849 0.041426 11.4958 22.48856 525.2123
mkt_pwr 0.033031 0.02756 0.533055 0.000134 0.031038 6.722101 88.04013
 
 
To compare results from the proposed theoretical model Eq.(3.1.1.38), variables 
proposed in Saunders and Schumacher (2000) is estimated on Eq.(3.3.1.1) and (3.3.1.2). 
Empirical model in Maudos and Solis (2009) is also estimated in Eq.(3.3.1.6) to 
(3.3.1.9). 
a. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) 
- Pure margin (PS) 
PS is spread between annualized interest income and annualized interest 
expense, over earning assets 
- Implicit interest rate (IMPLICIT) 
IMPLICT is spread between annualized non financial income and annualized 
non financial expense, over total assets   
- Cost of reserve requirement (RR) 
RR is calculated as non-maturity earning assets over earning assets 
- Capital (CAPITAL) 
CAPITAL is regulatory capital over total assets 
- Market structure (MP) 
Recalling equation (3.3.3.) to estimate market structure,  
ܲ ௜ܵ = ߙ + ߚଵܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ + ߚଶܴܴ௜ + ߚଷܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜ + ݁௜ 
where i is individual bank i. Thus, from 1224 observation, 24 MP for 24 
quarters will be derived. The value of MP is the same across banks. 
- Interest rate risk (IR) 
IR is proxy as quarterly standard deviation of 90days SBI 
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- Degree of risk aversion (R) 
R is calculated as non per forming loan over loan 
- Transaction size (Q) 
Q is the translog of loan size. 
b. Maudos and Solis (2009) 
Intermediation margin (IM) is calculated as spread between annualized interest 
income as well as annualized income from earning assets, and annualized interest 
expense as well annualized loss on earning asset, divided by asset.  
- Market power (MP) 
Lerner index is used as proxy for MP 
- Operating cost (C) 
C is operating expenses over assets 
- Degree of risk aversion (R) 
Equity to asset ratio is a proxy for R 
- Market risk (MR) 
MR is proxied as quarterly standard deviation of 90days SBI 
- Credit risk (CR) 
CR is calculated as non performing loan over loan size in the previous quarter. 
- Product between CR and MR (COV) 
- Transaction size (Q) 
Q is the translog of loan size 
- Net non interest income (NII) 
NII is calculated as spread between non interest income and non interest 
expense, divided by assets. 
- Fee based income (FEE) 
FEE is proxied as spread between fee based income over total income and fee 
based income over assets 
- Cost of reserve requirement (RR) 
Cash to asset ratio is used as proxy for RR 
- Management efficiency (MGT) 
MGT is proxied as operating costs over gross margin 
- Loan to asset ratio (L/A) 
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- Debt to asset ratio (D/A) 
- Gross domestic product (GDP) 
- Quarterly inflation rates (INF) 
INF is the quarterly growth of consumer price index 
 
 
3.5. Results 
This section compares the estimates from by using model specified previous work and 
the proposed extension of dealership model. Section 3.5.1 explains the results when 
model specification borrows from Saunders and Schumacher (2000). The model 
specification does not change model structure in Ho and Saunders (1981). Results using 
model specified in Maudos and Solis (2009) are also presented. This model adds 
variables to model in Maudos and Guevara (2004). Section 3.5.2 summarizes results 
from extended dealership model that is proposed in this study. Model performance 
when accounting margin is used is compared to that of contractual margin.  
 
 
3.5.1 The Ho-Saunders and Maudos-Guevara model: The seminal model 
This section describes results using variables introduced in Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000) which is defined from model of Ho and Saunders (1981). Following Saunders 
and Schumacher (2000), market power is estimated using cross section data, by 
regressing implicit interest rates, opportunity cost of reserve requirement and capital on 
net interest margin or pure spread (PS). The second step is regressing market power 
(MP), market risk (MR), degree of risk aversion (R) and loan size (Q) on pure spread 
(PS). The results of the second step are summarized in table 15. 
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Table 15 Determinant of net interest margin (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000) 
Dependent variable :  NIM
Coefficient s.e. t-stat
MP 0.0975 0.0421 2.3133
MR -0.0211 0.0633 -0.3327
R -0.0027 0.0029 -0.9481
Q 0.0030 0.0013 2.2610
Constant 0.0506 0.0031 16.2146
N.obs 1224
Breusch Pagan Test 2119.79
p-value 0
Hausman test 8.3566
p-value 0.0794
Normality of residual 1229.98
Chi-sq 0
Null hypothesis 
Breush Pagan test : zero variance of unit specific error
Hausman test : GLS estimates are consistent
Test for normality of residual : error is normally distributed  
 
Net interest margin or pure spread is positively related to market power and loan size. 
On the other hand, market risk and risk aversion negatively influence net interest 
margin. Although coefficient of market risk is not statistically significant, negative 
relationship between market risk and net interest margin does not support the theoretical 
model. The higher market risk and degree of risk aversion, the higher risk premium to 
bear the risk. Thus, net interest margin should increase with market risk and degree of 
risk aversion.  
 
Variables proposed in Maudos and Solis (2009) are used since they attempted to 
integrate variables in some studies about bank margin. 15 variables were used to explain 
the dynamics of intermediation margin. They also took into account the impact of 
margin in the previous period on today’s margin. Table 16 and 17 show results of static 
model with fixed effects, using variables introduced in Maudos and Solis (2009). 
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Table 16 Determinants of intermediation margin – Static model 1 
 (Maudos and Solis, 2009) 
Dependent variable :  IM
Coeff. s.e. t-stat Coeff. s.e. t-stat
MP 0.0001 0.0001 0.9651 0.0001 0.0001 0.9651
C -1.1913 0.0639 -18.6400 -1.1913 0.0639 -18.6400
R -0.0297 0.0049 -6.0310 -0.0297 0.0049 -6.0310
MR 0.1203 0.1760 0.6835 0.1203 0.1760 0.6835
CR 0.0097 0.0123 0.7915 0.0097 0.0123 0.7915
Q 0.0011 0.0082 0.1330 0.0011 0.0082 0.1330
IMPLICIT -0.0094 0.2588 -0.0362
RR 1.3642 0.4319 3.1580 1.3642 0.4319 3.1580
MGT -0.0297 0.0226 -1.3130 -0.0297 0.0226 -1.3130
NII 0.0094 0.2588 0.0362
const -0.0423 0.1285 -0.3292 -0.0423 0.1285 -0.3292
N.obs 1224 1224
Diff. group intercept 18.0348 18.0348
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Dist. Wald test 386545 386545
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Normality of residual 3441.54 3441.54
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Null hypothesis 
Test for differing group intercepts : the groups have a common intercept
Distribution free Wald test : the units have a common error variance
Test for normality of residual : error is normally distributed
(1) (2)
 
 
Column 1 shows results when net income from fee based activities (NII) are considered 
in the model, but implicit interest rate (IMPLICIT) are not taken into account. Column 2 
summarizes results by taking into account cost implicit interest rate but not net income 
from fee based activities. In all cases, only operating cost (C), degree of risk aversion 
(R) and cost of reserve requirement (RR) are significant in explaining variability in the 
intermediation margin. Other variables in the theoretical model (i.e. market power, risk 
exposure, loan size) are not statically significant. The margin increases with market 
power (MP), market risk exposure (MR), credit risk exposure (CR) and loan size (Q). 
Cost reserve requirement (RR) increases cost of fund which intuitively puts pressure on 
the margin. Thus, the sign of RR is expected to be negative. The results however show 
that the sign is positive but statistically insignificant. As expected, the margin decreases 
with operating cost, degree of risk aversion, implicit interest rate, and management 
inefficiency.  
 
111 
 
 
Table 17 summarizes results when empirical model is extended to solvency and 
macroeconomic measures. Column 1 shows results incorporating solvency measures i.e. 
loan to asset ratio (L/A) and deposit to asset ratio (D/A). Column 2 shows results taking 
into account macroeconomic measures i.e. gross domestic product (GDP) and changes 
of consumer price index (INF) as well as solvency measures. The interaction between 
variables changes when the empirical model is extended to solvency and 
macroeconomic measures. Market power, degree of risk aversion, cost of reserve 
requirement and solvency (D/A) are significant in explaining variability in the margin. 
Operating cost, risk exposure and loan size, which are variables specified in the 
theoretical model, do not count much in explaining the dynamics of the margin.  
 
Table 17. Determinants of intermediation margin – Static model 2 
 (Maudos and Solis, 2009) 
Dependent variable :  IM
Coeff. s.e. t-stat Coeff. s.e. t-stat
MP 0.0002 0.0001 2.1610 0.0003 0.0001 3.7000
C -0.2235 0.2216 -1.0080 -0.3119 0.2446 -1.2750
R -0.0707 0.0103 -6.8770 -0.0684 0.0107 -6.4130
MR 0.0616 0.1293 0.4764 0.1566 0.1159 1.3510
CR 0.0099 0.0067 1.4860 0.0115 0.0060 1.9270
Q 0.0052 0.0049 1.0580 0.0030 0.0064 0.4696
IMPLICIT -0.0659 0.4142 -0.1591
RR 2.4553 0.6544 3.7520 2.4849 0.6567 3.7840
MGT -0.0187 0.0126 -1.4840 -0.0178 0.0122 -1.4570
NII 0.1399 0.4236 0.3303
L/A 0.0001 0.0134 0.0064 0.0029 0.0140 0.2068
D/A 0.0543 0.0148 3.6650 0.0486 0.0164 2.9720
GDP -0.0002 0.0001 -2.3000
INF 0.0001 0.0001 1.6680
const 0.0491 0.0768 0.6388 -0.0540 0.0943 -0.5732
N.obs 1224 1224
Diff. group intercept 21.9152 22.4581
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Dist. Wald test 42700.9 54260.1
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Normality of residual 7508.22 8265.24
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
Null hypothesis 
Test for differing group intercepts: the groups have a common intercept
Distribution free Wald test : he units have a common error variance
Test for normality of residual: error is normally distributed
(1) (2)
 
 
Similar to the simple model, cost of reserve requirement is positively related to the 
margin. The margin expectedly increases with market power, credit and market risk 
exposure, loan size and solvency (L/A). The margin decreases with operating cost, 
implicit interest rate and management inefficiency. What has been puzzling is the 
negative sign of degree of risk aversion and positive sign of D/A. Theoretically, the 
more risk averse a bank, the higher risk premium it charges to bear the risk. The higher 
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risk premium is translated into higher margin. High deposit to asset ratio (D/A) 
represents high leverage. Banks with high leverage have high cost of financial distress, 
increasing cost to raise fund. Thus, D/A theoretically dampens the margin.     
 
 
Extending the empirical model to macroeconomic model changes the interaction 
between margin and credit risk exposure. Credit risk exposure along with market power, 
degree of risk aversion, cost of reserve requirement, solvency (D/A), gross domestic 
product and inflation (INF) are significant in explaining the margin. The margin 
increases with inflation as nominal interest rates increases with inflation. Interestingly, 
the margin decreases with gross domestic product. An increase in domestic product is 
supposed to be transmitted into an increase in loan size to support the expanding 
economic activity. Thus, the margin is expected to increases with loan size as well gross 
domestic product.       
 
Apparently, margin in the previous quarter is not statistically significant in explaining 
the variability of the margin. The results for dynamic model for Eq.(3.3.3.1.6) and 
Eq.(3.3.3.1.7) are summarized in table 18. 
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Table 18 Determinants of intermediation margin – Dynamic model 1  
(Maudos and Solis, 2009) 
Dependent variable :  IM
Coeff. s.e. t-stat
IM(-1) -0.0216 0.0202 -1.0680
MP 0.0105 0.0003 6.2400
C -1.5596 0.2662 -5.8580
R 0.0258 0.0144 1.7870
MR -2.1060 2.3069 -0.9129
CR -0.1926 0.2611 -0.7376
Q 0.0027 0.0038 0.7113
RR -0.0713 1.0750 -0.0663
MGT -0.0060 0.0456 -0.1324
NII 1.0370 0.7672 1.3520
const 0.0430 0.0498 0.8629
N.obs 1224
Test for AR(1) errors -0.9570
p-value 0.3386
Test for AR(2) errors -1.04557
p-value 0.2958
Sargan over-identification 49.8309
p-value 1.0000
Wald (joint) test 188337
p-value 0.0000  
Sign of some variables are difficult to be interpreted. For instance, the signs for risk 
exposure and loan size are negative when the margin theoretically increases with risk 
premium to bear risk and economies of scale. The margin also unexpectedly increases 
with management inefficiency. The more inefficient management operates, the higher is 
the cost to run a bank; hence the margin is expectedly lower. The longer equation 
Eq.(3.3.3.1.8) and (3.3.3.1.9) do not improve the results as shown in table 19. 
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Table 19 Determinants of intermediation margin – Dynamic model 2 
(Maudos and Solis, 2009) 
Dependent variable :  IM
Coeff. s.e. t-stat Coeff. s.e. t-stat
IM(-1) -0.0216 0.0205 -1.0550 -0.0245 0.0220 -1.1140
MP 0.0102 0.0003 1.9000 0.0103 0.0002 5.2400
C -1.3571 1.0567 -1.2840 -0.5514 0.3682 -1.4980
R -0.0419 0.0140 -2.9890 -0.0510 0.0081 -6.3220
MR -2.0184 2.2425 -0.9001 0.4483 0.4853 0.9237
CR -0.1969 0.2220 -0.8871 -0.0012 0.0677 -0.0180
Q 0.0041 0.0044 0.9149 0.0063 0.0057 1.1030
IMPLICIT -1.1888 0.7693 -1.5450
RR 0.8186 1.7991 0.4550 -0.6072 0.8494 -0.7148
MGT -0.0171 0.0220 -0.7757 -0.0008 0.0139 -0.0540
NII 0.3443 0.2704 1.2730
L/A 0.0119 0.0442 0.2698 -0.0263 0.0262 -1.0050
D/A 0.0041 0.0786 0.0525 0.0649 0.0334 1.9440
GDP 0.0009 0.0009 0.9552
INF -0.0005 0.0004 -1.3920
const 0.0472 0.0902 0.5229 -0.0824 0.1255 -0.6561
N.obs 1224 1224
Test for AR(1) errors -1.2936 -1.4131
p-value 0.1958 0.1576
Test for AR(2) errors -1.002 -1.0339
p-value 0.3164 0.3012
Sargan over-identification 171.391 152.122
p-value 0.0000 0.0005
Wald (joint) test 229704 181131
p-value 0.0000 0.0000
(1) (2)
 
 
Similar to the results from simple model Eq.(3.3.3.1.6) and (3.3.3.1.7), margin in the 
previous quarter is not statistically significant in explaining the margin. Only market 
power, degree of risk aversion and solvency (D/A) significantly influence the margin. 
The negative signs of risk exposure, degree of risk aversion and loan size are also 
difficult to explain. The sign of variable management inefficiency (MGT) and deposit to 
asset (D/A) implies that both variables theoretically hamper the margin.   
 
 
3.5.1. The Extended Models  
3.5.1.1.Contractual margin 
The equation of contractual intermediation margin from Eq.(3.3.3.1.10) to 
Eq.(3.3.3.1.12) is estimated with random effects. Breusch-Pagan test shows that null 
hypothesis of zero variance of the unit specific error is rejected in all cases. 
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Simultaneously, Hausman test rejects null hypothesis of consistent GLS estimates. 
Thus, fixed effect model estimators are consistent and efficient. Table 21 summarizes 
the determinants of contractual intermediation margin. Column (1) corresponds to the 
results of regression on pure margin (PURE) whilst column (2) and (3) correspond to 
regression on net interest margin (NIM) and gross margin (GM). Variable size in the 
first column represents size of new loans. In the second and third column however, size 
is volume of new maturity assets and volume of new earning assets respectively. 
Table 20 Determinants of contractual intermediation margin  
(regression with fixed effects and heteroskedasticity robust variance matrix) 
 
The results of regression with cluster variance estimation are summarized in table 21. 
  
IMPLICIT -0.1091 [ 0.1332 ] -0.1657 [ 0.1596 ] -4.7357 [ 0.5650 ] ***
CASH -0.2119 [ 0.2021 ] -0.2737 [ 0.2211 ] -2.6260 [ 0.7443 ] ***
CAPITAL 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ]
COST -0.0311 [ 0.0133 ] ** -0.0067 [ 0.0039 ] ** -1.0122 [ 0.1336 ] ***
LPS -0.0864 [ 0.0507 ] * -0.2198 [ 0.0743 ] *** -0.0001 [ 0.1662 ]
PM 0.0160 [ 0.0086 ] * 0.0006 [ 0.0017 ] 0.0093 [ 0.0237 ]
MR 0.1778 [ 0.0366 ] *** 0.3124 [ 0.1124 ] *** 0.1054 [ 0.2539 ]
CRL,CRI,CRE 0.0890 [ 0.0262 ] *** 0.0569 [ 0.0337 ] * 0.1760 [ 0.0555 ] ***
LOAN,IEA,EA -0.0057 [ 0.0012 ] *** 0.0007 [ 0.0017 ] 0.0119 [ 0.0032 ] ***
RA 0.0000382 [ 0.0001 ] 0.0000456 [ 0.0000 ] * 0.0001 [ 0.0041 ]
MKTPWR 0.0605 [ 0.0329 ] * 0.0329 [ 0.0242 ] 0.04752 0.0568 [ 0.0761 ]
No. obs 1165 1165 1165
MSE 0.0004 0.0212 0.0044
R2 0.7651 0.5311 0.6712
Hausman test ( 0.9876 ) ( 0.9599 ) ( 0.7292 )
Breusch Pagan test ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
[ ] : standard error
( ) : p-value
*, **, *** shows level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%
Explanatory variables
PURE NIM GM
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Table 21 Determinants of contractual intermediation margin  
(regression with fixed effects and clustered robust variance matrix) 
 
Table 22 and 23 show that results summarized in table 20 and 21 are robust to the 
inclusion of time dummies. 
 
  
IMPLICIT -0.1091 [ 0.1332 ] -0.1745 [ 0.2345 ] -4.6605 [ 0.6240 ] ***
CASH -0.3120 [ 0.1661 ] -0.2697 [ 0.3095 ] -2.6278 [ 0.7395 ] ***
CAPITAL 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ]
COST -0.0525 [ 0.1496 ] ** -0.0174 [ 0.0046 ] ** -1.0237 [ 0.1222 ] ***
LPS -0.0513 [ 0.0516 ] * -0.2664 [ 0.0817 ] *** -0.0002 [ 0.1869 ]
PM 0.0932 [ 0.0153 ] * 0.0008 [ 0.0054 ] 0.0095 [ 0.0507 ]
MR 0.0211 [ 0.0658 ] *** 0.4710 [ 0.3752 ] *** 0.1049 [ 0.2658 ]
CRL,CRI,CRE 0.0598 [ 0.0126 ] *** 0.0327 [ 0.0310 ] * 0.1734 [ 0.0973 ] ***
LOAN,IEA,EA -0.0057 [ 0.0012 ] *** 0.0003 [ 0.0015 ] 0.0117 [ 0.0273 ] ***
RA 0.0088000 [ 0.0062 ] 0.0015 [ 0.0028 ] * 0.0037 [ 0.0013 ]
MKTPWR 0.0521 [ 0.0518 ] * .019241 [ 0.0836 ] 0.04752 0.0523 [ 0.0963 ]
No. obs 1165 1165 1165
MSE 0.0132 0.0330 0.0341
R2 0.7651 0.5311 0.6712
Hausman test ( 0.9876 ) ( 0.9599 ) ( 0.7292 )
Breusch Pagan test ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
[ ] : standard error
( ) : p-value
*, **, *** shows level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%
Explanatory variables
PURE NIM GM
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Table 22 Determinants of contractual intermediation margin with time dummies  
(regression with fixed effects and heteroskedasticity robust variance matrix) 
 
  
IMPLICIT -0.1087 [ 0.1478 ] -0.1685 [ 0.1561 ] -4.6604 [ 0.6453 ] ***
CASH -0.2750 [ 0.1578 ] -0.2279 [ 0.3589 ] -2.6510 [ 0.6800 ] ***
CAPITAL 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ]
COST -0.0595 [ 0.0179 ] ** -0.0175 [ 0.0043 ] ** -1.0279 [ 0.1230 ] ***
LPS -0.0519 [ 0.0253 ] * -0.2306 [ 0.0849 ] *** -0.0002 [ 0.1624 ]
PM 0.0882 [ 0.0784 ] * 0.0008 [ 0.0054 ] 0.0092 [ 0.0481 ]
MR 0.0213 [ 0.0448 ] *** 0.4710 [ 0.3752 ] *** 0.1045 [ 0.2881 ]
CRL,CRI,CRE 0.0595 [ 0.0128 ] *** 0.0328 [ 0.0446 ] * 0.1521 [ 0.0881 ] ***
LOAN,IEA,EA -0.0067 [ 0.0047 ] *** 0.0006 [ 0.0031 ] 0.0139 [ 0.0278 ] ***
RA 0.0112 [ 0.0037 ] 0.0010 [ 0.0038 ] * 0.0032 [ 0.0027 ]
MKTPWR 0.0513 [ 0.0449 ] * 0.0167 [ 0.0822 ] 0.04752 0.0521 [ 0.0624 ]
Q1 -0.0014 [ 0.0025 ] -0.0128 [ 0.0094 ] -0.013 [ 0.0096 ]
Q2 -0.0013 [ 0.0019 ] (dropped) -0.013 [ 0.0096 ]
Q3 0.0001 [ 0.0013 ] -0.0109 [ 0.0122 ] 0.003 [ 0.0148 ]
Q4 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
const 0.0121 [ 0.0023 ] 0.0522 [ 0.0256 ] 0.0026 [ 0.0066 ]
No. obs 1165 1165 1165
MSE 0.0133 0.0330 0.0342
R2 0.7491 0.5252 0.6611
Hausman test ( 0.9836 ) ( 0.5279 ) ( 0.7292 )
Breusch Pagan test ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
[ ] : standard error
( ) : p-value
*, **, *** shows level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%
Explanatory variables
PURE NIM GM
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Table 23 Determinants of contractual intermediation margin time dummies  
(regression with fixed effects and clustered robust variance matrix) 
 
 
In all cases, all variables have the same sign as predicted in the theoretical model 
Eq.(3.3.1.1.38). Intermediation margin decreases with opportunity cost of reserve 
requirement and deposit insurance premium (IMPLICIT), opportunity cost of cash 
reserves (COST), and lower bound of deposit price under deposit insurance scheme 
(LPS). Recalling that COST is operating cost over total assets, the variable also implies 
operating efficiency of a bank. Thus, the higher COST the less efficient the operation, 
squeezing bank’s intermediation margin. Expectedly, market power is not statistically 
significant in explaining dynamics of net interest margin and gross margin since banks 
could not individually influence yield of fixed income securities and money market fund 
as well as value of financial derivatives. In pure margin case, large size of new loan 
push down transaction costs per unit and loan prices, which is translated into low pure 
margin. Banks having higher credit exposure (CRL, CRE, CRI) and interest rate risk 
IMPLICIT -0.1064 [ 0.1502 ] -0.1649 [ 0.1586 ] -4.5614 [ 0.6556 ] ***
CASH -0.2692 [ 0.1603 ] -0.2231 [ 0.3646 ] -2.5947 [ 0.6908 ] ***
CAPITAL 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ]
COST -0.0582 [ 0.0182 ] ** -0.0171 [ 0.0044 ] ** -1.0060 [ 0.1250 ] ***
LPS -0.0508 [ 0.0257 ] * -0.2257 [ 0.0863 ] *** -0.0002 [ 0.1650 ]
PM 0.0863 [ 0.0797 ] * 0.0008 [ 0.0055 ] 0.0090 [ 0.0489 ]
MR 0.0208 [ 0.0455 ] *** 0.4610 [ 0.3812 ] *** 0.1023 [ 0.2927 ]
CRL,CRI,CRE 0.0582 [ 0.0130 ] *** 0.0321 [ 0.0453 ] * 0.1489 [ 0.0895 ] ***
LOAN,IEA,EA -0.0066 [ 0.0048 ] *** 0.0006 [ 0.0031 ] 0.0136 [ 0.0282 ] ***
RA 0.0110 [ 0.0038 ] 0.0010 [ 0.0039 ] * 0.0031 [ 0.0027 ]
MKTPWR 0.0502 [ 0.0456 ] * 0.0163 [ 0.0835 ] 0.04752 0.0510 [ 0.0634 ]
Q1 -0.0014 [ 0.0025 ] -0.0126 [ 0.0096 ] -0.0129 [ 0.0097 ]
Q2 -0.0013 [ 0.0019 ] (dropped) -0.0129 [ 0.0097 ]
Q3 0.0001 [ 0.0014 ] -0.0107 [ 0.0124 ] 0.0030 [ 0.0150 ]
Q4 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
const 0.0118 [ 0.0023 ] 0.0511 [ 0.0260 ] 0.0025 [ 0.0067 ]
No. obs 1165 1165 1165
MSE 0.0133 0.0335 0.0347
R2 0.7491 0.5252 0.6611
Hausman test ( 0.9836 ) ( 0.5279 ) ( 0.7292 )
Breusch Pagan test ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
[ ] : standard error
( ) : p-value
*, **, *** shows level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%
Explanatory variables
PURE NIM GM
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exposure (MR) appear to have higher intermediation margin, to compensate them 
bearing the risks. Higher degree of risk aversion (RA) also corresponds to higher 
intermediation margin. The more risk averse are banks, the higher risk premium they 
call by increasing intermediation margin.  
 
Since some banks uses margin in previous quarter as proxy of expected profit margin, 
table 24 summarizes estimation of dynamic model for Eq.(3.3.3.2.1) to Eq.(3.3.3.2.3).     
Table 24 Determinants of contractual intermediation margin  
(system model with collapsed instrument set) 
 
No. of instruments: 27 (PURE), 26 (NIM), 27 (GM) 
MARGIN(-1) 0.6229 [ 0.0127 ] *** -0.0421 [ 0.0022 ] *** -4.7357 [ 0.5650 ] ***
IMPLICIT -0.2435 [ 0.0833 ] ** -0.2767 [ 0.0928 ] *** -2.6260 [ 0.7443 ] ***
CASH -0.3071 [ 0.1226 ] ** -2.3274 [ 0.2511 ] *** 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ]
CAPITAL 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] *** 1.0122 [ 0.1336 ] ***
COST -0.0057 [ 0.0023 ] ** -0.0293 [ 0.0051 ] *** -0.0001 [ 0.1662 ]
LPS -0.0258 [ 0.0185 ] -0.2457 [ 0.0195 ] *** -0.0093 [ 0.0237 ]
MR 0.1488 [ 0.0074 ] *** 0.1485 [ 0.0106 ] *** 0.1054 [ 0.2539 ]
CRL,CRI,CRE 0.0607 [ 0.0126 ] *** 0.3649 [ 0.0253 ] *** 0.1760 [ 0.0555 ] ***
size(LOAN,IEA,EA) -0.0028 [ 0.0006 ] *** 0.0133 [ 0.0015 ] *** 0.0119 [ 0.0032 ] ***
RA 0.0002 [ 0.0000 ] *** 0.0011 [ 0.0002 ] *** 0.0001 [ 0.0003 ]
MKTPWR 0.0319 [ 0.0228 ] 0.1981 [ 0.0267 ] *** 0.0568 [ 0.0761 ]
No. obs 1165 1165 1165
MSE 0.0003 0.0064 0.4532
Sargan test ( 0.6988 ) ( 0.7062 ) ( 0.6446 )
AR(-1) test ( 0.0094 ) ( 0.0237 ) ( 0.1876 )
AR(-2) test ( 0.7894 ) ( 0.1366 ) ( 0.7780 )
[ ] : standard error
( ) : p-value
*, **, *** show level of significance of 10%, 5% and 1%
MSE: mean squared of error
E xplanatory variables
P UR E NIM G M
 
The sign of explanatory variables do not change except for opportunity cost of cash 
reserve. Margin is negatively related to opportunity cost of capital when margin in the 
previous quarter is taken into account. Negative sign of autoregressive term of nim and 
im as well as positive sign of size could be explained as follows. As low net interest 
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margin and gross margin in the previous quarter will drive banks to charge more on 
their products in order to meet their earnings target. Thus, the larger size of new 
transaction, the higher revenues are (which is translated into higher margin).  
 
The results summarized in table 25 are robust when time variables are taken into 
account as depicted in table 25. 
 
Table 25 Determinants of contractual intermediation margin with time dummies  
(system model with collapsed instrument set) 
 
No. of instruments: 27 (PURE), 26 (NIM), 27 (GM) 
 
 
  
MARGIN(-1) 0.6152 [ 0.0125 ] *** -0.0415 [ 0.0022 ] *** -4.6769 [ 0.5580 ] ***
IMPLICIT -0.2405 [ 0.0823 ] ** -0.2733 [ 0.0917 ] *** -2.5935 [ 0.7351 ] ***
CASH -0.3033 [ 0.1210 ] ** -2.2986 [ 0.2480 ] *** 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ]
CAPITAL 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] *** 0.9997 [ 0.1320 ] ***
COST -0.0056 [ 0.0022 ] ** -0.0289 [ 0.0051 ] *** -0.0001 [ 0.1641 ]
LPS -0.0255 [ 0.0183 ] -0.2427 [ 0.0192 ] *** -0.0091 [ 0.0234 ]
MR 0.1469 [ 0.0073 ] *** 0.1466 [ 0.0105 ] *** 0.1041 [ 0.2507 ]
CRL,CRI,CRE 0.0600 [ 0.0124 ] *** 0.3603 [ 0.0250 ] *** 0.1738 [ 0.0548 ] ***
LOAN,IEA,EA -0.0028 [ 0.0006 ] *** 0.0132 [ 0.0015 ] *** 0.0117 [ 0.0031 ] ***
RA 0.0002 [ 0.0000 ] *** 0.0011 [ 0.0002 ] *** 0.0001 [ 0.0003 ]
MKTPWR 0.0315 [ 0.0225 ] 0.1956 [ 0.0263 ] *** 0.0561 [ 0.0751 ]
Q2 0.0031 [ 0.0033 ] 0.0906 [ 0.0021 ] 0.0017 [ 0.0014 ]
Q3 0.0060 [ 0.0080 ] dropped 0.0033 [ 0.0028 ]
Q4 0.0107 [ 0.0117 ] 0.0041 [ 0.0630 ] 0.0041 [ 0.0034 ]
No. of obs. 1165 1165 1165
S.E. of regression 0.0003 0.0064 0.0548
( 0.0050 ) ( 0.5250 ) ( 0.6350 )
( 0.0970 ) ( 0.4820 ) ( 0.4710 )
( 0.0890 ) ( 0.3030 ) ( 0.3480 )
( 0.2185 ) ( 0.1970 ) ( 0.1862 )
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )Normality of residual 
NIM GM
Test of AR(1) errors
Test for AR(2) errors
Sargan test of overidentification
Hansen test of overidentification
Explanatory variables
PURE
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3.5.1.2.Accounting margin 
The determinants of accounting margin are estimated with fixed effect since Breusch-
Pagan test and Hausman tests show that estimators are preferred to GLS estimators. The 
results of regression for pure, nim and im are summarized in table 26.  
Table 26 Determinants of accounting intermediation margin  
 (static model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results show that accounting intermediation margin is significantly determined by 
credit risk premium, operating cost and size of new transaction. Implicit interest rates 
are statistically significant in explaining dynamics of pure margin and gross margin but 
statistically insignificant in explain net interest margin. Implicit interest rates are 
positively related to pure margin and gross margin. It implies that implicit interest rates 
are passed on prices of all bank products. If this is true, implicit interest rates should 
also be positive related to net interest margin. The negative sign of cr in net margin case 
is also puzzling. Intuitively, banks ask for high risk premium to invest in risky assets. 
Thus, the higher credit riskiness of assets, the higher yields should be demanded on the 
assets, which is translated into high interest margin. This indicates that loss provision 
does not correspond to interest income and expenses in the same quarter. Interest 
income recognition might occur long after loss provision recognition due to grace 
implicit_rates 3.9444 [ 0.0141 ] *** -0.4760 [ 0.3539 ] 2.7751 [ 0.0000 ]***
mr -0.5958 [ 0.0060 ] 0.1844 [ 0.1364 ] 0.3692 [ 0.0043 ]
cr 0.2415 [ 0.0034 ] *** -0.1762 [ 0.0466 ]*** 0.0113 [ 0.0020 ]*
cost -0.3978 [ 0.0289 ] *** 0.2531 [ 0.0533 ]*** 0.4913 [ 0.0024 ]***
cost_capital 0.0001 [ 0.0003 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0050 ]
cost_cash -1.1702 [ 0.5404 ] -0.2376 [ 0.4110 ] 0.0924 [ 0.0000 ]***
lps 0.2321 [ 0.3834 ] 0.0284 [ 0.0938 ] 0.0794 [ 0.0058 ]
epm 0.0607 [ 0.0576 ] 0.0572 [ 0.0254 ]** -0.3788 [ 0.0010 ]***
size -0.1043 [ 0.0140 ] *** -0.0186 [ 0.0028 ]*** 0.0032 [ 0.0010 ]*
R -0.0005 [ 0.0009 ] 0.0000 [ 0.0001 ]*** 0.0655 [ 0.0000 ]***
mkt_pwr 0.0125 [ 0.1320 ] 0.1611 [ 0.0543 ] 0.1728 [ 0.0039 ]
No. obs 1165 1165 1165
MSE 0.0114 0.0115 1.2167
Hausman test ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
Breusch Pagan test ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
[ ] : standard error
( ): p-value
*, **, *** shows 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance
MSE: mean squared of error
Explanatory variables
GMNIMPure
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period in loan disbursement and so on. The dynamic model also performs as 
summarized in table 27. 
 
Table 27 Determinants of accounting intermediation margin 
 (dynamic model) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The contractual intermediation margin is significantly and positively related to market  
 
Briefly, the static and dynamic models perform better when contractual margin is used 
as proxy of intermediation margin. When accounting margin is used as proxy of 
intermediation margin, standard error of some coefficients is higher than in the 
contractual margin. Similarly, mean squared error is higher in the accounting margin 
case than contractual margin case. In term of explanatory power, adjusted R square is 
higher in the contractual margin case than in accounting margin case. Moreover, the 
sign and significance of variables in the empirical model confirms the model 
assumption. On the other hand, using accounting intermediation margin gives 
implausible results. Thus, using contractual intermediation margin is less likely to raise 
biased estimation problem.  
margin(-1) -0.1563 [ 0.0000 ] *** -0.0959 [ 0.0089 ]*** 0.0020 [ 0.0035 ]***
implicit_rates 2.5720 [ 0.0585 ] 0.2423 [ 0.3496 ] 0.3612 [ 0.5077 ]***
mr -24.7479 [ 0.0212 ] *** -0.1855 [ 0.0774 ] 0.4268 [ 0.0728 ]***
cr -78.0666 [ 0.0141 ] *** 0.0612 [ 0.2099 ]** -0.0081 [ 0.2817 ]***
cost 13.6311 [ 0.0172 ] *** 2.8812 [ 0.0692 ]*** 1.9723 [ 0.0570 ]***
cost_capital 0.0001 [ 0.0000 ] *** 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ]** 0.0000 [ 0.0000 ]***
cost_cash -3.9813 [ 0.0686 ] *** -2.7957 [ 0.5530 ]*** -3.0707 [ 0.4750 ]***
lps -8.5209 [ 0.0326 ] ** 0.3897 [ 0.0560 ]*** 0.5332 [ 0.0511 ]***
size -5.8936 [ 0.0123 ] *** -0.0236 [ 0.0059 ]*** 0.0073 [ 0.0051 ]***
R -0.0770 [ 0.0231 ] *** -0.0004 [ 0.0001 ]*** 0.0683 [ 0.0002 ]***
mkt_pwr -18.8278 [ 0.2330 ] *** 0.2617 [ 0.1176 ]** -0.0259 [ 0.1566 ]***
No. obs 1165 1165 1165
MSE   0.7685 1.5057 1.8550
AR(1) error (   0.1361 ) ( 0.0609 ) ( 0.0000 )
AR(2) error (   0.0331 ) ( 0.3084 ) ( 0.1654 )
Sargan test (   1.0000 ) (     1.000 ) (   1.0000 )
Wald (joint) test ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0000 )
[ ] : standard error
( ): p-value
*, **, *** show 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance
MSE: mean squared of error
Explanatory variables
GMNIMPure
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3.6. Conclusion 
A number of studies discuss bank margin in term of interest margin as well as gross 
margin. The intermediation margin comprises incomes and expenses from all business 
lines of a bank. Thus, the definition of intermediation margin is closer to that of gross 
margin than interest margin. In this study, theoretical model in Ho and Saunders (1981) 
is extended by adopting multi-product framework introduced in Allen (1998). The 
extended model takes into account the impact of non-maturity deposit, marginal rate of 
substitution between different types of loans as well as non loan products, on 
intermediation margin. Non-maturity deposit increases intermediation margin when 
return on invested non-maturity deposit surpasses operating cost and risk premium 
associated with this deposit. At the same time, diversifying loan as well as earning asset 
increases the margin when immediacy fee and risk premium is higher than operating 
cost occurring for each product.  
 
The static and dynamic models are used to examine factors influencing intermediation 
margin in the extended theoretical model. The static model is estimated with fixed 
effect and robust error (HAC) as well as clustered robust variance estimation. 
Contractual intermediation margin over the period of 2005 to 2010 for 51 commercial 
banks in Indonesia is analyzed. The analysis shows that operating cost of holding cash 
and degree of risk aversion are statistically significant.  Nonetheless, the greatest impact 
on intermediation margin comes from market power, transaction size, risk exposure, 
operating cost, opportunity cost of reserve requirement, LPS’s rate in the previous 
quarter, and expected profit margin. The margin increases with market power and 
transaction size. This implies that banks gain from economies of scale and elasticity of 
demanded products. The margin is also positively related to credit risk exposure, market 
risk exposure and degree of risk aversion. Thus, increasing either risk exposure or 
degree of risk aversion increases risk premium which is translated into higher margin. 
The margin also increases with opportunity cost of regulatory capital since the cost calls 
for higher margin to allow banks to meet their expected profit margin. The margin 
decreases with variables composing cost of fund i.e. operating cost, opportunity cost of 
reserve requirement as well as cash, and LPS’s rate in the previous quarter.  
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The findings indicate that using accounting intermediation margin changes the 
interaction between variables. Implicit interest rates are statistically significant in 
explaining dynamics of pure margin and gross margin but statistically insignificant in 
explain net interest margin. Moreover, sign of some variables are difficult to explain. 
For instance, net interest margin decreases with credit risk exposure. Higher risk 
exposure calls for higher risk premium which should be translated into higher margin.  
 
Examining the impacts of variables introduced in the model of Ho-Saunders (1981), 
sign of coefficients are different from what had been found in the paper. The margin 
decreases with market risk exposure and degree of risk aversion, and market power is 
statistically significant. The results from theoretical model in Valverde and Fernández  
(2007) also show that margin decreases with degree of risk exposure. However, the 
margin is positively related to market risk exposure. The sign of variable opportunity 
cost of reserve requirement changes when more macroeconomic and solvency 
indicators are taken into account. In contrast to what had been argued in Valverde and 
Fernández (2007) and Maudos and Solis (2009), margin in the previous quarter is not 
statistically significant in explaining changes in the margin.  
 
Dynamic model of the extended model shows that margin in the previous quarter is not 
statistically significant. Using variables introduced in Maudos and Solis (2009) also 
suggests the insignificant effect of margin in the previous quarter on this quarter’s 
margin. The expected profit margin might be influenced by margin gained in the 
previous quarter. However, omitting expected profit margin also shows that margin in 
the previous quarter is not statistically significant. The result from dynamic model is 
also inconsistent with what has been assumed in the extended model. Only operating 
cost, opportunity cost of cash and expected margin are statistically significant in 
determining contractual margin. On the other hand, accounting margin is significantly 
determined by transaction size, operating cost, opportunity cost of reserve requirement. 
The results are robust to time variables. 
 
Briefly, the results suggest that using accounting margin as proxy for intermediation 
margin has potential bias of estimators which was also indicated in Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999). Secondly, using marketing instruments to raise non-maturity deposit 
125 
  
might cost banks less than raising maturity deposit. Contrary to the hypothesis about the 
importance of upper bound of deposit prices, fluctuation in SBI yields is statically more 
important than upper bound of deposit prices in most cases. In other word, policy 
interest rate, which is transmitted into yields on SBI, is statistically important in 
determining loan prices. In contrast to findings in Valverde and Fernández (2007) and 
Maudos and Solis (2009), margin in the previous quarter is not statistically significant 
in explaining changes in net interest margin but significantly explain pure margin and 
gross margin.  
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CHAPTER 4 INTERNALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXTERNALITIES AND SOCIAL IMPACT UNDER DEALERSHIP 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
  
 
4.1. Introduction  
Environmental legislation and regulation on corporate social responsibility 
enforces firms to take measures to mitigate their environmental and social impact. 
If firms fail to take preventive measures, they are liable to clean up the 
environmental and social impact. At the same time, market for environmental 
externalities15 such as the EU Emission Trading System (ETS), allows firms to 
generate additional revenue by trading externalities. Thus, financiers should take 
into account these aspects in pricing and allocating fund to productive and 
consumptive investment.  
 
In Indonesia where more than 60% of productive and consumptive investment 
financed through bank loans, banks have been required to measure and price 
environmental and social risk of borrowing firms. Ministry of Environment 
provides environment and social risk rating as main reference. The risk rating 
tracks how important community development in firms’ corporate social responsibility 
initiatives, and how well firms in reducing, reusing, recycling, and recovering wastes or 
pollutants. Therefore, risk rating is the basis to set provision that absorbs expected cost 
to clean up social and environmental damage. The loss provision is transmitted to loan 
prices of the associated borrowers (Bank Indonesia, 2005). This statutory approach 
helps banks lacking expertise in or knowledge of assessing environmental and 
social risk to price both risks. Such references to assess and price risk has been 
looked-for by banks in Europe, the USA, and Pacific region (Rhee and Lee, 2003; 
Thomson and Crowton, 2004; Köllner et al, 2004; McKenzie and Wolfe, 2004; Weber 
et al 2008; Chave, 2010).  
                                                             
15 Environmental externalities are benefits or costs of production and consumption goods, which are not 
transmitted into price of goods and services, but externalized to natures or parties uninvolved in 
production and consumption process (Mishan, 2007). 
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What has been explained previously indicates that regulation in Indonesia does not 
comprise risk-return on loans generating tradable externalities. The tradable 
externalities generate additional revenue to make up environmental and social benefits 
missing from prices of goods and services. In Indonesia context, the only market 
available to trade externalities is international Emission Trading System (ETS). ETS 
such as the EU ETS allows firms in developing and developed countries to sell reduced 
emission of greenhouse gases (GHG)16 to firms emitting GHG excessively in developed 
countries. Many types of emission credits are traded at international and regional ETS. 
However, Certified Emission Reduction (CER) is the only emission credits tradable by 
developing countries such as Indonesia.  
 
The internalization of CER is as important as internalization of adverse impact of 
lending activities to environmental and society. Expected revenue from selling CER is 
often incorporated in the estimation of borrower’s financial capacity to repay loans. 
However, variation in CER prices and uncertainty about the issuance of CER by Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) registry administrators are risks inherent in the 
expected revenue from selling CERR. Without taking into account this risk, banks are 
likely to overestimate financial capacity of borrowing firms. In Indonesia, some banks 
have taken into account risk-return on selling CER and transmitted it into loan prices 
through one component in cost of loanable fund i.e. expected profit margin. These 
banks net expected revenue from selling CER of potential loss from unfavourable CER 
prices, and mix it with other factors composing expected profit margin. The rest of 
banks in Indonesia tend to ignore the impact of trading CER due to lack of expertise and 
knowledge of assessing risk-return on trading CER. 
 
In light of the abovementioned issues, this study aims to two objectives. First, it 
identifies how risk-return on loans generating CER influences loan prices and 
wealth maximizing intermediation margin. If CER is significantly important in 
pricing loans and maximizing banks’ wealth, variation in CER prices drives up 
loan prices and hurts demand on loans. The second objective is to investigate 
                                                             
16 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) classified six GHG emitted from production and 
consumption process as triggers of climate changes such as overlong draught and extreme winter. GHG 
emission abatement is argued to be the most important measure to mitigate climate change (IPCC, 2001). 
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whether mandatory environmental and social risk management enforces banks to 
internalize both risks. If so, loss provision associated with environmental and 
social risk of lending activities significantly influence loan prices and banks’ 
wealth maximization. Additionally, the study also provides empirical application 
of extended partial liability that is introduced in Dionne and Spaeter (2003). The 
extended partial liability has been has been discussed in many papers but 
empirical studies supporting the theoretical framework is almost nonexistent 
(Hiriart and Martimort, 2004; Kambia-Chopin, 2010; Jacob and Spaeter, 2010).  
 
A theoretical construct is proposed to demonstrate the internalization of 
environmental and social risk of lending activities as well as risk-return on loans 
generating emission credits. Dealership model modified in chapter 3 is extended to the 
impact of CER, and environmental and social risk of lending activities. The inclusion of 
three factors borrows Dionne and Spaeter’s (2003) idea about extended partial liability. 
They demonstrated that banks might lose but not more than loan size by lending to 
firms damaging environment. Thus, borrowers’ liability of their environmental impact 
is essentially extended to banks. Model in this study differs from Dionne and Spaeter's 
by assuming loan prices and supply are dependent of risk return on fund supplied to 
banks, and cost of regulation such as opportunity cost of regulatory capital.  
 
Obviously, the contribution of the study takes two folds. First, it provides 
empirical evidence about extended partial liability that has been almost 
nonexistent in the economic literatures. Second, it extends dealership model from 
‘traditional’ risk management to environmental and social risk of lending 
activities, and impact of emission credits. The inclusion of the three factors 
becomes important since banks globally have been urged to manage and mitigate 
the factors. 
 
The modified dealership model is tested on 1,165 quarterly unbalanced 
observations of 51 banks in Indonesia from March 2005 to December 2010. 
Techniques to correct clustering, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
standard error are employed. The results confirm theoretical construct 
representing the internalization, and robust to time variables and measures of 
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interest rate risks and implicit interest rates. Intermediation margin, spread 
between loan price and deposit price, increases with transaction size, interest rate 
and credit riskiness, environmental and social risk of lending activities, price 
volatility of CER, degree of risk aversion, opportunity cost of capital charge, and 
expected profit margin.  
 
Intermediation margin decreases during the first three quarter, and negatively 
influenced by The results show that demand on loans generating CER decreases 
with spread between loan price and borrowing cost from money market, but 
increases with expected revenue from selling CER and prices of other products. 
Spread between loan price and deposit price, which is known as intermediation 
margin, increases with environmental and social risk of lending activities, 
transaction size, market and credit riskiness of bank’s products, degree of risk 
aversion, opportunity cost of regulatory capital, and expected profit margin. 
Intermediation margin decreases with operating cost and implicit interest rates. 
Implicit interest rates are composed of opportunity cost of cash reserves and 
liquidity reserves requirement, and upper bound of deposit prices under 
mandatory deposit insurance scheme. Price volatility of CER and market power 
of banks is positively related to intermediation but statistically insignificant. 
Small number of banks factoring CER might be the cause.  
 
 
4.2. Environmental and Social Impact Assessment in Bank’s Risk 
Management 
4.2.1. Government policies on extending liability to environmental management 
and social responsibility to banks 
As previously explained, government policies on extending liability to 
environmental management and social development to banks vary across countries. 
However, the underlying idea considerably converges to the important role of banks in 
allocating capital in the economy. Banks’ deposit taking activities mobilize fund and 
allocate it through lending activities across sectors. Thus, banks present an opportunity 
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for government intervention to achieve sustainable development17. Government 
intervention to promote sustainable development creates investment opportunities and 
attempts to shift business as usual activities to environmentally and socially conscious 
activities. When such intervention takes form of fines, revoking business license, or 
even criminal charges, it creates risks to lending activities. Therefore, government 
intervention typically aims to change firm and household attitude by influencing 
banks' lending activities to be in favor of environmentally and socially conscious 
projects or firms. 
 
Extending liability to social development to banks is a more recent government 
policy than extending liability to environmental management. The US has adopted 
the policy known as Under the   Comprehensive   Environmental   Response,   
Compensation,   and   Liability   Act (CERCLA) since 1980,   which   was   amended   
by   the   Superfund   Amendments   and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 1986. Under 
the CERCLA and SARA Superfund, a potential polluter and any party influencing 
polluter decision making process might be liable to clean up the contaminated sites. If 
the responsible party fails to clean the site up, he will be fined. In the case polluter 
filling for bankruptcy, cleaning-up and compensation cost should be recovered 
before other financial obligation. Such responsible party is likely to fail to repay 
bank loans when clean-up and compensate costs exhaust the firm’s cash flow and 
saleable assets. Banks might be also liable to clean-up and compensation costs if the 
significantly influence polluters' decision-making process (Pitchford, 1995 and 2001; 
Boyer and Laffont, 1997; Heyes, 1996; Balkenborg, 2001; Kroszner and Strahan, 
2001; Patersen and Raya, 1995). The trust fund is set up to raise and manage fund to 
clean up a contaminated site when the responsible party could not be found. Most of the 
fund came from tax on petroleum and chemical industries. The fund exhausted 
in 2003 suggesting too many contaminated sites were cleaned up by the government 
(GOA, 2003). 
 
Aside from the US, at least four countries in Europe adopt similar regulatory 
                                                             
17 Sustainable development is an economic development ensuring at least the same amount of natural and man-
made resources as well as capital available for current generation are left fro future generation. The concept is 
highlighted in the EU 5th Environmental Programme and has become global commitment in COP 15 Copenhagen 
(the European Community, 1997; The UNFCCC, 1995) 
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intervention. Those are France, German, Italy, and UK. In developing countries, 
Asia and Latin America in particular, regulation or laws typically do not extend 
liability to environmental management to a polluter’s partners such as banks. To the 
author knowledge, Indonesia is the only country in Asia has introduced bank regulation 
to extend liability to environmental and social risk management to banks for more than 
ten years (Menlh, 2010). Since July 2007, China has followed the act but focused on 
environmental risk management (Jin and Mengqi, 2010). Bangladesh will launch 
bank regulation concerning environmental and social risk management by 
December 2013 (Bangladesh Bank, 2012). Aside from the three countries, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Philippines are among Asian countries introducing legislation to 
encourage either limited liability firms or listed firms to be socially responsible. The 
legislation is however lack in enforcement due to risk of unleveled playing field in the 
international markets (SGX, 2012; BoT, 2012, BoP, 2012). The rest of developing 
countries bend to voluntary participation of banks in social and environmental 
management since there has been insufficient evidence that lending activities in 
environmentally high-risk sectors increases potential of bank failures.  
 
The voluntary participation has been initially popular in Europe and the US. In 
Europe, the voluntary participation is highlighted in the fifth EU Environmental 
Programme. The program encourages financial institutions to influence and to 
some extent control management and investment decision of their counterparties to 
benefit environment. Since then more than 22 European banks attain ISO 14001 for 
corrective and preventive action against adverse impacts of their operation on 
environment. The Finance Initiative of United Nation Environment Program 
(UNEP-FI) draws 54 banks in the EU region to commit on sustainable development. 
The Equator Principles also get 34 banks together to voluntarily deny loans to projects 
violating the principles. While the first initiative focuses on environmental risk 
management, the last two have incorporated social risk management. In Asia and 
Latin America, ISO 14001 is less popular than UNEP-FI and the Equator Principles. 
About 52 banks in Asia and Latin America participate in the UNEP-FI while 13 banks 
in the regions sign the Equator Principles. So far, the ISO 14001 has been awarded to 
more than 14 banks in Asia and Latin America. Later Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme (EMAS) was amended in 2009 to encourage voluntarily audit on the 
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indirect impact of banks’ products and services on sustainable development (UNEP, 
2012; European Community, 2009). 
 
Rhee and Lee (2003) found evidence that voluntary initiatives make participating 
banks in Europe more active than others in environmental issues, but do not necessarily 
change operation or business strategy of participating banks. The same evidence is also 
found in North America and UK (McKenzie and Karfe, 2009; Koolner et al, 2009; 
Balkenberg, 2001). Moreover, accessibility and costs to gain reliable and consistent 
environmental information might vary across banks raising problem of unleveled 
playing field. Thus, regulatory intervention might be necessary to provide reference 
for banks to voluntarily change their operation or business strategy (Gouldson and 
Murphy, 1998). Nonetheless, regulatory intervention needs to be well defined or 
structured. Otherwise, the intervention is not effectual to curb environment and social 
problem as in the US CERCLA and SARA. The US CERCLA and SARA do not 
define whether liability extended fully or partly to banks. Under full information, 
regulation extending full liability to banks drives borrowing firms to invest 
sufficiently in prevention measures. In practice, banks often do not have access 
to full information about prevention level of borrowing firms. Thus, the second best 
policy is extending partial liability to banks (Boyer and Laffont, 2007). However, 
when bank loans are spent on productive investment but not on preventive 
investment, extending partial liability might yield lower level of prevention than not 
extending liability to banks (Pitchford, 1995). On the other hand, extending partial 
liability to banks might increase private optimal level of environmental protection if 
banks do not know how borrowers allocate bank loans to production activities and 
environmental protection. The liability increases face value of bank loans, implying 
increasing premium associated with environmental risk, which in turn increases 
level of environmental protection (Dionne and Spaeter, 2001). 
 
In light of regulatory intervention to extent partial liability to banks, Indonesia 
might provide good empirical evidence. Since 1998, the country has enforced 
environmental impact assessment, known as AMDAL, on lending activities in 
environmentally risky activities. AMDAL (Analisa Mengenai Dampak 
Lingkungan) is carried out by Ministry of Environment before a project or business 
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activity started up. The bank regulation also requires banks to take into account 
environmental and social performance of borrowing firms in estimating loss 
provision. The assessment on environmental and social performance of borrowers 
should at least refer to PROPER rating (Bank Indonesia, 2005). PROPER (Program 
Penilaian Kinerja Perusahaan dalam Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup) is annual 
assessment on environmental and social performance of selected firms which is 
carried out by Ministry of Environment. Aside from the firms selected by Ministry 
of Environment, other firms might voluntarily apply for PROPER assessment. The 
methodology used in PROPER has been reference for developing countries such as 
China, India, Mexico and Philippines. The result of the assessment is freely 
accessible and comes in five ratings i.e. gold, green, blue, red, and black. Firms are 
qualified for gold rating when they demonstrate excellent environmental and social 
performance. Green is attained by firms having excellent environmental performance 
but their social performance just meets the minimum requirement. Blue are obtained 
by firms demonstrating minimum required environmental management. Red is for 
firms performing below environmental standard but in the process to meet minimum 
requirement for environmental management. Black is given to firms poorly 
perform in environmental management. PROPER rating should minimize potentially 
unleveled playing field across  banks  which  comes from  varying  cost  and  
accessibility  to  information  about environmental and social performance of 
borrowing firms. 
 
4.2.2. Environmental and social risk management in practice: Indonesia 
case and international practice 
Indonesian  banking  regulation  No.7/2/PBI/2005  clearly  requires  all banks  to  
integrate assessment on environmental and social risk of borrowers into all 
phases of  credit risk management  process. The regulation enforces banks to 
identify, screen, and investigate environmental and social risk by using AMDAL 
and PROPER at the least. Controlling and monitoring changes in environmental and 
social risk are carried along the life of the loans by referring to annual PROPER grade. 
The PROPER grade should be reflected in the loss severity, which calls for capital 
buffer to absorb risk. The opportunity cost of capital to absorb the risk is transferred to 
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borrowers in the forms of loan prices and costs. Therefore, the regulation provides 
reference for banks to price environmental and social risk. This quantitative integration 
is what has not been found in many banks adopting voluntary initiatives. For instance, 
Weber et al (2008) found evidence that many European banks tend to integrate 
environmental risks into some parts of process in credit risk management. The most 
common practice is rating the environmental risk of borrowers. The rating often 
does not influence the cost and price of loans (Thomson and Cowton, 2004; 
Köllner et al, 2004). Consequently,  banks  often  do  not  anticipate  that  they  
might  be  liable  to  borrower’s environmental and social obligation (Pitchford, 1995, 
2001; McKenzie and Wolfe, 2004). Chave (2010) suggests that such risk could be 
transferred to borrowers by means cost and price of loans. The cost and price of loans 
could also be structured to mimic changes of borrower’s risk profile during the life of 
the loans. Therefore, a systematic and quantitative integration of environmental 
and social risk into risk management is an instrument to allow such risk influences all 
phases of risk management process. 
 
It  appears  that  Indonesian  regulation  gives  a  good  reference  to  quantify  and  
integrate environmental and social risk into credit risk management process. 
Moreover, the country adopts “one obligor” concept that single credit rating is applied 
to all firms owned by the same ultimate shareholders. If some subsidiaries or branches 
have different credit ratings, the lowest credit rating will be the single credit ratings for 
all sister companies as well as parent company. If a bank perceives credit rating of a 
borrower is lower his rating in other banks, other banks should downgrade that 
borrower’s credit rating. Thus, how much a borrower should pay to a bank is 
expected to be not much different from what he might pay to other banks. This does not 
happen in practice. The banking regulation leaves banks to decide themselves on how 
significant environmental and social performance to be factored into loan prices and 
costs. Therefore, some borrowing firms with red rating still enjoy market prices of loans. 
Those firms also pay different loan prices to different banks. In 2012, at least one state 
owned bank disburses loans to two state owned rated black in 2011. Another drawback is 
that firms rated gold, green and blue will not be liable to clean up or compensate victim 
of environmental and social problem. It implies that zero liability will be extended to 
banks disbursing loans to firms having either minimum required environmental 
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management or superior environmental and social management. This does not give 
incentives for banks and borrowing firms to be more socially conscious. The scheme 
also does not encourage banks and borrowing firms to invest in projects or 
activities producing positive environmental externalities such as energy saving and 
emission abatement. Above all, some firms are not consistently on the list of PROPER 
auditees and more than 70% of limited liabilities companies have not been audited 
under PROPER scheme during period 2005 – 2011 (BPS, 2011). Banks sometime fail 
to access free information about current state of environmental and social 
performance of their borrowers. The banks are also reluctant to bear cost to obtain 
such information. Consequently, many banks understate environmental and social risk 
factored in loan prices and costs. Nevertheless, assuming there is no collusion 
between audited firms and auditors, and the audited firms dominate environmentally 
and socially risky firms operating in the economy, linking PROPER and quality of loan 
portfolio might show the same result as in Dionne and Spaeter (2003) paper. 
 
 
 
4.3. The Theoretical Model: A Dealership Approach 
This section discusses methodology, with respect to dealership-model framework. The 
focus is on three major pieces. They are, demand interrelationships within different 
types of earning assets and two types of deposits, the impact of environmental and 
social risk  as well as price risk of emission credit on bank’s wealth, and dynamics of 
arrival of new transaction with respect to prices of positive externalities i.e. emission 
credits. The modified dealership model in Allen (1988) has been extended in chapter 3 
to capture the impact of demand elasticity between two types of deposits and among 
four types of earning assets. The extended model however has not detangled 
environmental risk and social risk premium from standard credit risk premium 
concerning credit quality of borrowers; hence, it does not consider that uncertainty 
about profit or revenue of borrowers might be independent of uncertainty about prices 
of emission credits as well as cost of environmental and social degradation. The 
following discussion on the model construction is borrowed heavily from Allen (1988), 
Valverde and Fernández (2007), and Dionne and Spaeter (2003). 
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4.3.1. Interrelationships in earning assets and deposits 
Using the same setting as dealership model modified by Valverde and Fernández (2007) 
and Allen (1988), banks are assumed risk averse. Banks are also assumed to maximize 
their utility of wealth by acting as “dealers” in money market. Specifically, banks 
borrow from or invest in money market when the arrival of demand on earning assets 
does not match the arrival of deposits. As such, initial wealth of banks ( ଴ܹ) is 
composed of their net position in money market (ܯ଴) and net credit inventory (ܫ଴) 
defined as earning assets net of deposits. Thus, banks expose to uncertainty about 
interest rate in money market and return of earning assets. To compensate interest rate 
risk ൫ ෨ܼெ൯, banks ask for immediacy fees i.e. spread between interest rates paid or 
earned in money market and prices of bank products. Immediacy fees might also allow 
banks to influence arrival of new transaction. For instance, increasing immediacy fees 
could dampen demand on earning assets and supply of deposit. Immediacy fees for 
earning assets and maturity deposits are defined in Valverde and Fernández (2007) and 
Allen (1988) as follows 
ܾ௖௢௡௦ = ݎ௖௢௡௦ − ݎ        (4.3.1.1) 
௙ܾ௜ = ݎ௙௜ − ݎ         (4.3.1.2.) 
ܾ௪௢௥௞ = ݎ௪௢௥௞ − ݎ        (4.3.1.3.) 
௜ܾ௡௩ = ݎ௜௡௩ − ݎ        (4.3.1.4.) 
ܽ௜ = ݎ − ݎௗ         (4.3.1.5.) 
ܾ௖௢௡௦, ௜ܾ௡௩ , ܾ௪௢௥௞, ௙ܾ௜ and ܽ௜ denotes immediacy fees of consumer loans, investment 
loans, working-capital loans, non-loan earning assets and maturity deposit respectively. 
ݎ, ݎௗ, ݎ௙௜, ݎ௖௢௡௦, ݎ௜௡௩, and ݎ௪௢௥௞ denotes interest rate in money market, maturity deposit, 
non-loan earning assets, consumer loans, investment loans, and working-capital loans. 
The immediacy fee of non-maturity deposit has not been elaborate so far in many 
variations of dealership models. Non-maturity deposits typically pay zero interest; 
hence, banks do not bear risk that interest rate paid to depositors is higher than interest 
rate earned in money market. In other world, immediacy fee of non-maturity deposits 
ܽ௡ = 0.  
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4.3.2. The implication of extended partial liability to social and environmental 
risk management on wealth of banks 
The notion about uncertainty of return of earning assets (i.e. credit risk) arises from the 
assumption that operating cash flow or revenue of borrowers and other bank’s 
counterparties determines their financial capacity to payback. Regulatory extension of 
partial liability to environmental and social impact in Indonesia makes funds available 
to repay loans spent first and up most on cleaning up environmental and social 
degradation. In other word, environmental and social risk influences bank’s wealth but 
could be mitigated by investing in prevention measures. Resorting to model framework 
of extended partial liability in Dionne and Spaeter (2003), credit risk ൫ ෨ܼ஺൯ as well as 
environmental and social risk ൫ ෨ܼ௘൯ are assumed normally distributed and are two 
independent events. Thus, ෨ܼ௘~(0,ߪ௘ଶ), ෨ܼ஺~(0,ߪ஺ଶ) and ෨ܼெ~(0,ߪெଶ ) with zero 
covariance between credit risk, and environmental and social risk. On the other hand 
ܥ݋ݒ(̃ݖூ , ̃ݖெ)	and ܥ݋ݒ(̃ݖ஺, ̃ݖெ) are non zero with ܣ଴ = ܨܫ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦,଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞,଴ + ܮ௜௡௩,଴. 
ܨܫ, ܮ௖௢௡௦, ܮ௪௢௥௞, ܮ௜௡௩ respectively denote non-loan earning assets, consumer loans, 
working-capital loans and investment loans. The non-zero covariance comes from 
empirical evidence about the relation between interest rate and credit quality of the 
firms (Jarrow, 1998; Bomfim, 2002; Drehmann et al, 2006). 
 
Aside from the abovementioned risks, banks also bear other types of risks when 
disbursing investment and working capital loans associated with emission credits. The 
borrowing firms might generate revenue from trading emission credits, which is 
rerouted to banks. The expected revenues typically influences loan prices (Labatt and 
White, 2002; Jeucken, 2002). Nonetheless, some firms fail to generate emission credits 
or produce fewer credits than expected (UNFCCC, 2012). Thus, uncertainty associated 
with emission credits ൫ ෨ܼ௦൯	 also influences terminal wealth with ෨ܼ௦~(0,ߪ௦ଶ).  
 
When there is no new transaction, terminal wealth of bank in Eq.(4.3.1.16) is influenced 
by environmental and social risk and uncertainty about prices of externalities in the 
following way  
்ܹ = ܫ଴൫1 + ݎூ + ෨ܼூ൯ + ܯ଴൫1 + ݎ + ෨ܼெ൯ + ܮ଴ ෨ܼ௘ + ܵ଴ ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴) 
If ݎௐ = ௥಺ூబା௥ெబௐబ , then terminal wealth	( ்ܹ) can be written as follows 
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்ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܫ଴ ෨ܼூ + ܯ଴ ෨ܼெ + ܮ଴ ෨ܼ௘ + ܵ଴ ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴) 
When new non-maturity deposit (ܦ௡) comes, terminal wealth becomes 
்ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ݎܦ௡ + ܫ଴ ෨ܼூ + (ܯ଴ + ܦ௡) ෨ܼெ + ܮ଴ ෨ܼ௘ + ܵ଴ ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܦ௡) 
Similarly, terminal wealth when new maturity deposit (ܦ௜) comes is expressed as 
follows 
்ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܽ௜ܦ௜ + ܫ଴ ෨ܼூ + (ܯ଴ + ܦ௜) ෨ܼெ + ܮ଴ ෨ܼ௘ + ܵ଴ ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܦ௜) 
 
It follows terminal wealth associated with new non-loan earning assets (ܨܫ) is written 
as follows  
்ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ௙ܾ௜ܨܫ + (ܫ଴ + ܨܫ) ෨ܼ஺ + (ܯ଴ − ܨܫ) ෨ܼெ + ܮ଴ ෨ܼ௘ + ܵ଴ ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴)
− ܥ(ܨܫ) 
Since environmental and social risk of lending activities is extended to banks, 
environmental and social risk exposure depends on prevention level of new lending. 
Thus, terminal wealth when new consumer loans (ܮ௖௢௡௦) comes is expressed as follows 
்ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܾ௖௢௡௦ܮ௖௢௡௦ + (ܫ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦) ෨ܼ஺ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௖௢௡௦) ෨ܼெ+ (ܮ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦) ෨ܼ௘ + ܵ଴ ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦) 
This implies that the new consumer loans presumably do not expose banks to the 
uncertainty about prices of positive externalities. The underlying notion of this 
assumption is that monetary values of positive environmental externalities might take 
two forms. First, it might be revenues from emission reduction trading that are 
generated from CDM project only. Second, the value could be proxy as government 
subsidy on “green” technology, which is financed by either investment loans or 
working-capital loans. Therefore, terminal wealth associated with new working-capital 
loans (ܮ௪௢௥௞) and investment loans (ܮ௜௡௩)	is influenced by uncertainty about value of 
positive externalities in the following way 
்ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܾ௪௢௥௞ܮ௪௢௥௞ + (ܫ଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞) ෨ܼ஺ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞) ෨ܼெ + (ܮ଴ + ܮ) ෨ܼ௘+ (ܵ଴ + ܵ௪௢௥௞) ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞) 
்ܹ = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ௜ܾ௡௩ܮ௜௡௩ + (ܫ଴ + ܮ௜௡௩) ෨ܼ஺ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩) ෨ܼெ + (ܮ଴ + ܮ௜௡௩) ෨ܼ௘+ (ܵ଴ + ௜ܵ௡௩) ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴) − ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩) 
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4.3.3. Dynamics of arrival of new transaction and the impact of emission credits  
Revenues generated from selling emission credits reduces immediacy fee of investment 
and working-capital loans as follows  
ܾ௪௢௥௞ = ݎ௪௢௥௞ − ݎ + ݏ       (4.3.3.1.) 
௜ܾ௡௩ = ݎ௜௡௩ − ݎ + ݏ        (4.3.3.2.) 
where ݏ  are sales of emission credits per unit of loans. 
 
In chapter 3, the assumption about the rate arrival of new transaction in the modified 
dealership model in Allen (1988) and Valverde and Fernández (2007) is explained. Both 
papers assume that probability of new transaction follows Poisson distribution 
conditional to immediacy fees. Then Poisson regression  
for each types of bank products is expressed in the following way 
ܲݎ(ܦ௜ = ݀௜) = ݁ିఒߣௗ೔݀௜! ,								݀௜ = 0,1,2,⋯					 
ߣ௝(ܦ௜) = ݁ఈ೔ିఉ௔೔ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ , ݊      (4.3.3.3.) 
ߣ௝(ܦ௡) = ݁ఈ೙ାఋ೔௥ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ ,݊      (4.3.3.4.) 
ߣ௝(ܨܫ) = ݁ఈ೑೔ିఉ௕೑೔ାఋ೔೙ೡ(௕೔೙ೡି௦)ାఋೢ೚ೝೖ(௕ೢ೚ೝೖೡି௦)ାఋ೎೚೙ೞ௕೎೚೙ೞ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ ,݊ (4.3.3.5.) 
ߣ௝(ܮ௖௢௡௦) = ݁ఈ೑೔ିఉ௕೎೚೙ೞାఋ೔೙ೡ(௕೔೙ೡି௦)ାఋೢ೚ೝೖ(௕ೢ೚ೝೖೡି௦)ାఋ೑೔௕೑೔ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ ,݊ (4.3.3.6.) 
ߣ௝(ܮ௜௡௩) = ݁ఈ೑೔ିఉ(௕೔೙ೡି௦)ାఋೢ೚ೝೖ(௕ೢ೚ೝೖೡି௦)ାఋ೎೚೙ೞ௕೎೚೙ೞାఋ೑೔௕೑೔ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ , ݊ (4.3.3.7.) 
ߣ௝(ܮ௪௢௥௞) = ݁ఈ೑೔ିఉ(௕ೢ೚ೝೖೡି௦)ାఋ೔೙ೡ(௕೔೙ೡି௦)ାఋ೎೚೙ೞ௕೎೚೙ೞାఋ೑೔௕೑೔ ,					݆ = 1,⋯ ,݊ (4.3.3.8.) 
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4.3.4.  Maximizing expected utility of wealth in the presence of environmental and 
social externalities 
Using Taylor series expansion around ഥܹ = ܧ[ܹ], the expected utility of wealth is 
written as follows  
ܧܷ(ܹ) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )ܧ[ܹ− ഥܹ ] + భ
మ
ܷ"( ഥܹ )ܧ[ܹ− ഥܹ ]ଶ          
where ܧ[ܹ] = ଴ܹ(1 + ݎௐ) + ܫ଴ ෨ܼூ + ܯ଴ ෨ܼெ + ܮ଴ ෨ܼ௘ + ܵ଴ ෨ܼ௦ − ܥ(ܫ଴) 
with ܷᇱ > 0	 
ܷ" < 0 
ܹ− ഥܹ = ܫ଴ ෨ܼூ + ܯ଴ ෨ܼெ + ܮ଴ ෨ܼ௘ + ܵ଴ ෨ܼ௦   
The 2nd order of immediacy and operating costs is assumed negligible.  
Thus, the expected utility of terminal wealth with zero new transaction can be written as 
follows 
ܧܷ(ܹ) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ଵ
ଶ
	ܷ"( ഥܹ )(ܫ଴ଶߪூଶ + ܯ଴ଶߪெଶ + ܮ଴ଶߪ௘ଶ + ܵ଴ଶߪ௦ଶ + 2ܫ଴ܯ଴ߪூெ)   (4.3.4.1.) 
where ܫ଴̃ݖூ  = ܮ௜௡௩,଴̃ݖ௜௡௩ + ܮ௪௢௥௞,଴̃ݖ௪௢௥௞ + ܮ௖௢௡௦,଴̃ݖ௖௢௡௦ + ܨܫ଴̃ݖ௙௜ 
 
New non-maturity deposit (ܦ௡) changes the expected utility of wealth changes into 
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௡) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ݎܦ௡ − ܥ(ܦ௡)] + భమܷ"( ഥܹ ){[ݎܦ௡ − ܥ(ܦ௡)]ଶ + ܫ଴ଶߪூଶ +(ܯ଴ + ܦ௡)ଶߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴(ܯ଴ + ܦ௡)ߪூெ + ܮ଴ଶߪ௘ଶ + ܵ଴ଶߪ௦ଶ}             (4.3.4.2.)        
New non-maturity deposit (ܦ௡) changes expected utility of wealth by the following 
terms.  
∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௡) = ܧܷ(ܹ) − ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௡) =Eq. (3.3.4.2) – Eq. (3.3.4.1) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ݎܦ௡ − ܥ(ܦ௡)] + ଵଶܷ"( ഥܹ ){ܦ௡(ܦ௡ + 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ܦ௡ߪூெ}                        (4.3.4.3.) 
                                                                          
Similarly, new maturity deposit (ܦ௜) changes the expected utility of wealth into 
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௜) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܽ௜ܦ௜ − ܥ(ܦ௜)] + భమܷ"( ഥܹ ){[ܽ௜ܦ௜ − ܥ(ܦ௜)]ଶ + ܫ଴ଶߪூଶ +(ܯ଴ + ܦ௜)ଶߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴(ܯ଴ + ܦ௜)ߪூெ + ܮ଴ଶߪ௘ଶ + ܵ଴ଶߪ௦ଶ}             (4.3.4.4.)        
Thus, new maturity deposit (ܦ௜) changes expected utility of wealth by the following 
terms.  
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∆ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௜) = ܧܷ(ܹ) − ܧܷ(ܹ|ܦ௜) =Eq. (4.3.4.4) – Eq. (4.3.4.1) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܽ௜ܦ௜ − ܥ(ܦ௜)] + ଵଶܷ"( ഥܹ ){ܦ௜(ܦ௜ + 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ܦ௜ߪூெ}             (4.3.4.5.) 
 
The expected utility of terminal wealth when non-loan earning arrives is 
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܨܫ) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )ൣ ௙ܾ௜ܨܫ − ܥ(ܨܫ)൧ + భమܷ"( ഥܹ ) ቄൣ ௙ܾ௜ܨܫ − ܥ(ܨܫ)൧ଶ +(ܫ଴ + ܨܫ)ଶߪூଶ + (ܯ଴ − ܨܫ)ଶߪெଶ + 2(ܫ଴ + ܨܫ)(ܯ଴ − ܨܫ)ߪூெ + ܮ଴ଶߪ௘ଶ + ܵ଴ଶߪ௦ଶൟ   (4.3.4.6.)   
Thus, FI changes expected utility of terminal wealth by  
Δܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܨܫ) = ܧݍ. (4.3.4.6) − ܧݍ. (4.3.4.1) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )ൣ ௙ܾ௜ܨܫ − ܥ(ܨܫ)൧ +
భ
మ
ܷ"( ഥܹ ){ܨܫ(ܨܫ + 2ܫ଴)ߪ஺ଶ + ܨܫ(ܨܫ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܨܫ(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܨܫ)ߪூெ}         (4.3.4.7) 
Similarly, new consumer loans (ܮ௖௢௡௦) changes expected utility of terminal wealth as 
follows. (Below expresses changes of expected utility of terminal wealth when either 
new consumer loans (ܮ௖௢௡௦), working-capital loans (ܮ௪௢௥௞), or investment loans (ܮ௜௡௩) 
arrives.  
Δܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܾ௖௢௡௦ܮ௖௢௡௦ − ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦)] +  
భ
మ
ܷ"( ഥܹ )[ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ + 2ܫ଴)ߪூଶ + ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ +                          2ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௖௢௡௦)ߪூெ + ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ + 2ܮ଴)ߪ௘ଶ ]       (4.3.4.8) 
This implies that consumer loan, which is disbursed for purchasing consumption goods 
is not the source of environmental and social risk as well as and price risk of emission 
credits.  In contrast, the arrival of working capital loans (ܮ௪௢௥௞) transforms the expected 
utility of terminal wealth into   
ܧܷ(ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) = ܷ( ഥܹ ) + ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܾ௪௢௥௞ܮ௪௢௥௞ − ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞)] + భమܷ"( ഥܹ ){[ܾ௪௢௥௞ܮ௪௢௥௞ −
ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞)]ଶ + (ܫ଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞)ଶߪூଶ + (ܯ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞)ଶߪெଶ + 2(ܫ଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞)(ܯ଴ −
ܮ௪௢௥௞)ߪூெ + (ܮ଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞)ଶߪ௘ଶ + (ܵ଴ + ܵ௪௢௥௞)ଶߪ௦ଶ}                                            (4.3.4.9)             
Thus, changes of expected utility of terminal wealth associated with ܮ௪௢௥௞ can be 
expressed as follows 
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Δܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) = ܧݍ. (4.3.4.9) − ܧݍ. (4.3.4.1) =    
ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܾ௪௢௥௞ − ݏ) − ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞)] + భమܷ"( ഥܹ )[ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ +2ܫ଴)ߪூଶ + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ −
ܮ௪௢௥௞)ߪூெ +              
ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ + 2ܮ଴)ߪ௘ଶ + ܵ௪௢௥௞(ܵ௪௢௥௞ − 2ܵ଴)ߪ௦ଶ        (4.3.4.10) 
              
Similarly, environmental, social and price risks are inherent risk of investment loans 
(ܮ௜௡௩). Thus, the impact of ܮ௜௡௩ on expected utility of terminal wealth mimics that of 
new working-capital loans. The arrival of ܮ௜௡௩ changes expected utility of termanl 
wealth by     
Δܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩) = ܷ′( ഥܹ )[ܮ௜௡௩( ௜ܾ௡௩ − ݏ) − ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩)] + భమܷ"( ഥܹ ){ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ + 2ܫ଴)ߪூଶ +
ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܮ௜௡௩(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩ݒ)ߪூெ + ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ − 2ܮ଴)ߪ௘ଶ +
௜ܵ௡௩( ௜ܵ௡௩ − 2ܵ଴)ߪ௦ଶ}                                                                                           (4.3.4.11) 
 
The rate of arrival of new transaction is assumed to follow Poisson distribution 
depending on immediacy fees as expressed in Eq.(4.3.3.3)  to Eq.(4.3.3.8). Wealth 
maximization problem is expressed as follows 
ܯܽݔ௔೔,௕೑೔,௕೎೚೙ೞ,௕ೢ೚ೝೖ ,௕೔೙ೡ ,∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ)= Prܦ௜ ∆ܧܷ(∆ ்ܹ|ܦ௜) + Prܦ௡ ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܦ௡) + Prܨܫ ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܨܫ)+ Pr ܮ௖௢௡௦ ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) + Pr ܮ௪௢௥௞ ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞)+ Pr ܮ௜௡௩ ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩) = ܧݍ. (4.3.3.3) × ܧݍ. (4.3.4.3) + ܧݍ. (4.3.3.4) × ܧݍ. (4.3.4.5)+ ܧݍ. (4.3.3.5) × ܧݍ. (4.3.4.7) + ܧݍ. (4.3.3.6)× ܧݍ. (4.3.4.8) + ܧݍ. (4.3.3.7) × ܧݍ. (4.3.4.10)+ ܧݍ. (4.3.3.8) × ܧݍ. (4.3.4.11) 
 
߲∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ)
߲ܽ௜
= (ߙ௜ − ߚܽ௜)∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܦ௜) + (ߙ௡ + ߜ௜ܽ௜)∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܦ௡) = 0 
 
If − ௎"(ௐഥ )
௎ᇱ(ௐഥ ) = ܴ is absolute risk aversion, then 
ܽ௜ = ଵଶ ఈ೔ఉ + ଵଶ ஼(஽೔)஽೔ + ோସ {(ܦ௜ + 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ߪூெ} + ଵଶ ఋ೔ఉ ቀ஽೙஽೔ ቄݎ − ஼(஽೙)஽೙ −   
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ோ
ଶ
൫(ܦ௡ + 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ߪூெ൯ቅቁ                                                     (4.3.4.12) 
డ∆ா௎(ௐ೅)
డ௕೑೔
= ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )ܨܫ × ܧݍ. (3.3.5) − ߚ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܨܫ) + ߜ௙௜{∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) +
∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) + ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩)} = 0  
௙ܾ௜ = ଵଶ ఈ೑೔ఉ + ଵଶ ஼(ிூ)ிூ + ோସ {(ܨܫ + 2ܫ଴)ߪூଶ + (ܨܫ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܨܫ)ߪூெ} +
ଵ
ଶ
ఋ೑೔
ఉ
൜( ௜ܾ௡௩ − ݏ) ൬ఋ೔೙ೡఋ೑೔ + ௅೔೙ೡிூ ൰ + (ܾ௪௢௥௞ − ݏ) ൬ఋೢ೚ೝೖఋ೑೔ + ௅ೢ೚ೝೖிூ ൰ + ܾ௖௢௡௦ ൬ఋ೎೚೙ೞఋ೑೔ +
௅೎೚೙ೞ
ிூ
൰ −
஼(௅೔೙ೡ)ା஼(௅ೢ೚ೝೖ)ା஼(௅೎೚೙ೞ)
ிூ
−
ோ
ଶிூ
ቀ൫ܮ௜௡௩(2ܮ଴ + ܮ௜௡௩) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(2ܮ଴ +
ܮ௪௢௥௞) + ܮ௖௢௡௦(2ܮ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦)൯ߪ௘ଶ + ൫ ௜ܵ௡௩( ௜ܵ௡௩ + 2ܵ଴) + ܵ௪௢௥௞(ܵ௪௢௥௞ +2ܵ଴)൯ߪ௦ଶ + ൫ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ + 2ܫ଴) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ + 2ܫ଴) + ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ + 2ܫ଴)൯ߪூଶ +
൫ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ − 2ܯ଴) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ − 2ܯ଴) + ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ − 2ܯ଴)൯ߪெଶ +
൫2ܮ௜௡௩(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩) + 2ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞) + 2ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ −
ܮ௖௢௡௦)൯ߪூெቁൠ                                                                                (4.3.4.13) 
 
 
డ∆ா௎(ௐ೅)
డ௕೎೚೙ೞ
= ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )ܮ௖௢௡௦ × ܧݍ. (3.3.6) − ߚ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) + ߜ௖௢௡௦൛∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩) +
∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) + ∆ܧܷ൫ ்ܹ|ܮ௙௜൯ൟ = 0   
ܾ௖௢௡௦ = ଵଶ ఈ೎೚೙ೞఉ + ଵଶ ஼(௅೎೚೙ೞ)௅೎೚೙ೞ + ோସ ቄ(ܮ௖௢௡௦ + 2ܫ଴)ߪூଶ + (ܮ௖௢௡௦ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ −
ܮ௖௢௡௦)ߪூெ + ௅೎೚೙ೞ(௅೎೚೙ೞା௅బ)௅೎೚೙ೞ ߪூଶቅ + ଵଶ ఋ೎೚೙ೞఉ ቄ( ௜ܾ௡௩ − ݏ) ቀ ఋ೔೙ೡఋ೎೚೙ೞ + ௅೔೙ೡ௅೎೚೙ೞቁ +(ܾ௪௢௥௞ − ݏ) ቀఋೢ೚ೝೖఋ೎೚೙ೞ + ௅ೢ೚ೝೖ௅೎೚೙ೞ ቁ + ௙ܾ௜ ቀ ఋ೑೔ఋ೎೚೙ೞ + ிூ௅೎೚೙ೞቁ − ஼(௅೔೙ೡ)ା஼(௅ೢ೚ೝೖ)ା஼(ிூ)௅೎೚೙ೞ −
ோ
ଶ௅೎೚೙ೞ
ቀ൫ܮ௜௡௩(2ܮ଴ + ܮ௜௡௩) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(2ܮ଴ + ܮ௪௢௥௞)൯ߪ௘ଶ + ൫ ௜ܵ௡௩( ௜ܵ௡௩ + 2ܵ଴) +
ܵ௪௢௥௞(ܵ௪௢௥௞ + 2ܵ଴)൯ߪ௦ଶ + ൫ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ + 2ܫ଴) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ + 2ܫ଴) +
ܨܫ(ܨܫ + 2ܫ଴)൯ߪூଶ + ൫ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ − 2ܯ଴) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ − 2ܯ଴) + ܨܫ(ܨܫ −2ܯ଴)൯ߪெଶ + ൫2ܮ௜௡௩(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩) + 2ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞) +2ܨܫ(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܨܫ)൯ߪூெቁቅ                          (4.3.4.14) 
144 
  
߲∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ)
߲ܾ௪௢௥௞
= ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )ܮ௜௡௩ × ܧݍ. (3.3.6) − ߚ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) + 
ߜ௪௢௥௞{∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩) + ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) + ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܨܫ)} = 0 
 
ܾ௪௢௥௞ = ଵଶ ఈೢ೚ೝೖఉ + ଵଶ ஼(௅ೢ೚ೝೖ)௅ೢ೚ೝೖ + ݏ + ோସ ቄ(ܮ௪௢௥௞ + 2ܫ଴)ߪூଶ + (ܮ௪௢௥௞ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ +2(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞)ߪூெ + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ + ܮ଴)ߪூଶ + ௌ೔೙ೡ(ௌ೔೙ೡାଶௌబ)௅ೢ೚ೝೖ ߪ௦ଶቅ +
ଵ
ଶ
ఋೢ೚ೝೖ
ఉ
ቄܾ௖௢௡௦ ቀ
ఋ೎೚೙ೞ
ఋೢ೚ೝೖ
+ ௅೎೚೙ೞ
௅ೢ೚ೝೖ
ቁ + ( ௜ܾ௡௩ − ݏ) ቀ ఋ೔೙ೡఋೢ೚ೝೖ + ௅೔೙ೡ௅ೢ೚ೝೖቁ + ௙ܾ௜ ቀ ఋ೑೔ఋೢ೚ೝೖ +
ிூ
௅ೢ೚ೝೖ
ቁ −
஼(௅೎೚೙ೞ)ା஼(௅೔೙ೡ)ା஼(ிூ)
௅ೢ೚ೝೖ
−
ோ
ଶ௅ೢ೚ೝೖ
ቀ൫ܮ௖௢௡௦(2ܮ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦) + ܮ௜௡௩(2ܮ଴ +
ܮ௜௡௩)൯ߪ௘ଶ + ܵ௪௢௥௞(ܵ௪௢௥௞ + 2ܵ଴)ߪ௦ଶ + ൫ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ + 2ܫ଴) + ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ + 2ܫ଴) +
ܨܫ(ܨܫ + 2ܫ଴)൯ߪூଶ + ൫ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ − 2ܯ଴) + ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ − 2ܯ଴) + ܨܫ(ܨܫ −2ܯ଴)൯ߪெଶ + ൫2ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௖௢௡௦) + 2ܮ௜௡௩(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௜௡௩) +2ܨܫ(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܨܫ)൯ߪூெቁቅ                                                                    (4.3.4.15) 
 
߲∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ)
߲ ௜ܾ௡௩
= ܷᇱ( ഥܹ )ܮ௜௡௩ × ܧݍ. (3.3.7) − ߚ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௜௡௩)+ ߜ௜௡௩{∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௖௢௡௦) + ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܮ௪௢௥௞) + ∆ܧܷ( ்ܹ|ܨܫ)} = 0 
௜ܾ௡௩ = ଵଶ ఈ೔೙ೡఉ + ଵଶ ஼(௅೔೙ೡ)௅೔೙ೡ + ݏ + ோସ ቄ(ܮ௜௡௩ + 2ܫ଴)ߪூଶ + (ܮ௜௡௩ − 2ܯ଴)ߪெଶ + 2(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ −
ܮ௜௡௩)ߪூெ + ܮ௜௡௩(ܮ௜௡௩ + ܮ଴)ߪூଶ + ௌ೔೙ೡ(ௌ೔೙ೡାଶௌబ)௅೔೙ೡ ߪ௦ଶቅ + ଵଶ ఋ೔೙ೡఉ ቄܾ௖௢௡௦ ቀఋ೎೚೙ೞఋ೔೙ೡ +
௅೎೚೙ೞ
௅೔೙ೡ
ቁ + (ܾ௪௢௥௞ − ݏ) ቀఋೢ೚ೝೖఋ೔೙ೡ + ௅ೢ೚ೝೖ௅೔೙ೡ ቁ + ௙ܾ௜ ቀ ఋ೑೔ఋ೔೙ೡ + ிூ௅೔೙ೡቁ −
஼(௅೎೚೙ೞ)ା஼(௅ೢ೚ೝೖ)ା஼(ிூ)
௅೔೙ೡ
−
ோ
ଶ௅೔೙ೡ
ቀ൫ܮ௖௢௡௦(2ܮ଴ + ܮ௖௢௡௦) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(2ܮ଴ +
ܮ௪௢௥௞)൯ߪ௘ଶ + ܵ௪௢௥௞(ܵ௪௢௥௞ + 2ܵ଴)ߪ௦ଶ + ൫ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ + 2ܫ଴) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ +2ܫ଴) + ܨܫ(ܨܫ + 2ܫ଴)൯ߪூଶ + ൫ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܮ௖௢௡௦ − 2ܯ଴) + ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܮ௪௢௥௞ − 2ܯ଴) +
ܨܫ(ܨܫ − 2ܯ଴)൯ߪெଶ + ൫2ܮ௖௢௡௦(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௖௢௡௦) + 2ܮ௪௢௥௞(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܮ௪௢௥௞) +2ܨܫ(ܯ଴ − ܫ଴ − ܨܫ)൯ߪூெቁቅ                                                                       (4.3.4.16)                                          
 
Intermediation margin = Eq.(4.3.4.12) + Eq.(4.3.4.13) + Eq.(4.3.4.14) + Eq.(4.3.4.15) + 
Eq.(4.3.4.16) 
145 
  
Assuming that ܮ௜௡௩ ,ܮ௪௢௥௞, ܮ௖௢௡௦ and ܨܫ has the same size A, the same elasticity of 
demand for ܮ௜௡௩ and ܮ௪௢௥௞ (ߜூௐ), investment and working-capital loans in projects 
generating emission credits will reduce intermediation margin when 
௜ܾ௡௩ + ܾ௪௢௥௞ − 2ݏ> ܾ௖௢௡௦ ൬1 + ߜ௖௢௡௦ߜூௐ ൰ + ௙ܾ௜ ቆ1 + ߜ௙௜ߜூௐቇ + 4ܥ(ܮ௖௢௡௦) + ܥ(ܨܫ)ܣ+ 32ܥ(ܮ௜௡௩) + ܥ(ܮ௪௢௥௞)ܣ + 2ܴ(∙) 
 
ܴ(∙) is the first term of risk premium in Eq.(4.3.4.13) and Eq.(4.3.4.14), representing 
risk premium for ܮ௖௢௡௦ and ܨܫ.  Competitive advantage of investment loans lies on 
whether average operating cost and risk premium of competing assets exceeds 
immediacy fees on competing earning assets net of per unit profit from selling emission 
credits.  
 
The inclusion of these indirect risks does not change condition for competitive 
advantage of non-maturity deposits, which is illustrated in chapter 3 section 3.3.1. 
Non-maturity deposits are more lucrative when 
ݎ > ܴ2 ൫(2ܯ଴ + ܦ௡)ߪெଶ + 2ܫ଴ߪூெ൯ + ܥ(ܦ௡)ܦ௡  
In other word, non-maturity deposits should weight more in deposit portfolio when 
return in money market exceeds average operating cost, and credit and interest rate risk 
premium of non-maturity deposits.  
 
 
4.4. Empirical Model and Data  
4.4.1.Empirical model 
4.4.1.1. Estimation of intermediation margin 
In practice, price risk premium of emission credit is embedded in the expected profit 
margin while premium for bearing environmental and social risk as well as governance 
of lending activities embedded in loan loss provision. The methodology to disentangle 
risk premium from the two variables is explained in section 4.4.2. This section focuses 
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on the methodology to examine the impact of price risk, environmental risk, social risk, 
and governance of lending activities on intermediation margin. The intermediation 
margin is premium required by banks to supply loans, invest in other earning assets and 
receive deposits, which is the summation of Eq.(4.3.4.12) to Eq.(4.3.4.16) in the 
extension of dealership model in section 4.3.4.  
 
Unbalanced quarterly data of 14 variables on 51 banks in Indonesia from March 2005 to 
December 2010 are regressed on intermediation margin. The 14 variables are explained 
in section 4.2. Those variables are market power of banks, operating cost, transaction 
size, degree of risk aversion, implicit cost of fund, lower bound prices of insured 
deposits, opportunity cost of cash reserves and regulatory capital, expected profit, 
banks’ degree of risk aversion, and premium for bearing risks (i.e. interest rate risk, 
credit risk, price risk of emission credits, environmental and social risk as well as 
governance of lending activities). Linear regression is employed to estimate the impacts 
of 14 variables on intermediation margin. Instead of assuming whether or not some 
explanatory variables arising from random causes, the inclusion of fixed effects and 
random effects is based on specification test of Breusch and Pagan (1978) and Hausman 
(1978). The specification tests are explained in details in chapter 3.  
 
The general form of regression is written as follows.  
ܷܴܲܧ௜௧ = ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଶܥܱܵ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଷܴܣ௜௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜௧ + ߚହܥܴܮ௜௧ + ߚ଺ܮܱܣ ௜ܰ௧ + 
ߚ଻ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚ଼ܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + ߚଽܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜௧ + ߚଵ଴ܲܯ௜௧ + ߚଵଵܧܴܵ௜௧ + 
ߚଵଶܥܧܴ௜௧ + ߚଵଷܮܲ ௧ܵ + ݁௜௧                         (4.4.1.1) 
 
ܩܯ௜௧ = ߚଵܯ ௜ܲ௧ + ߚଶܥܱܵ ௜ܶ௧ + ߚଷܴܣ௜௧ + ߚସܯܴ௜௧ + ߚହܥܴܧ௜௧ + ߚ଺ܧܣ௜௧ + 
ߚ଻ܫܯܲܮܫܥܫ ௜ܶ௧ߚ଼ܥܣܵܪ௜௧ + ߚଽܥܣܲܫܶܣܮ௜௧ + ߚଵ଴ܲܯ௜௧ + ߚଵଵܧܴܵ௜௧ + 
ߚଵଶܥܧܴ௜௧ + ߚଵଷܮܲ ௧ܵ + ݁௜௧                                                                      (4.4.1.2) 
where ݁௜௧ is i.i.d. Market power (MP) is an estimated variable while the rest of variables are 
observed variables. Details for each variable are discussed in section 4.4.2.  
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To ensure valid statistical inference when i.i.d. assumption of ݁௜௧ is violated, robust 
standard error is employed. If error terms ݁௜ are independent but having variance ߪ௜ଶ, White’s 
(1980) heteroskedasticity consistent estimator (HC) is employed to correct 
heteroskedastic in error terms. The White’s estimator transforms the following OLS 
variance-covariance matrix estimator (VCE). 
Σ෢
ை௅ௌ = (ܺ′ܺ)ିଵ(ܺ′Σܺ)(ܺ′ܺ)ିଵ ,   
where Σ = ௦మ(௑ᇱ௑) 
 ݏଶ = ∑ ௘̂೔మ೔
௡ି௞
 
k is no. of parameters to be estimated 
n is no. of observations 
X is matrix of explanatory variables 
The White’s VCE (HC) is derived as follows.  
Σ෠ு஼ = (ܺ′ܺ)ିଵܺᇱ݀݅ܽ݃(݁̂ଵଶ,⋯ , ݁̂௡ଶ)ܺ(ܺ′ܺ)ିଵ 
Nonetheless, standard errors are usually underestimated if the error terms for banks 
within group are not independent. The coefficients of regressors look statistically 
significant when they are actually not. In this case, White’s standard errors are adjusted 
to possible correlation within a cluster by two-way cluster robust standard errors (2CL). 
Cameron et al (2009) demonstrated that this technique yields errors that are robust to 
time-series correlation and cross-sectional correlation. 
Below is the general form of regression with two-way cluster.  
௜ܻ௚௛ = ߙ + ܺ′௜௚௛ߚ + ߛܥܮ1௜௚ + ߜܥܮ2௜௛ + ߝ௜௚௛  
with cluster ݃ = 1,⋯ ,ܩ 
cluster ℎ = 1,⋯ ,ܪ 
Σ෠ଶ஼௅ = Σ෠ீ + Σ෠ு + Σ෠ீ∩ு = ෍ ෍ ௜ܺ ௝ܺᇱߝ௜̂ߝ௝̂ 	1[ܧ ௚ܸ]ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
+ ෍ ෍ ௜ܺ ௝ܺᇱߝ௜̂ߝ௝̂	1[ܧ ௛ܸ]ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
+ 
෍ ෍ ௜ܺ ௝ܺ
ᇱߝ௜̂ߝ௝̂ 	1[ܧ ௚ܸ௛]ே
௝ୀଵ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
where the indicator function 1[ܧ ௚ܸ] takes value 1 when i,j in the cluster g    
    1[ܧ ௛ܸ] takes value 1 when i,j in the cluster h    
    1[ܧ ௚ܸ௛] takes value 1 when i,j in both cluster g and h   
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Aside from 2CL procedure, Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) procedure is considered. They 
modified standard nonparametric VCE by modifying Newy-West’s robust estimator to 
allow general forms of temporal and cross-sectional dependence. The standard error of 
coefficients is obtained by taking square roots of the diagonal elements of the following 
asymptotic VCE. 
Σ෠஽௄ = (ܺ′ܺ)ିଵ መ்ܵ(ܺ′ܺ)ିଵ   
In addition, መ்ܵ is borrowed from New-West (1987) as follows. 
መܵ
் = Ω෡଴ + ෍ ݓ(݆,݉)൫Ω෡௝ + Ω෡′௝൯௠(்)
௝ୀଵ
 
where ݉(ܶ) is the lag length of autocorrelation in error terms, and ݓ(݆,݉) is the 
modified Bartlett weights ݓ൫݆,݉(ܶ)൯ = 1 − ݆/(݉(ܶ) + 1). Ω෡௝ is (݇ + 1) × (݇ + 1) 
matrix derived in the following way. 
Ω෡௝ = ෍ ℎ௧൫ߚመ൯ℎ௧ି௝൫ߚመ൯′்
௧ୀ௝ାଵ
 
With  ℎ௧൫ߚመ൯ = ∑ ℎ௜௧ே(௧)௜ୀଵ ൫ߚመ൯ 
 ℎ௜௧൫ߚመ൯ = ௜ܺ௧൫ ௜ܻ௧ − ܺ′௜௧ߚመ൯ 
Either HC or 2CL modifies standard error of the estimated parameters but does not 
affect the point of estimates.  
 
Two-step system GMM with autoregressive term (Blundell and Bond, 1997) is also 
employed for robustness check although only a few of banks in the sample factoring 
prices of deposits and earning assets in previous quarter into current prices of deposits 
and earning assets. 
ititititititit
ititititititititit
uCERESRPMCAPITALCASHLPS
IMPLICITLOANCRLMRRACOSTMPPUREPURE

 
14131211109
876543211


 
ititititititit
ititititititititit
uCERESRPMCAPITALCASHLPS
IMPLICITEACREMRRACOSTMPGMGM

 
12121211109
876543211

  
The GMM technique should avoid downwards biased in Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
differenced-GMM when sample period T is considerably small. The system consists of 
two simultaneous equations. The first equation borrows from difference-GMM i.e. 
equation in levels with lagged first differenced of instrument variables. The second 
equation is in first difference with lagged level of instrument variables, adding moment 
149 
  
conditions to the difference-GMM. Blundell et al (2000) found that the additional 
moment conditions could reduce finite sample bias.  
 
In the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in error terms, Windmeijer’s 
(2005) finite sample correction is employed. The technique corrects the both problems 
as well as downward bias of two-step VCE sourced from large number of instrumental 
variables for Eq.(4.4.1.3) and Eq.(4.4.1.4). The equation in first difference has 
instrument count 253 = (24 − 1)(24 − 2)/2) while equation in level add 23 
instruments. Below is derivation of corrected VCE. 
Σ෡
௪௜௡ௗ௠௘௜௝௘௥ = Σ෡ଶௌீெெ + ܦ෡Σ෡ଶௌீெெ + Σ෡ଶௌீெெܦ෡ ′ + ܦ෡Σ෡ଵௌீெெ௥ܦ෡ ′ 
ܦ෡ is ݇ × ݇ matrix with elements of pth column derived as 
ܦ෡ = −൬ܺ′ܼ ቀܼ ′Σ෡ଵௌீெெܼቁିଵ ܼ ′ܺ൰ିଵ ܺ′ܼ ቀܼ ′Σ෡ଵௌீெெܼቁିଵ ܼ ′ ߲Σ෡ீெெ
߲Σ෡
ீெெ௣ |Σ෡ಸಾಾୀΣ෡భೄಸಾಾ  
ܼ ቀܼ ′Σ෡
ଵௌீெெ
ܼቁ
ିଵ
ܼ′ܧ෠ଶ 
 
VCE of uncorrected two-step GMM Σ෡ଶௌீெெ = ൬ܺ′ܼ ቀܼ ′	Σ෡ଵௌீெெܼቁିଵ ܼ′ܺ൰ିଵ.	 
Σ෡
ଵௌீெெ௥ is robust VCE of one-step GMM calculated as follows. 
Σ෡
ଵௌீெெ௥ = (ܺ′ܼ(ܼ ′ܪܼ)ିଵܼ′ܺ)ିଵܺ′ܼܼ ′ܪܼିଵܼ′Σ෡ଵௌீெெܼ(ܼ ′ܪܼ)ିଵܼ′ܺ (ܺ′ܼ(ܼ ′ܪܼ)ିଵܼ′ܺ)ିଵ 
with Σ෡ଵௌீெெ = E෡ଵE෡ଵ′ 
 E෡ଵ = ܻ − ߚመଵௌீெெ  
 ߚመଵௌீெெ = (ܺ′ܼ(ܼᇱܪܼ)ିଵܼ ′ܺ)ିଵܺ′ܼ(ܼᇱܪܼ)ିଵܼ ′ܻ 
Z is ݊ × ܮ matrix of instrument set 
Clearly, weight matrix is replaced by ܮ × ܮ optimal weight matrix (ܼ′ܪܼ)෣ ିଵ , and matrix H 
follows initial weighting matrix in Arellano and Bond (1991) as follows. 
ܪ =
⎝
⎜⎜
⎛
2 −1
−1 20 −1			 0 ⋯−1 02 −1			0 0⋯ 00 ⋯			0 00 00 0		0 00 00 0
⋮ ⋮0 00 0				 ⋮0 00 0 						 0 00 0 			 ⋮0 −10 0 		 ⋮ ⋮2 −1−1 2 ⎠⎟
⎟
⎞
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Roodman (2009) pointed out that robust system-GMM might correct downward bias in 
the standard error estimates, but increasing number of instrument set costs Hansen’s 
(1982) overidentification test. The p-value tends to close to one when instrument set is 
not optimal. The error of adjusted Sargan test introduced in Arellano and Bond (1991) 
also increases with the number of instrumental variables. To condense the instrument 
set, the instrument matrix is collapsed such that missing information can be minimized. 
Recalling that system-GMM consists of equation in first difference and equation in 
level, equation in first difference for Eq.(4.4.1.3) has the following 253 instrumental 
variables. 
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
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ܷܴܲܧ௜ଵ00
⋮0
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ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶ0
⋮0
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⋮
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ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶ
⋮
⋯
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⋮
				
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
				
0000
⋮
ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶଶ
						
0000
⋮
⋯
				
0000
⋮
ܷܴܲܧ௜ଵ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞
 
By collapsing technique (Roodman, 2009), the instrument is condensed into 
⎝
⎜
⎛
0
ܷܴܲܧ௜ଵ
ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶ
⋮
ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶଶ
			
00
ܷܴܲܧ௜ଵ
⋮
ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶଵ
			
000
⋮
				
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
			
000
⋮
ܷܴܲܧ௜ଵ⎠
⎟
⎞
 
Below is instrument matrix of equation in level for Eq.(4.4.1.3). 
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎛
0
∆ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶ00
⋮0
			
00
∆ܷܴܲܧ௜ଷ0
⋮0
					
0000
⋮0
				
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
				
0000
⋮
∆ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶସ⎠
⎟
⎟
⎞
 
Borrowing from Roodman (2009), the instrument set is condensed in the following way. 
൮
0
∆ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶ
⋮
∆ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶସ
൲ 
where ∆ܷܴܲܧ௜ଶ	is first difference of PURE at time ݐ − 2. 
The same technique is employed to condense instrument set for Eq.(4.4.1.4).   
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To test whether moment conditions fit the date well, Hansen’s  J test is used on system 
GMM with collapsed instrument set and robust VCE. The J test checks the following 
hypothesis with ߯ଶ with ݆ − ݇ degree of freedom. 
൬
1݊
ܼ′ܧ෠ଶ൰
ᇱ (ܼ′ܼ)ିଵܼ′ܧ෠ଶ 
 
 
4.4.1.2. The rate of arrival of new transaction 
Utility maximizing intermediation margin, the summation from Eq.(4.3.4.12) to 
Eq.(4.3.4.15), is influenced by rate of arrival of each bank product. Fundamental 
dealership model assumes that this rate of arrival follows Poisson distribution 
depending on immediacy fees. Poisson regression allows statistical theories determine 
hypothesis test and statistical inference, and the fitting procedure is easy. However, the 
regression has strong assumption that conditional variance is equal to conditional mean. 
In most cases, conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, which is known as 
overdispersion problem. Consequently, standard errors become downward bias. 
Therefore, the following test is employed to detect overdispersion. 
ܸܽݎ(ݕ௜| ௜ܺ) = ߣ௜ + ߙ݃(ߣ௜) 
ߙ	is an unknown parameter and ݃(∙) is a known function, most commonly ݃(ߣ) = ߣଶ or 
݃(ߣ) = ߣ. It is assumed that under null and alternative hypothesis the mean is correctly 
specified as, for example, ݁ఈ೔ିఉ௔೔ . The overdispersion test can be constructed as a 
simple test statistic for equidispersion ܪ଴:ߙ = 0 so that ܸܽݎ(ݕ௜| ௜ܺ) = ߣ௜ versus 
ܪଵ:ߙ ≠ 0 or 1:ߙ > 0. The test can be computed by estimating the Poisson model, 
extracting fitted value ߣመ௜, and running the auxiliary OLS regression without constant. 
The reported t-statistic for ߙ is asymptotically normal under the null hypothesis of no 
dispersion. The test can also be used to detect underdispersion i.e. conditional variance 
is less than conditional mean. 
 
Winkelmann (1995) argues that unobserved heterogeneity might cause overdispersion 
in the count data. In this case, the rate parameter ߣ	of Poisson process might not be 
correctly specified. Instead, ߣ is itself a random variable as assumed in the negative 
binomial model. In particular, let ߣ = ߤߥ, where ݒ is a deterministic function of ܺ, for 
example ݁௑೔ᇱఉ  and ߥ > 0 is i.i.d. distributed with density ݃(ߥ|ߙ). Thus, different 
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observations may have different heterogeneity ߣ but part of this difference is due to a 
random (unobserved) component ߥ. The marginal density of ݕ, unconditional on the 
random parameter ߥ but conditional on the deterministic parameter ߤ and ߙ is expressed 
as follows 
ℎ(ݕ|ߤ,ߙ) = ∫݂(ݕ|ߤ, ߥ)݃(ߥ|ߙ)݀ߥ     
where ݃(ߥ|ߙ)	is a mixing distribution with ߙ as the unknown parameter in the mixing 
distribution. The negative binomial density is obtained when ݂(ݕ|ߣ) is the Poisson 
density, ݃(ߥ) is the gamma density with ܧ[ߥ] = 1 and ܸܽݎ(ߥ) = ߙ. The first two 
moments of the negative binomial distribution are 
ܧ[ݕ|ߤ,ߙ] = ߤ 
ܸܽݎ(ݕ|ߤ,ߙ) = ߤ(1 + ߙߤ)         (4.3.3.1.) 
Thus, overdispersion always arises if ݂(ݕ|ߣ) is Poisson and the mixing distribution is of 
the form ߣ = ߤߥ where ܧ[ߥ] = 1. Two standard variants of negative binomial are used 
in regression application. Both variants specify ߣ௜ = ݁௑೔ᇱఉ . The difference in the two 
standard variants is that the first standard variant has ߙ as a parameter to be estimated 
with conditional variance function, ߤ + ߙߤଶ in Eq.(4.3.3.1.), is quadratic in the mean. 
This variant is called negative binomial 2 (NB2) model. The second standard variant, 
known as negative binomial 1 (NB1), has a linear function ܸܽݎ(ݕ|ߤ,ߙ) = (1 + ߜ)ߤ, 
obtained by replacing ߙ with ߜ/ߤ through out the following negative binomial density 
ℎ(ݕ|ߤ,ߙ) = Γ(ߙିଵ + ݕ)
Γ(αିଵ)Γ(y + 1)ቆ ߙିଵߙିଵ + ߤቇఈିଵ ൬ ߤߤ + ߙିଵ൰௬ ,					ߙ > 0 
 
Previously mentioned techniques to correct clustering, heteroskedasticty and 
autocorrelation in error terms are employed. 
 
 
4.5. Data 
The sample used is formed by unbalanced panel data from 24 quarterly observations, 
corresponding to 51 commercial banks for the period between 2005 and 2010, which 
represents an average of 90% of total loans in the Indonesia commercial banking system 
during the period of study. Sample does not include banks subsidized by government to 
disburse mortgage loans for the poor. Problem banks are also excluded since bank 
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supervisory authority imposes some restrictions such as curbing loan growth on these 
banks. The data are obtained from quarterly financial statement of banks except for 
contractual interest rates and new transaction. Quarterly contractual loan rate and 
deposit rate as well as new transaction are retrieved from quarterly regulatory report. 
Volatility of prices of emission credits is estimated under VARMAX framework, which 
is explained in details in chapter 2 section 2.5. Variables specified in the VARMAX 
model are explained in chapter 3 from section 2.3.1. to section 2.3.5.   
 
Two proxies for intermediation margin are used as dependent variables. The first proxy, 
pure margin (PURE), is the spread between contractual prices of loans and contractual 
prices of maturity deposits. The second proxy, gross margin (GM) is the contractual 
prices of all bank products on the asset side, net of contractual prices of all bank 
products on the liability side. The estimation of theoretical model in section 4.3.1 
demonstrates nine variables determining banks’ intermediation margin: market power, 
unit operating cost, degree of risk aversion, volatility of market interest rates, credit risk, 
covariance between interest rate and credit risk, environmental and social risk, price risk 
of emission credits, and size of new transactions. These variables are explained in 
chapter 3 section 3.3.4 and can be summarized as follows 
- Market power (MKTPWR) 
The Lerner index is widely used as to estimate market power in the specific case of 
banks (Angelina and Cetorelli, 1999; Fernández and Guevara, 2001; Maudos and 
Solis, 2009). The index could be estimated for individual banks at each point of 
time. Lerner index is calculated as spread between product price and marginal cost, 
divided by product price. The marginal cost is estimated by using model structure 
in the three-abovementioned papers.  
lnܶܥ௜,௧ = ߙ + ߙ௝෍ ݓ௜,௧௝ଷ
௝ୀଵ
+ 12෍෍ߙ௝௞ lnݓ௜,௧௝ ݓ௜,௧௞ + ߚଵ ln Y୧,୲ଷ
௞ୀଵ
ଷ
௝ୀଵ
+ 12ߚଶ൫ln ௜ܻ,௧൯ଶ
+ ෍ ߚଷ௝ ln ௜ܻ,௧ lnݓ௜,௧௝ଷ
௝ୀଵ
+ ߛଵ௧ܶ + 12 ߛଶ௧ܶଶ + ෍ ߛଷ௧ lnݓ௜,௧௝ଷ௝ୀଵ+ ߛସ௧ ln ௜ܻ,௧ + ߤ௜ + ݑ௜ 
where w1 is labor price, w2 is price of loanable fund, w3 is other operating cost, Y is 
total asset, T is time trend capturing technical progress, and ߤ captures individual 
fixed effect.  
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- Unit operating cost (COST) 
Unit operating cost is measured by ratio of annualized total operating costs to 
average total assets. 
- Degree of risk aversion (RA)   
Degree of risk aversion is proxied as ratio of average risk weighted asset (RWA) to 
average total assets. RWA takes value of 0% to 100% of asset size. Details for the 
calculation of RWA are in the appendix. 
- Volatility of market interest rates (MR) 
The volatility is proxied as annual standard deviation of monthly real interest rates 
on one-month treasury bills known as Sertifikat Bank Indonesia (SBI). 
- Credit risk (CRL, CRE) 
CRL is the ratio of loan loss provision over total loan while CRE is calculated as 
loss provision of earning assets over total earning assets. 
- Cross products between credit risk and market risk 
The variable illustrates interdependency between interest rate risk and credit risk. 
- Size of new transaction (LOAN, EA) 
Size of new loans (LOAN) is used as proxy for estimating dynamics of pure margin. 
In the case of gross margin, EA represents size of new earning assets.  
- Environmental and social risk (ESR) 
The risk is calculated as potential extended liability to environmental and social 
degradation over size of loans. Indonesian bank regulation does not prescribe 
methodology to quantify the extended liability. Surely, all firms with “black” grade 
settle costs to clean up environmental and social damage on courts. Some of those 
firms also end up with closure of their business operation or revoked business 
license (Menlh, 2010). Model based probability is difficult to estimate since factors 
determining PROPER grades vary across industry and change over time. Thus, 
empirical probability, which is the number of firms in each grade over total number 
of firms, estimates potential extended liability to clean up social and environmental 
damage.   
- Dynamic of prices of emission credits (CER) 
The dynamic of prices is estimated using VARMAX (4,0,3) – ARCH(4). The 
empirical application of this model is explained in chapter 2 section 2.5. All 
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variables specified in the model are explained in chapter 2 from sub section 2.4.1. 
to sub section 2.4.5.   
 
Aside from variables in the theoretical model, five other variables are included in the 
empirical model. They are implicit interest rates (IMPLICIT), opportunity cost of capital 
charge (CAPITAL), opportunity cost of holding cash (CASH), Interest rates published by 
deposit insurance agency (LPS) and expected profit margin (PM). The five variables are 
factored in product prices in some bank respondent in the banking survey. The banking 
survey has been carried out in April 2011 and explained in details in chapter 3. 
- Implicit interest rates (IMPLICIT) 
Implicit interest rates are calculated as the summation of insurance premium paid 
for deposit protection and opportunity cost of minimum reserve requirement, over 
total deposits. Jakarta Interbank Offered Rate (JIBOR) 1 month is used as proxy for 
the opportunity cost of minimum requirement.   
- Opportunity cost of capital charge (CAPITAL) 
Proxy for opportunity cost of capital is the product return on equity (ROE) and ratio 
of minimum regulatory capital over total equity. 
- Opportunity cost of holding cash (CASH) 
The opportunity cost of holding cash is the product of cash and return on earning 
assets 
- Interest rates published by deposit insurance agency (LPS) 
The interest rate is set as the lower bound of deposit prices under LPS’s deposit 
insurance scheme. Deposits pay interest rate higher than LPS are not covered by 
deposit insurance. 
- Expected profit margin (PM) 
The expected profit margin is passed on banks’ customers. The proxy for EPM 
is Return On total Assets (ROA). 
 
Table 28 summarizes descriptive statistics of pure margin, gross margin, immediacy 
fees, and return in money market. Table 29 summarize all explanatory variables used in 
the empirical models 
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Table 28 Summary statistics on intermediation margin, immediacy fees and market 
interest rates 
mean median max min std. dev skewness Ex. kurtosis
pure 0.075832 0.071287 0.325928 0.002879 0.039644 2.034688 7.56832
im 0.213706 0.192323 0.952873 0.031583 0.412521 -29.176 944.7851
r 0.088107 0.083433 0.127500 0.062533 0.020063 0.58359 -0.77393
a i 0.014899 0.022847 0.091998 -0.049302 0.020767 0.54567 0.77268
b inv 0.030575 0.034047 0.272910 -0.084722 0.036165 0.37638 2.3788
b work 0.028586 0.032258 0.151290 -0.065329 0.070800 -0.01278 -0.18856
b cons 0.066793 0.056187 0.371910 -0.088917 0.078751 1.4883 2.9636
b fi -0.041115 -0.056757 0.730550 -0.125550 0.078751 4.6352 29.239  
  
Table 29 Summary statistics on explanatory variables 
mean median max min std.dev skewness kurtosis
cost 0.046633 0.032346 0.980485 5.08E-05 0.056721 7.21798 101.4956
implicit 0.005637 0.00522 0.077249 0.001065 0.003617 10.41367 181.6905
lps 0.888870 0.083333 0.12775 0.07000 0.018592 0.91879 2.64004
cash 0.007533 0.00664 0.035364 0.00032 0.004434 1.542614 7.119256
capital 8.259842 0.228561 429.6093 0.111162 327.3874 -33.5527 1138.542
cr 0.015857 0.006588 6.125523 0.68521 0.181116 32.89 1111.722
mr 0.015303 0.015364 0.03627 0.000732 0.010444 0.355452 2.00119
env 0.01105 0.00564 0.05956 0.00000 0.01253 0.75252 2.19668
s 0.002591 0.001323 0.013967 0.000000 0.002938 0.176466 0.515121
epm 0.055408 0.0489 2.930509 0.067019 0.088334 29.62052 963.4132
R 1.367378 0.760332 282.1849 0.041426 11.4958 22.48856 525.2123
lerner 0.033031 0.02756 0.533055 0.000134 0.031038 6.722101 88.04013
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4.6. Empirical results  
4.6.1. Rate arrival of new transaction 
The banking survey in April 2011 indicates that banks closely tied by ownership tend to 
have the same price structure on their products, loans in particular. Thus, the estimation 
of arrival rate of each product considers correlation within cluster. There are 7 clusters 
i.e. state owned banks, local banks having international operation, local banks without 
to international money markets, branches of foreign banks heavily depending on non-
loan business activities, branches of foreign banks heavily depending on lending 
activities, subsidiaries of international banks heavily depending on non-loan business 
activities, subsidiaries of international banks heavily depending on lending activities, 
and subsidiaries of non-bank international financial institutions.  
 
In all cases, Poisson regression yields theoretical variance lower than the observed 
variance. Thus, the rate of arrival of each product is estimated by using negative 
binomial regression with fixed effect and Cameron and Triverdi’s (1985) Pseudo 
Poisson, with VCE is used to correct clustering and heteroskedasticity in error terms.. 
Overdispersion test on both models employs Cameron and Triverdi’s procedures. Model 
selection is based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC). AIC and BIC indicates that negative binomial with fixed effect is better 
fit to data than Pseudo Poisson. Table 30 summarizes results of negative binomial and 
pseudo Poisson regression for arrival rate of maturity deposits. 
Table 30 Arrival rate of maturity deposits 
 
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
a i -10.4865 0.2865 -7.7335 0.3724 -5.9500
intercept 16.4554 0.0727 3.9658 0.1343 2.1463
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.8725 0.8725
AIC of the model 3815.249 419.367
BIC of the model 381.6271 419.5203
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 28900 28900
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 28900 28900
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.5300 0.5300
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .Variable
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The sign of estimators is as expected in theoretical model. Immediacy fees of maturity 
deposits (ai) are negatively related to arrival rate of maturity deposits. The results are 
robust to time variables as depicted in table 31. Size of new deposits picks up in the first 
two quarters but depleting in the third quarter, indicating money demand for transaction 
around long public holidays in the third quarter. 
Table 31 Arrival rate of maturity deposits with time variables 
 
 
Table 32 shows that arrival rate of non-maturity deposit increases with immediacy fee 
of maturity deposits  (ai). This confirms the notion that reducing price of one type 
deposit increases the arrival of other type deposits.  
Table 32 Arrival rate of non-maturity deposits 
 
Dependent variable: maturity deposits (D i )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
a i -10.3670 0.2576 -6.9523 0.3885 -6.2081
Q1 -0.0189 0.0499 -1.3478 0.0588 -0.9400
Q2 -0.0125 0.0269 -0.7271 0.0411 -0.6569
Q3 -0.0201 0.0274 -0.7401 0.0380 -0.6067
intercept 16.4056 0.0727 1.9624 0.1515 -2.4207
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.8725 0.8713
AIC of the model 381.5249 419.367
BIC of the model 381.6271 419.5203
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 28900 28900
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 28900 28900
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.5300 0.5300
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable
White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
Dependent variable: maturity deposits (Dn )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
a i 17.3830 0.2992 58.1000 0.3889 6.2138
intercept 3.3943 0.0614 3.35100 0.0135 0.2158
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.8164 0.8164
AIC of the model 381.4269 419.698
BIC of the model 381.5291 419.8513
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 24600 28900
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 24600 28900
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.4310 0.4310
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
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Supply of non-maturity deposits increases when maturity deposits become cheaper. 
Cheaper price of maturity deposit is reflected in increasing spread between return on 
invested maturity deposit in money market and price of maturity deposit. Table 33 
shows that he results are robust to time variables. 
Table 33 Arrival rate of non-maturity deposits with time variables 
 
  
The arrival rate of investment loans decreases with its intermediacy fee (binv) but 
increases with immediacy fees of working-capital loans (bwork), consumer loans (bcons), 
and non-loan earning assets (bfi).    
Table 34. Arrival rate of investment loans 
 
Dependent variable: maturity deposits (Dn )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
a i 17.3621 0.3016 58.5719 0.4336 6.9285
Q1 -0.0189 0.0499 -9.6958 0.0178 0.2845
Q2 -0.0125 0.0269 5.2303 0.0176 0.2816
Q3 -0.0201 0.0274 -5.3241 0.0180 0.2881
intercept 3.3902 0.0110 0.59857 0.0731 1.1682
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.8164 0.8164
AIC of the model 381.4269 419.716
BIC of the model 381.5291 420.018
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 24600 24200
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 24600 24200
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.4310 0.4310
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable
White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
Dependent variable: investment loans (L inv)
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
b inv -16.7375 0.2051 -8.1600 0.2783 -1.3230
b work 29.7854 0.2780 10.6500 0.3772 7.6079
b cons 0.3786 0.0887 163.5000 0.1203 127.3861
b fi 1.2411 0.0739 1.6780 0.1003 1.0922
intercept 14.7580 0.0774 0.4266 0.1050 0.7043
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.8765 0.8765
AIC of the model 371.366 380.034
BIC of the model 370.890 379.547
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 8765.0 8765.0
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 8765.0 8765.0
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.5647 0.5647
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable
White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
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The time variables indicate that demand on investment loans pick up in the first three 
quarters. The inclusion of time variables does not change sign of explanatory variables 
as shown in table 35. 
Table 35 Arrival rate of investment loans with time variables 
 
  
Table 36 shows that arrival rate of working capital loans is positively related to 
immediacy fees of investment loans, consumer loans, and non-loan earning assets, but 
negatively related to immediacy fees of working-capital loans.  
 
  
Dependent variable: investment loans (L inv)
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
b inv -16.7339 0.2051 -8.1583 0.2782 -1.3228
b work 29.7791 0.2779 10.6477 0.3771 7.6062
b cons 0.3785 0.0887 163.4652 0.1203 127.3589
b fi 1.2408 0.0739 1.6776 0.1002 1.0920
Q1 -0.0345 0.0988 -0.9470 0.1085 -0.9470
Q2 -0.2451 0.0859 -1.0884 0.0944 -1.0884
Q3 -0.9730 0.0988 -0.9467 0.1085 -0.9467
intercept 14.7549 0.0774 0.4265 0.1050 0.7041
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.8765 0.8765
AIC of the model 379.833 388.698
BIC of the model 379.346 388.200
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 8964.842 8964.842
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 8964.842 8964.842
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.5647 0.5647
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable
White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
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Table 36 Arrival rate of working-capital loans 
 
Standard error increases sharply, reducing level of significance of regressors when 
cluster robust standard error is used. The results are robust to the inclusion of time 
variables. New working-capital loans appear to build up in the first three quarters.  
 
Table 37 Arrival rate of working-capital loans with time variables 
 
 
Table 38 summarizes estimates of negative binomial of arrival rate of consumer loans. 
Dependent variable: investment loans (Lwork )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
b work -16.7375 0.2051 -8.1600 0.2253 -1.3230
b inv 29.7854 0.2780 10.6500 0.3054 7.6079
b cons 0.3786 0.0887 163.5000 0.0975 127.3861
b fi 1.2411 0.0739 1.6780 0.0812 1.0922
intercept 14.7580 0.0774 0.4266 0.0850 0.7043
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.8765 0.8765
AIC of the model 371.366 380.034
BIC of the model 370.890 379.547
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 8765.0 8765.0
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 8765.0 8765.0
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.5647 0.5647
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable
White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
Dependent variable: investment loans (Lwork )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
b work -9.0947 0.2378 -8.1583 0.2253 -1.3228
b inv 15.8545 0.1912 10.6477 0.3054 7.6062
b cons 0.3677 0.0511 163.4652 0.0974 127.3589
b fi 2.6033 0.0610 1.6776 0.0812 1.0920
Q1 -0.0347 0.0880 1.1636 0.0966 -0.9470
Q2 -0.2470 0.0789 1.2965 0.0867 -1.0552
Q3 -0.9825 0.0986 1.0379 0.1083 -0.8447
intercept 15.9146 0.0653 0.4265 0.0850 0.7041
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.8765 0.8765
AIC of the model 379.833 388.698
BIC of the model 379.346 388.200
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 8964.842 8964.842
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 8964.842 8964.842
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.5647 0.5647
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
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Table 38 Arrival rate of consumer loans 
 
 
Arrival rate of consumer loans decreases with immediacy fees of consumer loans but 
increases with immediacy fees of other earning assets. Table 39 indicates that new 
consumer loans also build up in the first three quarters.  
Table 39 Arrival rate of consumer loans with time variables 
 
Dependent variable: consumer loans (L cons )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
b cons -9.0644 0.1629 -83.8400 0.2210 -13.5937
b inv 35.3892 0.0625 7.3010 0.0848 5.2155
b work 7.9651 0.1900 4.7690 0.2578 3.7156
b fi 7.9651 0.3355 4.7690 0.4552 3.1042
intercept 13.6562 0.1091 3.9650 0.1480 6.5460
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.9958 0.9958
AIC of the model 313.365 348.187
BIC of the model 313.627 348.239
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 8132.9 8132.9
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 8132.9 8132.9
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.8337 0.8337
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
Dependent variable: consumer loans (L cons )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
b cons -9.0625 0.1629 -83.8221 0.2210 -13.5908
b inv 35.3817 0.0625 7.2994 0.0848 5.2144
b work 7.9634 0.1900 4.7680 0.2577 3.7148
b fi 7.9634 0.3354 4.7680 0.4551 3.1036
Q1 -0.0276 0.0737 -0.9470 0.0737 -0.9470
Q2 -0.0246 0.0724 -0.9642 0.0724 -0.9642
Q3 -0.0140 0.0655 -1.0662 0.0655 -1.0662
intercept 13.6533 0.1091 3.9642 0.1480 6.5446
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.9958 0.9958
AIC of the model 342.446 380.498
BIC of the model 342.731 380.556
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 8887.6 8887.6
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 8887.6 8887.6
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.8337 0.8337
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
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Estimation of arrival rate of non-loan earning assets such as fixed income securities and 
equity investment is summarized in table 40. 
Table 40 Arrival rate of non-loan earning assets 
 
Arrival rate of non-loan earning assets confirms theoretical model. Arrival rate of non-
loan earning assets decreases with immediacy of non-loan earning assets but increases 
with immediacy fees of loans. Size of new non-loan earning assets increases in the first 
three quarters. The following table implies that the same conclusion as found in loans. 
Asset building occurs across banks during the first three quarter. 
Table 41 Arrival rate of non-loan earning assets with time variables 
 
Dependent variable: non-loan earning assets (FI )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
b inv -18.6368 0.0563 -26.2000 0.6433 -4.6700
b work 2.4735 0.1904 4.8720 0.7606 3.9500
b cons 0.7317 0.2369 7.8680 0.5834 3.0300
b fi 9.2778 0.0653 3.7850 0.6759 3.5100
intercept 16.8751 0.0746 1.29900 0.2836 1.4730
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.9734 0.9734
AIC of the model 306.32 340.3584
BIC of the model 306.576 340.410
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 7950 7950
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 7950 7950
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.8150 0.8150
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
Dependent variable: non-loan earning assets (FI )
Coeff. s.e. z-stat s.e. z-stat
b fi -18.4131 0.0556 -25.8856 0.2354 -12.7600
b inv 2.4686 0.1900 4.8623 0.7543 3.9830
b work 0.7302 0.2364 7.8523 0.4797 6.2627
b cons 9.2593 0.0652 3.7774 0.8007 3.7523
Q1 -0.0276 0.0737 -0.9470 5.2614 -0.5710
Q2 -0.0246 0.0724 -0.9642 3.8916 -0.7720
Q3 -0.0140 0.0655 -1.0662 3.3344 -0.9010
intercept 16.8542 0.0745 1.2974 2.0396 1.4730
No. Of obs. 1165 1165
Adj. R2 0.9734 0.9734
AIC of the model 306.2121 340.4966
BIC of the model 306.621 340.957
AIC of Pseudo Poisson 7690 7690
BIC of Pseudo Poisson 7690 7690
Overdispersion test (p-value) - Ho: mean equals the variance 0.8150 0.8150
Normality of error terms (p-value) 0 0
Variable White's robust s.e. 2 way cluster robust s.e .
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4.6.2. Intermediation margin 
Pure margin is estimated by using regression with fixed effects and robust error (HAC). 
Table 42 show the test results that GLS estimates are not consistent in pure margin case. 
 
Table 42 Static model with fixed effect – pure margin (PURE) 
  Dependent variable: quarterly PURE 
Variable Coeff. s.e. t-stat 
MKTPWR 0.0194 0.0552 0.3507 
COST -0.01145 0.02582 -3.6000 
CASH -4.3723 0.3564 -0.0898 
IMPLICIT -0.0119 0.1322 -1.2270 
LPS -0.3044 0.0524 -5.8090 
CAPITAL 8.56311e-07 9.68291e-07 0.8844 
LOAN -0.0047 0.0025 -1.9650 
MR 0.1504 0.0712 2.1120 
CRL 0.1485 0.0923 2.3670 
PM 0.2582 0.1091 1.6090 
RA 0.0033 0.0055 0.6038 
ESR 0.3310 0.05134 1.9721 
CER 0.1103 0.0171 0.1612 
Intercept  0.1356 0.0377 0.4434 
No. of obs   1166 
S.E. of regression   0.0290 
Adjusted R-squared   0.8009 
Breusch-Pagan test- Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 (p-value) 0 
Normality of residual (p-value) 7.2963e-034 
Hausman test – Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent (p-value) 3.59798e-019 
The results support the theoretical model about interplay between margin and its 
determinants. Pure margin increases with market power of banks, riskiness of lending 
activities, and degree or risk aversion of banks. The margin is negatively influenced by 
unit operating cost and implicit interest rates. The opportunity cost of holding cash 
reserves might put pressure on the margin while opportunity cost of capital charge could 
be translated into prices of earning assets. The margin decreases with loan size, 
indicating that economic scale might allow banks to reduce loan prices. Negative sign 
of LPS’s published rates indicates that increasing threshold for fully insured deposits 
might increase deposit prices and put pressure on pure margin. Notably, uncertainty 
about emission credits, bank’s market power, implicit interest rates, opportunity cost of 
regulatory capital and cash reserve, degree of risk aversion, and expected profit margin 
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are not statically significant in explaining pure margin. Table 43 shows that decreasing 
pure margin is observed due to low loan prices during low interest rate periods.  
Table 43 Static model with fixed effect and time variables – pure margin (PURE) 
  Dependent variable: quarterly PURE 
Variable Coeff. s.e. t-stat 
MKTPWR 0.0192 0.0557 0.3504 
COST -0.01127 0.0261 -3.5965 
CASH -4.2833 0.3599 -0.0897 
IMPLICIT -0.0121 0.1335 -1.2258 
LPS -0.2940 0.0529 -5.8033 
CAPITAL 8.563e-07 0.0000 0.8835 
LOAN -0.0065 0.0025 -1.9632 
MR 0.1558 0.0719 2.1099 
CRL 0.1469 0.0932 2.3647 
PM 0.2589 0.1102 1.6074 
RA 0.0033 0.0056 0.6032 
ESR 0.2651 0.0518 0.4830 
CER 0.1096 0.0173 0.9623 
MKTPWR 0.0194 0.0557 0.3504 
Q1 -0.0009 0.0014 0.8881 
Q2 -0.0004 0.0008 0.1612 
Q3 -0.0008 0.0011 0.1739 
Intercept  0.1356 0.0381 0.4430 
No. of obs   1166 
S.E. of regression   0.0293 
Adjusted R-squared   0.8000 
Breusch-Pagan test- Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 (p-value) 0 
Normality of residual (p-value) 7.2812e-034 
Hausman test – Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent (p-value) 3.2567e-019 
 
 
Regressing explanatory variables in on gross margin in the static model uses regression 
with random effect and robust error (HAC). The random effects are considered since 
Breusch-Pagan test and Hausman test indicate that GLS estimators are consistent and 
efficient. The results of regression as well as Breusch-Pagan test and Hausman test are 
summarized in table 44. 
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Table 44 Static model with random effect – gross margin (GM) 
   Dependent variable: quarterly GM 
Variable Coeff. s.e. t-stat 
MKTPWR 0.0988 0.0548 0.2381 
COST -2.1317  0.0804 -26.50 
CASH -8.0809 0.3264 -2.476 
IMPLICIT -1.9188 0.4201 -4.568 
LPS -0.4771 0.1138 -4.191 
CAPITAL 1.02719e-06 4.31458e-06 1.801 
EA 0.0049 0.0025 1.930 
MR 0.3817 0.1871 2.040 
CRE 0.4481   0.2454 5.683 
PM 0.4489 0.0790 2.626 
RA 0.0182 0.0087 2.088 
ESR 0.3050 0.1161 1.826 
CER 0.1016 0.0388 0.1267 
Intercept  -0.01683 0.0443  -0.2535 
No. of obs   1166 
S.E. of regression   0.0543 
Adjusted R-squared   0.8009 
Breusch-Pagan test- Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 (p-value) 6.86241e-106 
Normality of residual (p-value) 0 
Hausman test – Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent (p-value) 0.05145 
 
Similar to the results using pure margin as proxy for intermediation margin, gross 
margin increases with market power of banks, opportunity cost of capital charge, degree 
of risk aversion, and expected profit margin. Gross margin decreases with unit operating 
cost, implicit interest rate, opportunity cost of holding cash reserves, and LPS’s 
published rates. However, sign for coefficient of transaction changes. Gross margin is 
positively influenced by size of earning assets. This could possibly be explained by the 
high weight of non-loan earning assets in the earning asset portfolio. Prices of non-loan 
earnings assets such as bonds and financial derivatives are often not in the control of 
individual banks. Thus, high return on non-loan earning assets is likely to increase the 
weight of such assets in earning asset portfolio, which in turn increases gross margin. 
Similar to pure margin case, gross margin is decreasing during low interest rate period. 
It is interesting to note that opportunity cost of cash reserve and regulatory capital, 
expected profit margin, implicit interest rate, and degree of risk aversion are statistically 
significant in explaining variation in gross margin. Thus, these factors are likely to be 
passed on buyer of non-loan earning assets, implying cross subsidy in prices of bank’s 
products.  
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Table 45 Static model with random effect and time variables – gross margin (GM) 
   Dependent variable: quarterly GM 
Variable Coeff. s.e. t-stat 
MKTPWR 0.0998 0.0553 0.2379 
COST -2.1314 0.0812 -26.4739 
CASH -8.0798 0.3296 -2.4736 
IMPLICIT -1.9377 0.4242 -4.5635 
LPS -0.4770 0.1149 -4.1869 
CAPITAL 0.0000 0.0000 1.7992 
EA 0.0049 0.0025 1.9281 
MR 0.3817 0.1889 2.0380 
CRE 0.4525 0.2478 5.6774 
PM 0.4533 0.0798 2.6234 
RA 0.0182 0.0088 2.0859 
ESR 0.3080 0.1172 1.8242 
CER 0.1026 0.0392 0.1266 
Q1 -0.0009 0.0014 0.8872 
Q2 -0.0004 0.0008 0.1610 
Q3 -0.0008 0.0011 0.1737 
Intercept -0.0170 0.0447 -0.2533 
No. of obs   1166 
S.E. of regression   0.0543 
Adjusted R-squared   0.8009 
Breusch-Pagan test- Null hypothesis: Variance of the unit-specific error = 0 (p-value) 6.8617e-106 
Normality of residual (p-value) 0 
Hausman test – Null hypothesis: GLS estimates are consistent (p-value) 0.05151 
    
Using GMM procedure in Blundell and Bond (1997) with collapsed instrument matrix 
deriving from PCA of the initial instrument set, dynamic panel model gives similar 
results. The dynamic model should capture survey findings that intermediation margin 
in the previous quarter determines current value of intermediation margin in some 
banks.         
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Table 46 Dynamic model (Blundell and Bond, 1997) 
Dependent variable: quarterly PURE, GM 
No. of instruments: 46 
Variable PURE   GM   
MARGIN(-1) 0.4601 [0.0147] * 0.4081 [0.0130] * 
MKTPWR -0.1310 [0.0490]  -0.0073 [0.0027] * 
COST -0.5071 [0.0182] ** -0.4567 [0.0164] *** 
CASH -0.0119 [0.1322] * -0.0035 [0.0385] ** 
IMPLICIT -1.3600 [0.0524] ** -0.5205 [0.0201] *** 
LPS -0.0047 [0.0025] * -0.0015 [0.0008] * 
CAPITAL 0.0000 [0.0000]  0.0000 [0.0000] * 
LOAN,EA -0.0328 [0.0236] ** 0.0285 [0.0205] ** 
MR 0.0340 [0.0876] ** 0.0198 [0.0511] *** 
CRL, CRE 0.0719 [0.0694] ** 0.0149 [0.0144] ** 
PM 0.0033 [0.0055]  0.0002 [0.0003]  
RA 0.0081 [0.0254] * 0.0018 [0.0057] * 
ESR 0.1103 [0.0171] * 0.0140 [0.0022]  
CER 0.0001 [0.0000]  0.0001 [0.0000]  
Intercept 0.5589 [0.0386]  0.1557 [0.0108]  
No. of obs   1166   1166 
S.E. of regression   0.0295   0.0548 
Adjusted R-squared   0.7224   0.6580 
Test of AR(1) errors (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
Test of AR(2) errors (0.4640)   (0.5141) 
Hansen test of overidentification – Ho: overidentified restriction  (0.1870)   (0.1889) 
Normality of residuals (0.0000)   (0.0000) 
 
 
In the dynamic model, the sign of all coefficients does not change when explanatory 
variables are regressed on pure margin. Pure margin increases with market power, 
opportunity cost of capital charge, and riskiness of lending activities. The margin 
decreases with unit operating cost, implicit interest rate, opportunity cost of holding 
cash reserves, LPS’s published interest rates, and loan size. Interestingly, high or low 
pure margin might be persistent since past value of pure margin is positively related to 
current value of pure margin. The small amount of emission credits (i.e. counting for 
less than 0.022% of total operating income of 51 banks) might explain that statistically, 
the uncertainty about emission credits is not significantly influenced pure margin.       
Regressing all explanatory variables on gross margin GM produces the coefficients with 
the same sign as all coefficients mimics the results in static model. Gross margin 
increases with past value of gross margin, market power, opportunity cost of capital 
charge, riskiness of earning assets, degree of risk aversion, and size of new earning 
assets. Gross margin is negatively influenced by operating cost, implicit interest rate, 
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opportunity cost of holding cash reserves, and LPS’s published rates. Uncertainty about 
emission credits is not statistically significant in explaining gross margin. The results 
are robust to the inclusion of time variables as summarized in table 47. 
Table 47 Dynamic model with time variables (Blundell and Bond, 1997) 
Dependent variable: quarterly PURE, GM 
No. of instruments: 46 
Variable PURE GM 
MARGIN(-1) 0.4601 [0.0148] * 0.4121 [0.0131] * 
MKTPWR -0.1310 [0.0495]  -0.0073 [0.0027] * 
COST -0.5071 [0.0184] ** -0.4566 [0.0166] *** 
CASH -0.0119 [0.1335] * -0.0035 [0.0389] ** 
IMPLICIT -1.3600 [0.0529] ** -0.5204 [0.0203] *** 
LPS -0.0047 [0.0025] * -0.0015 [0.0008] * 
CAPITAL 0.0000 [0.0000]  0.0000 [0.0000] * 
LOAN,EA -0.0328 [0.0238] ** 0.0285 [0.0207] ** 
MR 0.0340 [0.0885] ** 0.0200 [0.0516] *** 
CRL, CRE 0.0719 [0.0701] ** 0.0150 [0.0145] ** 
PM 0.0033 [0.0056]  0.0002 [0.0003]  
RA 0.0081 [0.0257] * 0.0018 [0.0058] * 
ESR 0.1103 [0.0173] * 0.0141 [0.0022]  
CER 0.0001 [0.0000]  0.0001 [0.0000]  
Q1 -0.0022 [0.0077]  -0.0031 [0.0010]  
Q2 -0.0048 [0.0095]  -0.0020 [0.0012]  
Q3 -0.0023 [0.0066]  -0.0018 [0.0043]  
Intercept 0.5589 [0.0390]  0.1572 
 
[0.0109]  
No. of obs   1166  1166  
S.E. of regression   0.0295  0.0548  
Adjusted R-squared   0.7208  0.6512  
Test of AR(1) errors (0.0023)  (0.0016)  
Test of AR(2) errors (0.5178)  (0.5212)  
Hansen test of overidentification – Ho: overidentified restriction  (0.1870)  (0.1889)  
Normality of residuals (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
 
 
Briefly, the relation between intermediation margin and explanatory variables are 
consistent in term of sign of coefficient. The intermediation margin is positively 
influenced by market power of banks, riskiness of products, degree of risk aversion, 
opportunity cost of capital charge, and expected profit margin. The intermediation 
margin decreases with operating cost per unit, implicit interest rate (which is composed 
of deposit insurance premium and opportunity cost or reserve requirement), opportunity 
cost of holding cash reserves, and upper bound of deposit price under deposit insurance 
scheme. When individual banks might influence product price, economies of scale 
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might allow banks to offer cheaper prices. Risks associated emission credits are not 
statistically significant in determining intermediation margin.  
 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
In this chapter, the case study of Indonesian banks is used to illustrate the financial 
impact of extending partial liability to environmental and social risk management of 
lending activities and risk of emission credits on banks. Dionne and Spaeter (2003) 
provide comprehensive theoretical setting on the impact of extending partial liability to 
banks. However, the theoretical model is restrictive. Modified dealership model (Allen, 
1988; Valverde and Fernández, 2007) is extended to partial liability of bank in Dionne-
Spaeter (2003) model. 
 
The dealership model in the context of extended partial liability demonstrates how 
social and environmental risk, and uncertainty about emission credits influence wealth 
if banks. Revenue from selling emission credit increases rate of arrival of investment 
and working capital loans for emission abatement projects if the revenue is rerouted to 
banks. Working-capital loans and investment loans for emission abatement technology 
have competitive advantage when immediacy fees and emission credit sales per unit 
investment and working capital loans supersedes operating cost per unit and risk 
premium of the loans. Maturity deposits make banks better off if return in money 
market exceeds average operating cost, and credit and interest rate risk premium of non-
maturity deposits.         
 
Empirical model is estimated on unbalance quarterly panel data of 51 Indonesia banks 
counting for 90% of national credits for sample period 2005 – 2010. Contractual prices 
and size for each bank products is used to avoid potential bias estimation. Selection of 
static model is based on results of Breusch-Pagan test and Hausman test. The estimation 
employs two-way cluster robust standard error to allow correct clustering, 
autocorrelation, and heteroskedasticity in error terms. GMM procedure of Blundell and 
Bond (1997) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction is employed to 
accommodate some banks in the sample that factor past value of intermediation margin 
into current value of intermediation margin. To ensure validity of Hansen’s 
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overidentification test, the instrument set is condensed by collapsing technique in 
Roodman (2009). The dynamic of gross margin, defined as spread between prices of 
earning assets and deposits, is estimated using regression with robust error (HAC). 
Dynamic model is estimated using GMM procedure of Blundell and Bond (1997).  
 
The empirical model results show that pure and gross margin increases with market 
power of banks, degree of risk aversion, opportunity cost of capital charge, expected 
profit margin, and risk premium associated with emission credits, environmental and 
social risk, credit risk and interest rate risk. Pure and gross margin decreases with 
operating cost per unit, deposit insurance premium, opportunity cost of reserve 
requirement, upper bound of deposit price under deposit insurance scheme, and 
opportunity cost of holding cash reserve. In the case that individual banks might freely 
change prices of earning assets, economies of scale allows bank to reduce product 
prices. Thus, intermediation margin might decrease with transaction size. Uncertainty 
about emission credits is also statically insignificant in explaining intermediation 
margin. The small amount of emission credits (i.e. counting for less than 0.022% of 
total operating income of 51 banks) might explain that statistically, the uncertainty 
about emission credits is not significantly influenced pure margin.  
 
Briefly, environmental and social impact of lending activities might matter in pricing 
loans when the internalization of such impact into banks’ risk management process is 
mandatory. The insignificance of the impact of emission credits implies that the lack of 
reference about methodology to assess the impact and mechanism to internalize is likely 
to boost the amount of unpriced benefits and costs. The implication of this finding is 
that statutory approach in managing environmental and social impact of lending 
activities should take into account not only unpriced cost but also unpriced benefit from 
disbursing loans to firms. Otherwise, risk associated with unpriced benefit is overlooked 
and banks overestimate debts service of borrowing firms. The second important point is 
that environmental and social risk rating such as risk rating published by Ministry of 
Environment focuses on environmentally and socially sensitive sectors. In reality, all 
economic sectors such as telecommunication might have environmental and social 
footprints or assume indirect environmental and social risk. If the indirect risk takes 
form reputational risk or risk of loosing potential buyers and suppliers, then the risks 
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should be factored into loan prices. Thirdly, Labatt and White (2002)’s findings that 
only a small number of banks lend to GHG abatement project because many banks lack 
of knowledge about price formation of CER might not be completely true. Maturity 
profile of deposit portfolio might matter in asset selection. In Indonesia case, the more 
non-maturity deposit is raised, the less deposit is invested in loans. Additionally, 
monetary policy to control inflation might be contra productive if deposit insurance in a 
country imposes upper bound for deposit price that does not mimic the dynamics of 
policy rates. All banks in the sample factor in LPS’s upper bound of deposit price into 
cost of fund, which is transmitted into prices of bank’s products.    
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CHAPTER 5 CONSLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
 
 
This chapter critically discusses findings of thesis for internalization of emission credits, 
environmental risk, and social impact of lending activities. The chapter is structured as 
follows: in section 5.1, the main findings of the thesis are summarized; section 5.2 
discusses the implications of the findings, the shortcoming of the findings, and further 
research are discussed.  
 
 
5.1. Summary of Main Findings 
This thesis addresses the growing demand for assessing and mitigating environmental 
and social impact of lending activities. There has been evidence that the UK, EU, and 
USA where assessing and mitigating such impact is not mandatory, banks fail to 
integrate the impact to each stage of their risk management (Rhee and Lee, 2003; 
Thomson and Crowton, 2004; Köllner et al, 2004; McKenzie and Wolfe, 2004; Weber 
et al 2008; Chave, 2010). Thus, case study in integrating environmental and social 
impact of lending activities is barely found. Even literatures in environmental 
economics concentrate on theoretical setting for internalizing negative impact of 
production and consumption process to the environment. Doubt therefore exists the 
explicit considerations of the risk-return on lending to projects generating emission 
credits together with environmental and social impact of lending. 
 
This thesis provides empirical evidence about the necessity of government intervention 
to enforce banks to manage environmental and social impact of their lending activities. 
Reference about assessment and pricing methodology has allowed banks in Indonesia to 
link environmental and social performance of borrowing firms and loan prices. This 
thesis also indentifies an urgent need to improve statutory approach in Indonesia to 
ensure unpriced benefits and costs of production and consumption process are counted 
in loan prices. Specifically, risk-return on environmental and social impact that is 
tradable such as emission credits should be taken into account in the guidelines for 
assessing and pricing environmental and social impact of lending activities. The thesis 
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also gives an sight to bank practitioners about what they should understand before 
disbursing loan to firms generating emission credits. 
 
5.1.1. Dynamics of CER prices 
In Indonesia context, the only market available to trade externalities is international 
Emission Trading System (ETS) for trading Certified Emission Reduction (CER). CER 
is sold by firms reducing greenhouse gases (GHG)18 emission to firms emitting GHG 
excessively in developed countries. A small number of banks estimates revenue from 
selling CER and risk associated with CER trading. 
 
Estimation of risk associated with CER trading is carried out by investigation factors 
influencing CER spot prices at Bluenext from August 12, 2008 to May 31, 2011. The 
use of spot price eliminates the effect of project risk that has been captured in the credit 
risk of lending activities. Vector autoregressive moving-average processes with 
exogenous regressors (VARMAX) procedure is used to allow interdependency of the 
variables and for exogenous shocks. This has been a critical issue in the empirical 
investigation prices of emission credits. Previous works concerning macroeconomic 
effects on EUA future prices indicate bidirectional causality between some variables. 
The technique is also not theoretic which can be used when theory does not yield a clear 
prediction, but its estimated parameters have structural interpretation and economic 
meaning. Exogenous variables considered in VARAMAX (4,0,3) are extreme cold 
temperature, extreme hot temperature, and changes in climate policy. Endogenous 
variables in the system are CER and EUA spot prices, 11 variables as proxies of cost of 
switching technology and business cycle in the EU-27 )EU-27 is the biggest CER 
buyers in the world). 
 
The results somewhat do not support conclusion in Mansanet-Bataller et al (2011) and 
Chevallier (2011) who used future prices of CER and EAU. Using CER spot prices 
eliminates the effect of project risk and convenience yield, and shows the same effect of 
economic expansion in the EU-27 on EUA and CER prices. Economic expansion 
increase emission production which in turn boosts demand on EUA and CER. On the 
                                                             
18 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) classified six GHG emitted from production and 
consumption process as triggers of climate changes such as overlong draught and extreme winter. GHG 
emission abatement is argued to be the most important measure to mitigate climate change (IPCC, 2001). 
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other hand, CER and EUA respond differently to the shocks to the economy. A jump in 
sCER prices moves up price adjusted output and prices of goods acquired by household. 
A jump in EUA prices however put pressure on price adjusted output and prices of 
goods acquired by household. Interdependent relationship between EUA and CER 
exists. EUA responds negatively to the shocks to CER and vice versa. This implies that 
demand on one emission credits influences demand on another emission credit.  
 
Extreme weather and changes in climate policy are not significant in the price dynamics 
of emission credits. EUA and sCER prices respond positively to technology shocks, 
suggesting that equilibrium price for emission credit mimic dynamics of fuel switching 
cost. Another important finding is that clean dark spread and clean spark spread are 
most important in the fluctuation of electricity prices. Further, technology shocks put 
pressure on electricity prices shocks while shocks to emission credits are fully passed on 
electricity buyers. Economic expansion expectedly moves up demand on electricity up 
and energy prices which is translated into higher fuel switching cost. 
 
5.1.2. The implication of risk-return in fund raising and portfolio effect 
In April 2001, a banking survey was carried out on 66 banks, representing 97% of 
total loans in the country. The survey identified pricing methodology and 
parameters to price banks’ products. The results show that prices of bank products 
are determined by costs of loanable fund and expected profit. Costs of loanable fund 
comprise cost of fund, risk premium, and opportunity cost associated with regulatory 
capital and cash reserves. Cost of fund is composed of deposit prices, operating costs, 
deposit insurance premium, upper bound of prices for deposits under mandatory deposit 
insurance.  
 
Another finding is that banks have been required to measure and price 
environmental and social risk of borrowing firms. Ministry of Environment 
provides environment and social risk rating as main reference. The risk rating 
tracks how important community development in firms’ corporate social responsibility 
initiatives, and how well firms in reducing, reusing, recycling, and recovering wastes or 
pollutants. Therefore, risk rating is the basis to set provision that absorbs expected cost 
to clean up social and environmental damage. The loss provision is transmitted to loan 
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prices of the associated borrowers (Bank Indonesia, 2005). Clearly, the regulation 
does not comprise risk-return on loans generating tradable externalities. 
 
5.1.3. The impact of CER risk-return, environmental risk, and social impact of 
lending activities on loan prices and supply 
Theoretical construct that represents the internalization of emission credit as well as 
environmental and social risk of lending activities is tested on unbalanced quarterly data 
of 51 banks in Indonesia. Aside from the three factors, other factors found in survey are 
included in the model. The survey found that prices of bank products are determined by 
costs of loanable fund and expected profit. Costs of loanable fund comprise cost of 
fund, risk premium, and opportunity cost associated with regulatory capital and cash 
reserves. Cost of fund is composed of deposit prices, operating costs, deposit insurance 
premium, upper bound of prices for deposits under mandatory deposit insurance. The 
assumption about deposits in Ho-Saunder’s (1981) is relaxed by classifying deposits 
into maturity and non-maturity deposits. Maturity deposits are composed of term 
deposits and saving with lock-up period while non-maturity deposits consist of demand 
deposit and savings.    
 
Pure margin and gross margin are proxies for net price of bank’s products and the basis 
to investigate the impact of risk and other factors on prices. Pure margin is the spread 
between loan and deposit price. Gross margin is defined as spread between price of 
earning asset and deposit price. Least square with two-way cluster robust standard 
errors is used to correct heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in error terms, and 
correct possible correlation within a cluster by two-way cluster robust standard errors 
(Cameron et al, 2009). Breusch-Pagan test and Hausman test are employed to identify 
whether fixed effect or random effect present. Aside from least square, system GMM of 
Blundell and Bond (1997) is another technique that has been employed to accommodate 
survey findings. Some banks take into account spread between deposit and loan prices 
in the previous quarters while others do not. The instrument set of system GMM is 
condensed by using collapsing technique proposed by Roodman (2009). Thus, J-
statistics overidentifying restriction is valid. Following Windmeijer’s (2005) finite 
sample correction, VCE is adjusted to correct heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
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error terms as well as downward bias of two-step VCE sourced from large number of 
instruments.  
 
The results confirm the theoretical model for internalization. Pure and gross margin 
increases with market power of banks, degree of risk aversion, opportunity cost of 
capital charge, expected profit margin, and risk associated with CER, environmental 
and social risk, credit risk and interest rate risk. The margin decreases with operating 
cost per unit, deposit insurance premium, opportunity cost of reserve requirement, upper 
bound of deposit price under deposit insurance scheme, and opportunity cost of holding 
cash reserve. Pure margin decreases with loan size indicating that economies of scale in 
lending activities allow banks to offer low loan prices. However, banks are price takers 
in capital markets. Expectedly, the higher is the size of earning assets such as bonds, the 
higher gross margin is. Bank’s market power and uncertainty about CER is statically 
insignificant in explaining variation in intermediation margin. The possible explanation 
is that revenue from selling CER counts for less than 0.022% of total operating income 
of 51 banks.  
 
The estimation of arrival rate of each product considers correlation within cluster. There 
are 7 clusters i.e. state owned banks, local banks having international operation, local 
banks without to international money markets, branches of foreign banks heavily 
depending on non-loan business activities, branches of foreign banks heavily depending 
on lending activities, subsidiaries of international banks heavily depending on non-loan 
business activities, subsidiaries of international banks heavily depending on lending 
activities, and subsidiaries of non-bank international financial institutions.  
 
In all cases, Poisson regression yields estimates with variance higher than the mean. 
Thus, the rate of arrival of each product is estimated by using negative binomial 
regression with fixed effect and Cameron and Triverdi’s (1985) Pseudo Poisson. The 
standard error of Pseudo Poisson is robust to clustering by bank ownerships. Both 
estimators negate overdispersion problem, but information criterion and negative log 
likelihood indicate that negative binomial with fixed effect is good fit to data. 
Nonetheless, the use of pseudo-Poisson might reduce bias estimation since the 
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regression produces high standard errors of coefficients and diminishes significance of 
some coefficients.   
 
 
5.2. Implications, Limitation and Further Research  
The presence of fungibility EUA and CER are strong. This means that assessing and 
managing risk of lending to projects generating CER requires good estimation about the 
state of EUA market. In other word, banks should understand the direction business 
cycle and the states of installation and power plants operators in the member states of 
EU ETS in the near future. The fungibility also implies substitution effect of emission 
credits traded in ETS outside EU such as Australian and Canadian emission credits 
needs to be taken into account. Such emission credits are perfect substitute for CER, 
hence, influencing demand and prices of CER. Further research needs to be devoted on 
the impact of ETS-liking directives that allows CER, and ERU import to each ETS and 
whether import limit on CER such as the EU ETS policy influences prices of CER and 
ERU.  
 
It is important to note that this work tests statutory approach in internalizing emission 
credits as well as environmental and social risk in lending activities in Indonesia. It does 
not relate investigate the impact of the amount invested by borrowers to prevent from 
environmental and social impact to debt service and default risk exposure of borrowers. 
Although the amount invested in preventive investment might not move in accordance 
with environmental and social performance of borrowers. The more important point is 
that regulation does not enforce banks to capture tradable externalities such as CER. 
Internalizing tradable externalities should be considered in the regulation to price 
correctly all benefits and costs in lending activities. Another important point is that 
cross price subsidy among bank’s product might present. The conclusion is drawn from 
the results that opportunity cost of cash reserve and regulatory capital, expected profit 
margin, implicit interest rate, and degree of risk aversion are statistically significant in 
explaining variation in gross margin but not statistically significant in explaining pure 
margin. Thus, regulation that tightens loan supply by increasing capital charge and 
liquidity reserve requirement might not be effectual since the opportunity cost of capital 
charge might be transmitted into prices of non-loan products. 
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The implication of the abovementioned findings is that statutory approach in managing 
environmental and social impact of lending activities should take into account not only 
unpriced cost but also unpriced benefit from disbursing loans to firms. Otherwise, risk 
associated with unpriced benefit is overlooked and banks overestimate debts service of 
borrowing firms. The second important point is that environmental and social risk rating 
such as risk rating published by Ministry of Environment focuses on environmentally 
and socially sensitive sectors. In reality, all economic sectors such as 
telecommunication might have environmental and social footprints or pose indirect 
environmental and social risk. If the indirect risk takes form reputational risk or risk of 
loosing potential buyers and suppliers, then the risks should be factored into loan prices. 
Thirdly, Labatt and White (2002)’s findings that only a small number of banks lend to 
GHG abatement project because many banks lack of knowledge about price formation 
of CER might not be completely true. Maturity profile of deposit portfolio might matter 
in asset selection. In Indonesia case, the more non-maturity deposit is raised, the less 
deposit is invested in loans. Additionally, monetary policy to control inflation might be 
contra productive if deposit insurance in a country imposes upper bound for deposit 
price that does not mimic the dynamics of policy rates. All banks in the sample factor in 
LPS’s upper bound of deposit price into cost of fund, which is transmitted into prices of 
bank’s products.    
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Appendix A Estimates of conditional mean equation of cointegrated VARMAX(4,0,3) 
 
 
 Sample (adjusted): 6 753
 Included observations: 748 after adjustments
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
cpit-1 1 0 0
ipit-1 0 1 0
euat-1 0 0 1
cert-1 -1.378443 -10.76673 -2.014044
-0.32763 -2.4214 -0.3686
[-4.20733] [-4.44649] [-5.46404]
cdst-1 0.024093 -0.195052 -0.017479
-0.05834 -0.43118 -0.06564
[ 0.41297] [-0.45236] [-0.26630]
cdsot-1 -3.025465 -25.56311 -1.531217
-0.98685 -7.29348 -1.11026
[-3.06578] [-3.50492] [-1.37915]
ogt-1 -0.090708 -0.108674 0.132648
-0.0746 -0.55136 -0.08393
[-1.21590] [-0.19710] [ 1.58044]
csst-1 -0.022551 -0.062719 -0.01745
-0.02083 -0.15394 -0.02343
[-1.08266] [-0.40742] [-0.74464]
cgt-1 -0.060105 -0.387609 -0.03841
-0.02822 -0.20856 -0.03175
[-2.12997] [-1.85854] [-1.20985]
epit-1 -0.165076 -1.082149 -0.184201
-0.05926 -0.43795 -0.06667
[-2.78573] [-2.47092] [-2.76296]
1 -0.008736 -0.057931 -0.009379
-0.0025 -0.01851 -0.00282
[-3.48825] [-3.12985] [-3.32870]
C 10.56762 69.51785 12.15969
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1 CointEq2 CointEq3
Sample (adjusted): 753 
Included observations: 748 after adjustment 
Standard errors in the 2nd row, t-statistics in [ ] 
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 Appendix B Estimates of error correction of cointegrated VARMAX(4,0,3) 
( ): standard error 
[ ]: t-statistics 
 
 
Error Correction: Δcpi Δipi Δeua Δcer Δcds Δcdso Δog Δcss Δcg Δepi
Coint Eq1 -0.3082 -0.2485 0.0125 0.0201 0.2428 0.0020 -0.1037 0.4717 0.0946 0.2675
(0.0384) (0.1886) (0.0205) (0.0165) (0.0426) (0.0066) (0.0426) (0.2241) (0.0688) (0.2064)
[-0.6127] [-1.3179] [8.0181] [1.2205] [1.1516] [0.3071] [-2.4337] [2.1042] [1.3756] [1.2959]
Coint Eq2 -0.0077 -0.4612 0.0153 0.0127 0.1167 -0.0033 0.0098 0.1034 -0.0091 0.1301
(0.0115) (0.0566) (0.0061) (0.0049) (0.0633) (0.0020) (0.0128) (0.0673) (0.0206) (0.0619)
[-0.6646] [-.2.4945] [-8.1510] [-2.5760] [1.8441] [-1.6467] [0.7676] [1.5377] [-0.4429] [2.1010]
Coint Eq3 0.2589 3.3364 -0.0884 -0.0608 -0.3242 0.0206 0.0189 -0.5152 -0.1227 -0.3862
(0.0933) (0.4571) (0.0497) (0.0400) (0.5118) (0.0161) (0.1035) (0.0544) (0.1669) (0.0501)
[1.5196] [1.7782] [-7.2893] [-2.7747] [-0.6335] [1.2760] [0.1823] [-0.9470] [-0.7354] [-0.7709]
Δcpit-1 -0.3473 -0.5817 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0068 0.0000 0.0044 -0.0091 -0.0871 0.0033
(0.0231) (0.0961) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0084) (0.0011) (0.0031) (0.0186) (0.0786) (0.0048)
[-15.0235] [-6.0509] [-0.4359] [-0.2274] [0.8052] [0.0390] [1.3911] [-0.4871] [-1.1082] [0.6945]
Δipit-1 0.0077 -0.4588 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0083 -0.0075 -0.0007
(0.0041) (0.0265) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0043) (0.0144) (0.0011)
[1.8807] [-17.3018] [-0.0724] [-0.2377] [-0.0484] [1.2645] [-0.0938] [-1.9265] [-0.5226] [-0.6372]
Δeuat-1 -11.8739 49.1254 0.2982 0.3162 -5.8297 -0.4733 -1.0316 -19.8331 18.5670 -0.8899
(0.5759) (0.3389) (0.5411) (0.5118) (0.2062) (0.4825) (0.1107) (0.0835) (0.2475) (0.1769)
[-2.0615] [1.4495] [0.5511] [0.6178] [-2.8270] [-0.9809] [-0.9315] [-2.3724] [0.7501] [-0.5029]
Δcert-1 1.6531 2.5525 0.0945 0.0620 -1.3072 0.0315 -0.5175 5.1540 -0.5175 -0.5417
(0.2177) (0.1139) (0.1613) (0.1663) (0.0786) (0.1611) (0.3511) (0.2474) (0.8723) (0.5525)
[0.7592] [0.2241] [0.5861] [0.3731] [-1.6621] [0.1956] [-1.4738] [2.0836] [-0.0593] [-0.9804]
Δcdst-1 0.0357 -0.4210 -0.0023 -0.0007 -0.8248 -0.0024 -0.0003 0.0481 0.1357 -0.0068
(0.0275) (0.1608) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0424) (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0291) (0.1197) (0.0075)
[1.2983] [-2.6174] [-1.1314] [-0.3564] [-19.4690] [-1.2788] [-0.0683] [1.6532] [1.1330] [-0.9040]
Δcdsot-1 -14.3188 31.7062 0.3828 0.0007 -4.4211 -0.9653 -0.9218 -27.6680 15.1726 -0.1356
(0.0590) (0.3449) (0.5646) (0.0020) (2.0666) (0.5479) (0.1177) (0.0905) (0.2395) (0.1822)
[-2.4249] [0.9192] [0.6780] [0.3564] [-2.1393] [-1.7618] [-0.7829] [-3.0567] [0.6332] [-0.0744]
Δogt-1 1.2544 0.7130 0.1531 0.1615 0.6519 0.2326 0.0783 3.7906 2.0211 -0.1112
(0.7633) (0.4343) (0.0783) (0.0657) (0.3205) (0.0747) (0.1570) (0.1372) (0.3135) (0.2261)
[1.6433] [0.17287] [1.9546] [2.4593] [2.0339] [3.1109] [0.4990] [2.7624] [0.6446] [-0.4920]
Δcsst-1 -0.0221 -0.1091 -0.0022 -0.0034 -0.0346 -0.0040 0.0018 -0.3167 0.2032 -0.0048
(0.0179) (0.1081) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0067) (0.0016) (0.0031) (0.0461) (0.0703) (0.0055)
[-1.2352] [-1.0087] [-1.4345] [-2.5690] [-5.2024] [-2.5360] [0.5717] [-6.8627] [2.8920] [-0.8700]
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Error Correction: Δcpi Δipi Δeua Δcer Δcds Δcdso Δog Δcss Δcg Δepi
Δcgt-1 0.0010 0.2615 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0317 0.0005 -0.0034 0.0048 -0.0122 0.0161
(0.0186) (0.1117) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0071) (0.0015) (0.0036) (0.0234) (0.0692) (0.0058)
[0.5126] [2.3411] [-0.0954] [-06530] [4.4947] [0.3642] [-0.9224] [0.2069] [-0.1764] [2.7629]
Δepit-1 -1.8166 8.7417 -0.0843 -2.5182 -0.2612 -0.1869 -0.1395 -2.5182 3.6938 0.4961
(0.7035) (0.5056) (0.0711) (0.1021) (0.4705) (0.0733) (0.1493) (0.1021) (0.3121) (0.2371)
[-2.5820] [1.7287] [-1.1868] [-2.4673] [-0.5552] [-2.5502] [-0.9338] [-2.4672] [1.1835] [2.0924]
Δepit-2 -1.9903 18.2530 -0.0586 -0.9501 -0.8180 -0.1345 -0.0724 -0.9501 4.9261 0.3566
(0.6354) (0.4533) (0.0621) (0.8655) (0.4076) (0.0664) (0.1351) (0.8655) (0.2662) (0.2051)
[-3.1322] [4.0260] [-0.9443] [-1.0977] [-2.0070] [-2.0252] [-0.5356] [-1.0977] [1.8501] [1.7383]
Δcgt-2 0.0403 0.1163 0.0001 0.0082 0.0341 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0082 -0.0028 0.0120
(0.0173) (0.0962) (0.0015) (0.0201) (0.0064) (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0201) (0.0547) (0.0049)
[2.3335] [1.2085] [0.0726] [0.4054] [5.3195] [0.4041] [-0.0851] [0.4054] [-0.0516] [2.4423]
Δcsst-2 0.0094 -0.3698 -0.0049 -0.1286 -0.0221 -0.0055 0.0026 -0.1286 0.0957 0.0074
(0.0153) (0.0982) (0.0013) (0.0353) (0.0096) (0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0353) (0.0659) (0.0056)
[0.6140] [-3.7669] [-3.6235] [-3.6479] [-2.3112] [-3.7162] [0.8323] [-3.6479] [1.4510] [1.3174]
Δogt-2 2.3002 -9.5687 0.0960 1.9436 0.8864 0.1667 0.0726 1.9436 1.0333 -0.0926
(0.7310) (3.8208) (0.0689) (0.1139) (0.2913) (0.0702) (0.1375) (0.1139) (0.2874) (0.2009)
[3.1467] [-2.5044] [1.3926] [1.7056] [3.0423] [2.3761] [0.5276] [1.7056] [0.3595] [-0.4610]
Δcdsot-2 -18.8922 91.1574 -0.2772 -11.4518 -6.5327 -0.7480 -0.9997 -11.4518 9.6443 0.3555
(0.5442) (0.3109) (0.0495) (0.0761) (0.2028) (0.5140) (0.1055) (0.7610) (0.2191) (0.1639)
[-3.4713] [2.9323] [-05600] [-1.5048] [-3.2216] [-1.4551] [-0.9472] [-1.5047] [0.4402] [0.2169]
Δcdst-2 0.0984 -0.5702 -0.0040 -0.0055 -0.1654 -0.0040 -0.0037 -1.0055 0.2527 -0.0042
(0.0286) (0.1499) (0.0021) (0.0322) (0.0376) (0.0021) (0.0054) (0.0322) (0.1138) (0.0077)
[3.4392] [-3.8026] [-1.8553] [-0.1718] [-4.4011] [-1.9195] [-0.6737] [-0.1718] [2.2200] [-0.5420]
Δcert-2 -0.7946 -7.6627 -0.1204 6.6991 -1.0868 0.0532 -0.6754 6.6991 0.0177 -0.4897
(0.1934) (0.1036) (0.1500) (0.2114) (0.6398) (0.1494) (0.3082) (0.2114) (0.7530) (0.4902)
[-0.4108] [-0.7395] [-0.8025] [3.1683] [-1.6985] [0.3559] [-2.1916] [3.1683] [0.0024] [-0.9989]
Δcpit-2 -0.1879 -0.4532 -0.0007 -0.0622 0.0024 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0622 0.0423 -0.0026
(0.0169) (0.0796) (0.0014) (0.0214) (0.0076) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0214) (0.0615) (0.0047)
[-11.1233] [-5.6921] [-0.5116] [-2.9079] [0.3207] [0.4562] [-0.7006] [-2.9079] [0.6874] [-0.5602]
Δipit-2 -0.0042 -0.2784 -0.0003 -0.0081 -0.0053 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0081 0.0347 -0.0003
(0.0043) (0.0255) (0.0003) (0.0046) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0046) (0.0146) (0.0010)
[-0.9660] [-10.9035] [-1.0209] [-1.7610] [-0.3676] [-1.5654] [-0.0783] [[-1.7610] [2.3705] [-0.3059]
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Error Correction: Δcpi Δipi Δeua Δcer Δcds Δcdso Δog Δcss Δcg Δepi
Δeuat-2 17.9673 -80.2556 0.1888 4.9319 7.2562 0.4733 1.2528 4.9319 -5.5432 0.4041
(0.5442) (0.3081) (0.4652) (0.6978) (0.1957) (0.4825) (0.1001) (0.6977) (0.2250) (0.1548)
[-3.4713] [-2.6051] [0.4058] [0.7068] [3.7079] [0.9809] [1.2514] [0.7068] [-0.2463] [0.2610]
Δeaut-3 15.8611 -38.9002 0.0240 -0.6869 4.9912 0.4733 0.9157 -0.6869 2.7506 -0.3848
(0.4779) (0.2893) (0.3862) (0.6104) (0.1848) (0.4825) (0.8812) (0.6104) (0.0958) (0.1354)
[3.3187] [-1.3446] [0.0621] [-0.1125] [2.7006] [0.9809] [1.0391] [-0.1125] [0.1404] [-0.2842]
Δcpit-3 0.0335 -0.2629 0.0001 0.0286 -0.0022 0.0005 -0.0038 0.0286 0.0463 -0.0029
(0.0218) (0.0931) (0.0013) (0.0199) (0.0073) (0.0011) (0.0030) (0.0200) (0.0526) (0.0046)
[1.5353] [-2.8232] [0.0858] [1.4320] [-0.3070] [0.4562] [-1.2518] [1.4320] [0.8810] [-0.6348]
Δipit-3 0.0038 -0.1310 0.0001 -0.0077 -0.0015 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0077 0.0290 -0.0009
(0.0043) (0.0241) (0.0003) (0.0042) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0042) (0.0158) (0.0012)
[0.8813] [-5.4440] [0.3534] [-1.8345] [-1.1020] [0.3018] [1.0043] [-18344] [1.8338] [-0.7289]
Δcert-3 -2.9614 -29.2081 -0.0565 5.6912 -1.1434 0.1864 -0.3874 5.6912 2.1898 -0.2564
(0.1731) (0.0934) (0.1367) (0.1738) (0.5059) (0.1302) (0.2757) (0.1738) (0.6444) (0.4463)
[-1.7102] [-3.1253] [-0.4133] [3.2741] [-2.2600] [1.4316] [-1.4052] [3.2741] [0.3398] [-0.5745]
Δcdst-3 0.0722 -0.4938 -0.0019 0.0506 -0.2205 -0.0022 -0.0022 0.0506 0.2312 -0.0142
(0.0275) (0.1595) (0.0023) (0.3361) (0.0270) (0.0023) (0.0052) (0.0336) (0.1129) (0.0083)
[2.6278] [-3.0952] [-0.7896] [1.5068] [-9.1527] [-0.9334] [-0.4266] [1.5068] [2.0478] [-1.7097]
Δcdsot-3 -14.9087 76.9970 0.0135 -3.2748 -4.0222 -0.2758 -0.9072 -3.2748 0.1621 1.0119
(0.4918) (0.2823) (0.4137) (0.6717) (0.1958) (0.4248) (0.0949) (0.6717) (0.1991) (0.1418)
[-3.0314] [2.7279] [0.0326] [-0.4875] [-2.0542] [-0.6493] [-0.9554] [-0.4875] [0.0081] [0.7138]
Δogt-3 1.8628 -8.8065 0.0112 0.6891 0.4134 0.0651 0.1216 0.6891 0.9502 -0.1203
(0.6713) (0.3552) (0.0588) (0.1026) (0.2808) (0.0599) (0.1227) (0.1026) (0.2693) (0.1785)
[2.7749] [-2.4793] [0.1911] [0.6713] [1.4722] [1.0867] [0.9905] [1.0265] [0.3529] [-0.6741]
Δcsst-3 0.0251 -0.6287 -0.0025 -0.1045 -0.0266 -0.0043 -0.0023 -0.1045 0.0180 0.0052
(0.0178) (0.1105) (0.0015) (0.0287) (0.0086) (0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0287) (0.0653) (0.0058)
[1.4104] [-5.6906] [-1.7187] [-3.6404] [-3.0984] [-2.6901] [-0.6745] [-3.6404] [0.2754] [0.8918]
Δcgt-3 0.0323 0.1203 0.0004 -0.0070 0.0209 0.0001 0.0013 -0.0070 0.0288 0.0083
(0.0158) (0.0868) (0.0014) (0.0168) (0.0058) (0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0168) (0.0465) (0.0041)
[2.0485] [1.3863] [0.2908] [-0.4183] [3.5993] [0.0932] [0.4335] [-0.4183] [0.6181] [2.0179]
Δepit-3 -1.7001 18.6921 -0.0481 -0.0385 -0.1351 -0.0960 -0.0778 -0.0385 2.6543 0.3921
(0.5581) (0.3815) (0.0468) (0.0776) (0.3536) (0.0522) (0.1149) (0.0777) (0.2301) (0.1637)
[-3.0462] [4.8995] [-1.0270] [-0.0495] [-0.3820] [-1.8379] [-0.6768] [-0.0495] [1.1531] [2.3959]
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Error Correction: Δcpi Δipi Δeua Δcer Δcds Δcdso Δog Δcss Δcg Δepi
Δipit-4 0.0012 -0.1310 0.0001 0.0003 0.0021 0.0001 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0055 0.0009
(0.0036) (0.0241) (0.0003) (0.0036) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0036) (0.0153) (0.0010)
[0.3361] [-6.6345] [0.3251] [0.0753] [1.9870] [0.3018] [1.0415] [0.0753] [-0.3602] [0.8878]
Δcpit-4 -0.0612 -0.0867 0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0116 0.0008 -0.0018 -0.0012 -0.0207 -0.0009
(0.0148) (0.0857) (0.0012) (0.0193) (0.0092) (0.0012) (0.0034) (0.0193) (0.0575) (0.0048)
[-4.1242] [-1.0109] [0.7000] [-0.0618] [-1.2639] [0.6433] [-0.5212] [-0.0618] [-0.3606] [-0.1944]
Δeuat-4 8.9166 -32.3842 -0.4169 -1.0603 0.9937 -0.6113 0.0581 -1.0603 21.0873 -0.6850
(0.3816) (0.2442) (0.3060) (0.5117) (1.0067) (0.2917) (0.0741) (0.5117) (0.1666) (0.1118)
[2.3363] [-1.3260] [-1.3624] [-0.2072] [0.9871) [-2.0954] [0.0784] [-0.2072] [1.2660] [-0.6126]
Δcert-4 -2.0585 -22.7679 0.0662 3.4972 4.2390 0.1599 -0.3431 3.4972 2.2705 -0.0008
(0.1435) (0.0762) (0.1128) (0.1417) (0.1609) (0.1099) (0.2161) (0.1417) (0.5642) (0.3916)
[-1.4348] [-2.9877] [0.5870] [2.4676] [2.6346] [1.4540] [-1.5879] [2.4675] [0.4024] [-0.0020]
Δcdst-4 -0.0086 -0.0235 -0.0020 0.0268 -0.2915 -0.0041 -0.0018 0.0268 0.3274 0.0034
(0.0241) (0.1689) (0.0022) (0.0278) (0.0309) (0.0021) (0.0059) (0.0278) (0.1012) (0.0057)
[-0.3589] [-0.1392] [0.9196] [0.9665] [-9.4384] [-2.0087] [-0.3096] [0.9665] [3.2343] [0.5980]
Δcdsot-4 -8.4548 60.5794 0.3587 -2.2428 -3.5813 0.4708 0.1053 -2.2428 -20.6664 0.7401
(0.4011) (0.2450) (0.3220) (0.5646) (0.1672) (0.3150) (0.7783) (0.5646) (0.1720) (0.1164)
[-2.1076] [2.4725] [1.1142] [-0.3973] [-2.1422] [1.4943] [0.1353] [-0.3972] [-1.2016] [0.6358]
Δogt-4 1.2209 -7.8666 -0.0277 0.8138 0.3975 -0.0434 0.0142 0.8138 3.5731 -0.1159
(0.5567) (3.2306) (0.0451) (0.8459) (0.2346) (0.0469) (0.0987) (0.8459) (2.2744) (0.1504)
[2.1932] [-2.4350] [-06139] [0.9621] [1.6941] [-0.9247] [0.1440] [0.9621] [1.5710] [-0.7704]
Δcsst-4 0.0276 -0.2183 -0.0008 -0.0625 -0.0064 -0.0039 -0.0073 -0.0625 -0.0345 0.0067
(0.0187) (0.1169) (0.0013) (0.0269) (0.0081) (0.0014) (0.0033) (0.0269) (0.0632) (0.0050)
[1.4633] [-1.8669] [-0.6294] [-2.3246] [-0.7939] [-2.7798] [-2.2414] [-2.3246] [-0.5454] [1.3545]
Δcgt-4 0.0065 0.0201 -0.0006 -0.0097 0.0134 -0.0009 0.0004 -0.0097 -0.0198 0.0040
(0.0135) (0.0827) (0.0011) (0.0125) (0.0049) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0125) (0.0436) (0.0034)
[0.4784] [0.2424] [-0.5460] [-0.7778] [2.7305] [-0.8385] [0.1757] [-0.7779] [-0.4540] [1.1786]
Δepit-4 -0.7737 12.2888 -0.0102 0.0336 0.1161 -0.0009 0.0027 0.0336 -3.0303 0.2220
(0.4419) (0.3159) (0.0358) (0.6362) (0.2648) (0.0381) (0.0882) (0.6362) (0.2133) (0.1374)
[-1.7507] [3.8895] [-0.2865] [0.0529] [0.4382] [-0.0248] [0.0302] [0.0529] [-1.4204] [1.6150]
news -0.0400 0.1284 0.0017 0.0074 -0.0428 -0.0041 0.0132 -0.0469 -0.0308 0.0071
(0.0531) (0.2607) (0.0283) (0.0228) (0.2915) (0.0092) (0.0589) (0.3099) (0.0951) (0.2853)
[-0.7521] [0.4926] [0.5847] [0.3256] [-0.1470] [-0.4445] [0.2240] [-0.1513] [-0.3240] [0.0250]
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Error Correction: Δcpi Δipi Δeua Δcer Δcds Δcdso Δog Δcss Δcg Δepi
cdd 0.0014 -0.0760 0.0258 0.0250 0.1272 -0.0071 0.0817 0.3362 -0.0148 0.2575
(0.0530) (0.2600) (0.0282) (0.0227) (0.2907) (0.0092) (0.0588) (0.3091) (0.0950) (0.2846)
[0.0261] [-0.2922] [0.9139] [1.0905] [0.4376] [-0.7771] [1.389] [1.0876] [-0.1565] [0.9046]
hdd 0.0268 2.3140 0.0434 0.0813 1.0207 -0.0057 0.1245 1.1990 0.5458 0.9780
(0.2837) (0.1391) (0.1511) (0.1215) (0.1555) (0.0490) (0.3145) (0.1654) (0.5074) (0.1523)
[0.0945] [1.6631] [0.2867] [0.6591] [0.6561] [-0.1157] [0.3957] [0.7249] [1.0760] [0.6422]
const 0.0044 -0.0432 -0.0367 -0.0336 -0.0719 0.0098 -0.0791 -0.2543 0.0268 -0.2392
(0.0473) (0.2323) (0.0252) (0.0203) (0.2560) (0.0082) (0.0525) (0.2761) (0.0847) (0.2542)
[0.0920] [-0.1860] [-1.4545] [-1.6542] [-0.2767] [1.1938] [-1.5060] [-0.9209] [0.3164] [-0.9407]
R-sq 0.3742 0.4890 0.8924 0.6999 0.6273 0.0562 0.1289 0.4890 0.2169 0.2668
Adj. R-sq 0.3331 0.4397 0.8822 0.6716 0.5913 -0.0380 0.0718 0.4397 0.1427 0.2187
s.e. Reg. 0.3288 0.7024 0.6748 3.3441 0.6240 0.0258 0.1066 0.7024 0.0658 0.3129
F-stat 1.6106 9.9183 87.4627 24.6122 17.4455 0.5964 2.2559 9.9183 2.9218 5.5460
Log. Lik. -204.9800 -440.2949 -409.1544 -1669.9420 -166.7955 1768.8130 637.4500 -440.2949 984.0989 -193.0700
Akaike IC 0.6737 1.4067 1.3170 4.8339 0.6438 -4.7498 -1.5787 1.4067 -2.5693 5.2943
Schwarz IC 0.9639 1.8151 1.7190 5.2359 1.0522 -4.3287 -1.2886 1.8151 -2.1673 5.5844
196 
  
Appendix C Estimates of conditional variance of VARMAX(4,0,3) 
 
 
  
u(t-1)2 u(t-2)2 u(t-3)2 u(t-4)2 c
Δcpi 1.445              0.354               -                    -                 0.017            
(0.144)             (0.070)              -                    -                 (0.003)           
[10.011] [5.079] -                    -                 [4.911]
Δipi 1.942              -                   -                    -                 1.207            
(0.175)             -                   -                    -                 (0.151)           
[11.102] -                   -                    -                 [7.995]
Δeua 0.186              0.115               0.072                0.491            0.027            
(0.053)             (0.043)              (0.029)               (0.085)           (0.004)           
[3.508] [2.673] [2.477] [5.786] [6.770]
Δcer 0.643              -                   -                    -                 0.035            
(0.096)             -                   -                    -                 (0.003)           
[6.704] -                   -                    -                 [12.310]
Δcds 0.449              -                   -                    -                 6.912            
(0.078)             -                   -                    -                 (0.515)           
[5.741] -                   -                    -                 [13.413]
Δcdso 0.142              0.109               0.161                0.283            0.004            
(0.061)             (0.052)              (0.055)               (0.062)           (0.001)           
[2.342] [2.070] [2.923] [4.586] [6.624]
Δog 0.127              0.242               0.090                0.226            0.151            
(0.043)             (0.057)              (0.051)               (0.061)           (0.023)           
[2.969] [4.288] [1.782] [3.715] [6.551]
Δcss 0.117              0.192               0.037                0.195            6.086            
(0.057)             (0.066)              (0.038)               (0.050)           (0.695)           
[2.066] [2.900] [0.989] [3.916] [8.751]
Δcg 0.038              -                   -                    -                 1.085            
(0.041)             -                   -                    -                 (0.042)           
[0.929] -                   -                    -                 [25.614]
-                   -                    -                 
Δepi 0.341              -                   -                    -                 7.422            
(0.070)             -                   -                    -                 (0.500)           
[4.863] -                   -                    -                 [14.844]
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Appendix D Risk Weighted Assets 
Model Size of RWA
a.1. standardized approach Duration x Δyields
a.2. Internal model 12.5 x VaR
b.1. Standardized approach
b.2. Internal model 12.5 x VaR
Basic indicator approach  positive annual 
gross income in the 
last 3 years
a. Without credit insurance 85% of volume
b. With credit insurance
b.1.   State owned credit 
insurance company
20% of volume
b.2. Other credit insurance 
companies:
 b.2.1.) AAA – AA- rated 
firm
20% of volume
b.2.2.) A+ - BBB rated firm 50% of volume
b.2.3.)BB+ - B- firms 75% of volume
b.2.4.)Others 100% of volume
12.5 x net open 
position for each 
currency
(2)  Operational risk weighted assets
(3)  Credit risk weighted assets
Types of risk weighted assets (RWA)
(1)  Market risk 
weighted assets
a.    Interest rate risk
b.   Foreign exchange 
translation risk
Sources: Central Bank of Indonesia 
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Appendix E Questionnaires for banking survey 
 
QUESTIONAIRES 
           
STUDY ON BANK MARGIN AND SUSTAINABLE BANKING 
Shanty Noviantie 
PhD Program in Economics & Finance 
Università degli Studi di Verona, Italy 
            
Q1. Rank financial instruments in which you invest "ST liquidity surplus"1)  in the last 
5 years. Rank the instruments from the most frequently to the less frequently 
you invest in.   
  
1) "ST liquidity surplus": Cash In Flow  > Cash Out Flow, with time to maturity ≤ 1 
month 
            
Q2. Rank financial instruments that you use to fund/cover "ST liquidity shortage"2)  in the 
last 5 years. 
Rank instruments from the most frequently to the less frequently you use.   
  
2) ST liquidity shortage occurs when Cash In Flow  < Cash Out Flow at any hour or 
day, within 1month period 
  
 
  
Q3. Write down your pricing model for loans.  
  Notes:       
  
If your formulation/equation depends on types of loans, write down formulation/equation for 
each type of loans 
 
 
 
Q4. Write down your pricing model for deposits. 
  Notes:       
  If you distinguish the formulation/equation for each type of deposits, write down 
formulation/equation for each type of deposits 
  
    
      
            
           
 
 
Q.5.   What is your institutional structure in Indonesia? 
 (put cross sign (X) in the box next to your answer)  
 
  Branch of a foreign bank 
  Location of the head office (country): 
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  (go to Q8) 
    
  Subsidiary of a foreign company 
  
(notes: if your ultimate shareholder is a foreign company, you belong to this 
class) 
  (go to Q6) 
    
  Local/Indonesian bank 
  (go  to Q16) 
 
Q6. Is your parent company/majority shareholder/ultimate shareholder a foreign bank? 
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer, and fill up associated yellow box) 
  
    Yes 
    
Location of the head office of parent company or majority/ultimate shareholder 
(country): 
      
    (go to Q12) 
      
    No 
    (go to Q7) 
 
Q7. Do you have a sister company which is a foreign bank?  
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer, and fill up associated yellow box) 
  
    Yes 
    Location of sister company (country): 
      
    (go  to Q.) 
      
    No 
    (go  to Q.) 
 
Q8. Does your head office build pricing model in Q3? 
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer) 
  
    Yes 
    (go to Q9) 
      
    No 
                       (go to Q10) 
  Q9. Does your head office build pricing model in Q4? 
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer) 
  
    Yes 
    (go to Q16) 
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    No 
                       (go to Q11) 
 
  Q10. Does the regional office build pricing model in Q3? 
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer, and fill up associated yellow box) 
  
    Yes 
    Location (i.e. Country) of regional office: 
      
    (back  to Q9) 
      
  
 
No 
    (back  to Q9) 
 
 
Q11. Does the regional office build pricing model in Q4? 
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer, and fill up associated yellow box) 
  
    Yes 
    Location (i.e. Country) of regional office: 
      
    (go  to Q16) 
      
  
 
No 
    (go  to Q16) 
 
 
Q12. Does  your parent company/majority shareholder/ultimate shareholder build model in 
Q3? 
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer)  
  
    Yes 
    (go  to 13) 
      
    No 
                      (go to Q14) 
 
Q13. Does  your parent company/majority shareholder/ultimate shareholder build model in 
Q4? 
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer)  
  
    Yes 
    (go  to Q16) 
      
    No 
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                      (go to Q15) 
 
 
Q14. Does your sister company use pricing model in Q3?  
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer) 
 
    Yes  (back  to Q13) 
       No (back  to Q13) 
 
 
Q15. Does your sister company use pricing model in Q4?  
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer) 
 
    Yes (go  to Q16) 
       No (go  to Q16) 
 
 
 
Q16. State variables/factors determining whether or not a project/loan proposal is 
bankable (max. 20 variables/factors)!   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q17. Do you have volume/size threshold for a bankable loan proposal? 
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box next your answer)  
  
    Yes 
      
    No 
    (go to Q19.) 
 
 
Q18. What kind of volume/monetary limit do you adopt?  
  
(put cross sign (X) in the box of your answer, and fill up associated yellow box) 
  
    Lower bound/limit       
    at least as much as (in IDR) ………..    
     
    Range (i.e. Lower & upper bound/limit)       
    ………………………………………………. 
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    Upper bound/limit       
    less than (in IDR) ……………………………….    
 
 
            
 Q19.  Volume of each type of loans as of 31-Dec-2010  
    Working capital lines of credit    IDR ………   
    Seed capital program/start up loans    IDR ………   
    Trade finance    IDR ………   
 
 
Q20. How much have you disbursed annually within period 2005 – 2010, to the 
following projects? 
  Indicate: 
  A: for  "Working capital lines of credit" generating CER      
  B: for  " investment loans" generating CER      
  C: for  "Trade finance" in project generating CER     
  D: for  "Others"     
          
 Q.21 Do you estimate revenue generated from selling CER? 
  
If ‘YES’, gives an example how such revenue is 
factored in loan price     
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